Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-1410, SECTION "L" (1).
July 2, 2004
ORDER REASONS
Before the Court is the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The matter came before the Court with oral argument on June 23, 2004, at 9:00 a.m. The Court orally granted the motion, and now issues its findings.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are the parents of decedent, Peter A. Reneau. On May 22, 2002, police were summoned to the decedent's home address to investigate complaints about the decedent's behavior. Reneau was having a schizophrenic episode and was standing in the backyard between the main house, where his parents lived, and his detached apartment. Officers were advised that he was armed with a machete and holding a female neighbor and a small child hostage in a locked shed.
At 6:30 a.m., multiple members of the New Orleans Police Department ("NOPD") arrived at the scene of the disturbance and heard cries of help from the hostages. Eventually confirming that this was a hostage situation, the officers requested assistance from the Special Weapons and Tactical Unit (SWAT). SWAT members arrived on the scene at approximately 7:40 a.m. and began to set up a perimeter to contain Reneau. While taking up his position, SWAT Officer Stoltz became engaged in a verbal dialogue with Reneau who was standing in the doorway of a shed. Officer Stoltz ordered Reneau to show his hands and come out of the shed. In response, Reneau made threatening remarks to Stoltz, telling him to get off his property and to drop the gun, or Reneau would kill him. During this exchange, the hostages located in an adjacent shed were making intermittent pleas for help. Another SWAT Officer, Crawford, a counter-sniper, positioned himself in the rear room of the main house in order to provide cover for Officer Stoltz.
At approximately 7:49 a.m., Reneau exited the shed, pointed a gun at Stoltz, and advanced toward him. Officer Stoltz yelled at Reneau to put the gun down. When Reneau refused and kept moving forward, Stoltz, believing his life was imminent danger, fired several times at Reneau. Officer Crawford saw Reneau raise his gun and advance toward Stoltz. He heard Stoltz fire his weapon but observed that Reneau continued to advance. At this point, Crawford fired multiple shots at Reneau and killed him. When the police officers approached Reneau, they found that the gun he was pointing was a toy gun. The two hostages were rescued, one of whom was found suffering from a stab wound inflicted earlier by Reneau. These facts are not disputed by the parties.
The Plaintiffs allege that in fatally shooting Peter Reneau, Officers Stoltz and Crawford directly violated the rules and regulations of the NOPD regarding the use of deadly force. More importantly, however, the Plaintiffs claim that the use of deadly force in this case constitutes excessive force in violation of Reneau's civil rights. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs bring a wrongful death action on behalf of their son pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 2315.2. Finally, on their own behalf, the Plaintiffs bring a survival action pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 2315.1 and an action for the deprivation of their rights to parenthood under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In their complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged that Reneau's First, Fourth, Fifth, Eight, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights were violated, as well as his rights arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985(2)(3), 1986, and 1988. Though Plaintiffs assert multiple violations of Reneau's constitutional rights, the basis for each is the Plaintiffs' allegation that the Defendants used excessive force. Claims that law enforcement officers used excessive force are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 204 (2001) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388, 394 (1989). Accordingly, the Court shall not discuss each alleged violation of Reneau's constitutional rights separately, but rather within the framework of its analysis under the Fourth Amendment.
The Plaintiffs also allege that the Defendants deprived them of their rights to parenthood under the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has concluded that " all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force-deadly or not-in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other `seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its `reasonableness' standard. . . ." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (emphasis in original). Thus, the Court shall not consider this cause of action separately, but rather within the framework of its analysis under the Fourth Amendment.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard
Summary judgment will be granted only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions, together with affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. If the party moving for summary judgment demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact "the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Willis v. Roche Biomedical Laboratories, Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995). "[A] dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. To oppose a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant cannot rest on mere allegations or denials but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321-22 (1986).
The burden of demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue is not met by "metaphysical doubt" or "unsubstantiated assertions." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). The Court must "resolve factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party, but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contrary facts." Id. The Court does not, "in the absence of proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts." Id. If the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, no genuine issue exists for trial. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588. Finally, "the mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat a motion for summary judgment; Rule 56 requires that the fact dispute be genuine and material." Willis, 61 F.3d at 315. If the evidence leads to only one reasonable conclusion, summary judgment is proper. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
The Defendants claim that summary judgment is appropriate in this matter because they are entitled to qualified immunity from litigation for their actions because: (1) the actions of Officers Stoltz and Crawford were reasonable and justified under the circumstances; and (2) the officers were acting in the course and scope of their employment.
For their part, the Plaintiffs argue that qualified immunity does not apply because the use of deadly force under the circumstances of this case does not meet the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. For the following reasons, the Court is not persuaded by the Plaintiff's arguments.
The Plaintiff's concede that they do not have sufficient evidence to hold the City of New Orleans liable for the officers' actions under the stringent standards of Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which require proof that municipal policy was the driving force behind the deprivation of a Constitutional right.
B. Qualified Immunity and Excessive Force
The United States Supreme Court has held that the analysis to determine the applicability of qualified immunity is separate and distinct from the question of whether an officer used excessive force. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 197 (2001). Before reaching the question of whether an officer used excessive force, a court must first determine whether that officer is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 200.
Qualified immunity is "an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). The threshold inquiry to determine the availability of qualified immunity is "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?" Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If the facts alleged do not support that a constitutional right could have been violated, then the inquiry ends. Id. However, if a violation could be established, then the court must determine whether the right was clearly established such that a reasonable officer could understand that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id. at 202.
In the case at bar, the Plaintiffs claim that Reneau's right to be free from excessive force was violated. Claims that law enforcement officers used excessive force are analyzed under the Fourth Amendments reasonableness standard. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 204 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388, 394 (1989)). In this Circuit, a plaintiff has a high burden in order to state a claim for excessive force in violation of the Constitution. A plaintiff must allege: "(1) an injury, which (2) resulted directly and only from the use of force that was clearly excessive to the need; and the excessiveness of which was (3) objectively unreasonable." Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 433-34 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Spann v. Rainey, 987 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1993). Deadly force is reasonable when an officer had "probable cause to believe that the suspect pose[d] a threat of serious harm to the officer or to others." Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). In determining whether or not an officer used excessive force, the Court is mindful that "police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
The Plaintiffs assert that the officers knew that Reneau was mentally ill, and, therefore, they should have employed the use of a negotiator before turning to intimidating and forceful SWAT tactics. Failure to do so, according to the Plaintiffs, was unreasonable and caused the situation to escalate. Plaintiffs assert that Officer Stoltz should have known that his actions would be threatening to Reneau and possibly lead to dangerous or violent consequences. The Plaintiffs maintain that Reneau was not armed with a deadly weapon, but with a toy gun that should not have put Officer Stoltz in reasonable fear for his life. Finally, Plaintiffs assert that there is no evidence that the deceased had access to the hostages and, therefore, officers could not reasonably claim that the hostages' lives were in danger.
Whether the Defendants could have employed a better procedure to deal with the decedent is immaterial to the question of whether deadly force was excessive at the moment that the Defendants fired on the decedent. In this situation, the confrontation between Officer Stoltz and Reneau occurred as the SWAT officers were setting up a perimeter so that a negotiation could take place safely. Before officers had the opportunity to complete this precautionary procedure, Reneau pointed a gun at Officer Stoltz from approximately twenty feet away, advanced, and said that he was going to kill him. There is no evidence before the Court to indicate that the Officer Stoltz or anyone else other than Reneau knew that the gun was a toy. The gun looked real and it was reasonable under the circumstances for Officer Stoltz to believe that it was, in fact, real. Under these circumstances, Officer Stoltz had probable cause to believe that his life was in danger. Likewise, Officer Crawford had probable cause to believe that Officer Stoltz's life was in danger. While the death of Peter Reneau is certainly tragic, under the circumstances, the officers reacted in a reasonable and appropriate way.
Given that the Defendants were reasonable in their belief that the decedent posed a threat of serious physical harm to Officer Stoltz, the question of whether the officers had reason to believe that the hostages were also at risk of serious physical harm is irrelevant. Since the use of deadly force was not unreasonable, the Defendants' conduct did not violate the constitutional right to be free from excessive force. The Court finds that the facts alleged do not support that the officers' conduct violated a constitutional right; therefore, the Court need not proceed to second stage of the qualified immunity analysis. Accordingly, the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' Constitutional claims and claims based on federal law.
C. Louisiana Tort Claims
The Plaintiffs also assert state law claims: namely, a wrongful death action on behalf of their deceased son (La. Civ. Code art. 2315.2); and a survival action on their own behalf (La. Civ. Code art. 2315.1). These claims are also based on the Plaintiffs' assertion that the officers used excessive force. Under Louisiana law, the same standard is used in analyzing a state law claim of excessive force as a constitutional claim, namely reasonableness under the circumstances. Kyle v. City of New Orleans, 353 So.2d 969, 973 (La. 1977); Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corporation, 646 So.2d 318, 323 (1994). As the Court has found that the officers acted reasonably under the circumstances, the Plaintiffs state law claims must fail as well.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that summary judgment is appropriate. Accordingly, the Defendants' Motion for summary judgment should be and hereby is GRANTED.