Opinion
Civil Action 20-768-BAJ-SDJ
09-20-2021
DAVID REPATH #484984 v. JAMES LEBLANC, ET AL.
NOTICE
SCOTT D. JOHNSON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Please take notice that the attached Magistrate Judge's Report has been filed with the Clerk of the United States District Court.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), you have fourteen (14) days after being served with the attached Report to file written objections to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations therein. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations within 14 days after being served will bar you, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge which have been accepted by the District Court.
ABSOLUTELY NO EXTENSION OF TIME SHALL BE GRANTED TO FILE WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss filed on behalf of Defendants, Secretary James LeBlanc, Warden Darrell Vannoy, and Saundra Rosso (R. Doc. 14). The Motion is not opposed.
The pro se Plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated at Louisiana State Penitentiary (“LSP”), filed this proceeding against Defendants, complaining that his constitutional rights were violated due to removal of funds from his inmate account without due process. He seeks monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief.
Defendants first seek dismissal on jurisdictional grounds, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against them in their official capacities. In this regard, Defendants are correct that § 1983 does not provide a federal forum for a litigant who seeks monetary damages against either a state or its officials acting in their official capacities, specifically because these officials are not seen to be “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). In addition, in Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991), the United States Supreme Court addressed the distinction between official capacity and individual capacity lawsuits and made clear that a suit against a state official in an official capacity for monetary damages is treated as a suit against the state and is therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 25. Accordingly, Plaintiff's § 1983 claims asserted against Defendants in their official capacities for monetary damages are subject to dismissal.
Turning to Plaintiff's claims that are not subject to dismissal on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity, Defendants next assert, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court clarified the standard of pleading that a plaintiff must meet in order to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Specifically, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, supra, at 555. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, supra, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, supra. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. It follows that, “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.' ” Id. at 679. “Where a Complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.' ” Id. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the Complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Further, “[a] document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed' ... and ‘a pro se Complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.' ” Id. (citation omitted). Notwithstanding, the court need not accept “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation, ” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), or “naked assertions [of unlawful conduct] devoid of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, supra, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following: as part of a plea bargain, Plaintiff pled guilty to violations of Rule 30 and Rule 22 (theft) for removing funds from the account of another offender. At the time of the disciplinary proceedings, it was stated that no restitution was required.
Months later, funds were removed from Plaintiff's account when the Department of Corrections determined that Plaintiff was required to pay restitution. Since the determination was not made as part of a disciplinary or other type of proceeding, Plaintiff was unable to appeal the decision.
Defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity in connection with Plaintiff's claims. The qualified immunity defense is a familiar one and, employing a two-step process, operates to protect public officials who are performing discretionary tasks. Huff v. Crites, 473 F. App'x. 398 (5th Cir. 2012). As enunciated in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the first step in the analysis is to consider whether, taking the facts as alleged in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the defendant's conduct violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Id. at 201. Second, the district court looks to whether the rights allegedly violated were clearly established. Id. This inquiry, the Court stated, is undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad, general proposition. Id. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a constitutional right was clearly established is whether it would have been clear to a reasonable state official that his conduct was unlawful in the situation which he confronted. Id.
Undertaking the qualified immunity analysis, the Court finds that Defendants' motion should be denied in part. Plaintiff's allegations, accepted as true, state a claim for violation of his right to procedural due process.
The 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against deprivations of life, liberty, and property without due process of law. Deprivations may be “random and unauthorized” or made pursuant to policy. The “random and unauthorized” deprivation of property neither violates the Constitution nor states a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when adequate state post-deprivation remedies are available. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). The adequate-state-remedies analysis is not applicable if the deprivation of property results from “established state procedure, rather than random and unauthorized action.” See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-36 (1982).
Defendants ask this Court, without evidence, to determine that Plaintiff was not entitled to a hearing specific to the removal of the funds in his account for restitution purposes as alleged by Plaintiff. The Court cannot, in evaluating a Motion to Dismiss, make such a determination while accepting Plaintiff's allegations as true.
Additionally, in order for a prison official to be found liable under § 1983, the official must have been personally and directly involved in conduct causing an alleged deprivation of an inmate's constitutional rights, or there must be a causal connection between the actions of the official and the constitutional violation sought to be redressed. Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756, 768 (5th Cir. 1983). Any allegation that a defendant is responsible for the actions of subordinate officers or co-employees under a theory of vicarious responsibility or respondeat superior is alone insufficient to state a claim under § 1983. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009), citing Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). See also Bell v. Livingston, 356 F. App'x. 715, 716-17 (5th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that “[a] supervisor may not be held liable for a civil rights violation under any theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability”). Further, in the absence of direct personal participation by a supervisory official in an alleged constitutional violation, an inmate plaintiff must allege that the deprivation of his constitutional rights occurred as a result of a subordinate's implementation of the supervisor's affirmative wrongful policies or as a result of a breach by the supervisor of an affirmative duty specially imposed by state law. Lozano v. Smith, supra, 718 F.2d at 768.
Plaintiff has not alleged that all Defendants were personally or directly involved in removing funds from his account, but it appears that Plaintiff has alleged that one or more Defendants are policy-makers. It further appears that one or more of the Defendants may be the appropriate supervisory official to respond to any order for injunctive relief that may be found to be warranted in this case.
RECOMMENDATION
It is the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 14) be granted, in part, and Plaintiff's claims asserted against Defendants in their official capacities for monetary damages be dismissed, with prejudice. It is further recommended that in all other regards the Motion be denied and that this matter be referred back to the Magistrate Judge for further proceedings herein.