Compare Wietharn v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 820 P.2d 719, 722-23 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991); Hunt v. Sherwin Williams Co., 624 P.2d 489, 492 (Mont. 1981); Renco, Inc. v. Nunn, 474 P.2d 936, 939-40 (Okla. 1970) with Daigle v. Daigle, 505 A.2d 778, 780 (Me. 1986); Moreno v. Las Cruces Glass Mirror Co., 818 P.2d 1217 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 447 A.2d 1116 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982). This is not a case in which the carrier was "willfully ignorant" of the continued use of a medical appliance.

We adopt the rule that a showing of fraud or improper corporate manipulation is necessary before the protection afforded a claimant by § 8-52-105(2) may be overcome. Cf. Renco Inc. v. Nunn, 474 P.2d 936 (Okla. 1970) (since there was evidence of claimant's concealment of injury from insurer, corporate president's claim barred because of failure to provide notice to Division and insurer). Furthermore, we agree with the Panel that, since the record does not show any deliberate conspiracy between claimant and his son to delay reporting the injury, it would not serve any equitable purpose to impute to claimant the employer's failure timely to notify the Division of the injury. To do otherwise would disregard the corporate entity, which we will not lightly undertake. It was employer's statutory responsibility to report the injury, and here the employer, as in many cases, was a corporation.

Our research found only one case in the United States that directly addressed this issue. Under a similar statute, the Montana court in Hunt v. Sherwin Williams Co., 191 Mont. 348, 624 P.2d 489 (1981), held that where claimant failed to give notice of an injury, employer had no actual notice, and employer could not protect itself by investigating and providing treatment, knowledge by claimant did not constitute actual knowledge by the managing agent or superintendent even though claimant was manager of the paint store. Accord Renco, Inc. v. Nunn, 474 P.2d 936 (Okla.1970) (president and manager of corporation acting as both employer and employee, injured at work and selecting his own doctor, without notice to workers compensation insurer, cannot operate to toll one-year statute of limitations).        In the instant case, there is conflicting testimony over the circumstances surrounding the June 20, 1984, accident.

We acknowledge that other jurisdictions have held that where an employer is also acting in a dual capacity as employee, the actual knowledge exception to notice is not satisfied by notice to oneself. See Hunt v. Sherwin Williams Co., 191 Mont. 348, 624 P.2d 489 (1981); see also Nebenhaus v. Lydmark Corp., 79 A.D.2d 804, 435 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1980) (statute which imputes knowledge of employer to insurance carrier does not apply where the injured worker is the president of the employer close corporation and he relies on own knowledge of injury as knowledge of employer); Renco. Inc. v. Nunn, 474 P.2d 936 (Okla. 1970). Further, we understand the basis for these decisions is that the primary reason for requiring notice is to allow an employer and its insurer to protect themselves against fictitious or false claims for workers' compensation.

As a matter of law, therefore, if appellant in fact occupied these dual roles, he is required to discharge the responsibilities of each or suffer the consequence of failing either one. Cf. Renco, Inc. v. Nunn, 474 P.2d 936 (Okla. 1970). Whether he indeed occupied the role of employer — the causative agent for corporate action — is a question of fact, to which, as noted, the "clearly erroneous" standard of Maryland Rule 1086 applies.