Opinion
No. 05-04-01293-CR
Opinion Filed January 30, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F04-19066-SR. Dismissed.
Before Justices MORRIS, BRIDGES, and FRANCIS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
William Joseph Remy appeals his conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child. On appeal, appellant's attorney filed a brief in which he concludes that the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The brief presents a professional evaluation of the record showing why, in effect, there are no arguable grounds to advance. See High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978). Appellant filed a pro se response to counsel's brief. In five grounds, appellant contends there are arguable issues regarding limitations, involuntariness of his plea, and ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant further contends he did not receive adequate access to the record to prepare his pro se response. We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, appellant entered a plea of guilty to the offense and a plea of true to an enhancement paragraph. In accordance with the plea bargain agreement, the trial court assessed the agreed punishment of twenty-two years confinement and a $3,000 fine. In his brief, counsel points out that the trial court's certification of the right of appeal ("CORTA") erroneously states that this case "is not a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has the right of appeal." See Tex.R.App.P. 25.2(a)(2). We are not bound by the trial court's defective CORTA. See Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 614 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005); Saldana v. State, 161 S.W.3d 763, 764 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2005, no pet.). Rule 25.2(a)(2) limits appeals after plea bargains to (1) matters raised by written motion and ruled on before trial and (2) matters appealed with the trial court's permission. See Tex.R.App.P. 25.2(a)(2); Griffin v. State, 145 S.W.3d 645, 647-49 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). Because the record does not show any adverse rulings on pretrial motions nor that the trial court gave appellant permission to appeal, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. See Saldana, 161 S.W.3d at 764; Barcenas v. State, 137 S.W.3d 865, 866 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). See also Woods v. State, 108 S.W.3d 314, 316 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003); Cooper v. State, 45 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001) (interpreting former rule 25.2(b)(3) as precluding ineffective assistance and voluntariness contentions in appeals from negotiated guilty pleas). Regarding the access issue, our record shows the Court ordered the trial court to provide appellant with access to the appellate record and to provide written verification to the Court showing the record had been made available to appellant. In response, the trial court filed a supplemental clerk's record containing a certificate, signed by appellant, showing he was brought to the trial court on March 7 and 8, 2005 and allowed the opportunity to review the short clerk's and reporter's records in this case. Subsequently, appellant filed a motion to extend the time to file his response in which he acknowledged that he had been given access to the record. We conclude, therefore, that there is no merit to appellant's complaint regarding access to the record. We have reviewed the record, counsel's brief, and appellant's pro se response. We agree the appeal is frivolous and without merit. Because there is nothing presented over which we have jurisdiction, we find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal. We dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.