Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, Lisa Hart Cole, Judge., Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. SC057036.
Marcus, Watanabe, Snyder & Dave and David M. Marcus for Defendants and Appellants.
Law Office of Nancy B. Goldstein and Nancy B. Goldstein for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
INTRODUCTION
Defendants SoCal Communication Sites, L.L.C. (SoCal) and its successor LT-WR, L.L.C., appeal from March 9, 2005 and March 25, 2005 post-judgment orders granted by the trial court in favor of plaintiffs Remote Communication Systems, Inc. (RCSI) and Stanley and Clarene Harris (collectively Harris), enforcing a stipulation made by plaintiffs and SoCal which was incorporated into the judgment. We modify the March 25, 2005 order and affirm it as modified, and we affirm the March 9, 2005 order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1999, Harris, SoCal, and other persons owned real property parcels through which Castro Peak Motorway (Castro Motorway) passed as it extended up Latigo Canyon to Castro Peak. The Harris parcel, Assessor Parcel Number (APN) 4464-022-013, was near the peak, and Castro Motorway was the road by which Harris and RCSI could access the parcel. RCSI held a leasehold interest in, and was in possession of, the Harris parcel. SoCal owned APN 4464-022-042, which was located at a lower point along Castro Motorway. RCSI and SoCal were competitors in the telecommunications business. Plaintiffs filed suit against SoCal to quiet title in their interest in Castro Motorway where it crossed SoCal’s parcel and to enjoin SoCal from blocking that portion of Castro Motorway and preventing plaintiffs from accessing the Harris parcel.
On August 1, 2000, the trial court entered judgment pursuant to a stipulation made by plaintiffs and SoCal. Pursuant to the provision entitled “Easement” in the stipulation, defendants granted plaintiffs an easement for ingress and egress over that portion of defendants’ property known as Castro Motorway.
The stipulation also included a provision entitled “Maintenance.” Pursuant to the provision, plaintiffs and defendants agreed they would grade a portion of Castro Motorway that was longer than the easement SoCal granted to plaintiffs over defendants’ property (maintenance area). The cost of the maintenance was to be shared between plaintiffs and defendants.
The “Maintenance” provision states in part: “The owner of the dominant tenement (currently Harris) shall pay to the owner of the servient tenement (currently Socal) the sum of $1000 per annum for the maintenance and upkeep of the road . . . . This sum shall include all road work such as, but not limited to, annual maintenance, storm damage, and construction use/damage. [¶] Should repair or maintenance not be performed by the owner of the servient tenement (currently Socal), then the owner of the dominant tenement (currently Harris) or their designated agent (currently RCSI) shall give written notice of the need to repair or maintain the road, and . . . thereafter may hire the services of a . . . contractor to perform the needed services . . . . [¶] One time per year, . . . the owner of the dominant tenement shall arrange for the grading of the Castro Peak Motorway by a licensed grader, from the gate located at the boundary of parcel 4464 022 016 and parcel 4464 022 019 to the start of the access roadway on the Socal property, the cost of which shall be shared equally . . . .” A reference involving the length of the access road is also included in the “Easement” provision as follows: “No additional gates will be constructed across the access road between the existing gate and the park service property.”
Additionally, the parties included a provision that the trial court would maintain jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 to enforce the stipulation for judgment.
All subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 664.6 provides: “If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”
In 2005, heavy rainfall caused a landslide that blocked the portion of Castro Motorway crossing over APN 4464-022-001 (Parcel 1). Plaintiffs desired to repair Castro Motorway. Defendants prevented plaintiffs’ maintenance efforts by locking a gate and blocking Castro Motorway with vehicles owned by James A. Kay, Jr. (Kay), the principal in both defendant business entities. Neither plaintiffs nor defendants were owners of Parcel 1, and the owners of Parcel 1 were not named as parties in the action resolved by the 2000 stipulation and judgment and the post-judgment proceedings at issue in this appeal.
Apparently, during the period intervening between the entry of judgment and the filing of plaintiffs’ motion, ownership of Parcel 1 had been transferred to Third District Meadowlands, LLC. In their reply brief, defendants assert that Third District Meadowlands, LLC is a company wholly owned by Kay and that the determination of easements over Parcel 1 is the subject of pending litigation in Los Angeles County Superior Court, Case No. BC332586.
Plaintiffs made an ex parte motion pursuant to section 664.6 requesting the trial court to grant an order to allow plaintiffs to repair Castro Motorway on Parcel 1. Defendants were the only named parties in the litigation and the only parties which opposed the motion. After a hearing on March 4, 2005, the trial court signed an order dated March 9, 2005, which required defendants to provide access through the gate and otherwise refrain from blocking plaintiffs’ access to Castro Motorway, subject to certain conditions not applicable to this appeal.
The trial court then set the matter for further hearing on March 25, 2005. The purpose was to give the parties an opportunity to provide additional evidence and briefing based upon which the trial court would rule on plaintiffs’ request for an order to the effect that plaintiffs had the right to repair the portion of Castro Motorway over Parcel 1 and defendants could not block access or otherwise prevent the repair.
On March 25, 2005, the trial court entered the following written order: “1. That Plaintiffs RCSI and Harris shall be entitled to maintain Castro Motorway over [Parcel 1]; [¶] 2. That neither SoCal Communications Sites, LLC, LT-WR, LLC, nor James A. Kay Jr. shall do any act to prevent said maintenance including the blocking of Castro Motorway; [and] [¶] [3.] That the current owner of the parcel designated by APN 4464-022-016, Yogibear Properties, LLC, by and through its manager James A. Kay, Jr., being subject to the access rights of Plaintiffs, shall continue to provide access through the gate across Castro Motorway, located on that parcel.” Defendants appealed.
DISCUSSION
In their notice of appeal, defendants indicated their intent to appeal from the March 9, 2005 order and the March 25, 2005 order. Defendants’ focus on appeal, however, is their claim that the trial court had no authority to issue the first paragraph of the March 25, 2005 order, which states “[t]hat Plaintiffs RCSI and Harris shall be entitled to maintain Castro Motorway over [Parcel 1]” (hereinafter the Parcel 1 provision).
Plaintiffs contend that defendants have no standing to appeal the Parcel 1 provision in order to protect the interests of the owner of Parcel 1. Indeed, defendants do not claim that they are legally entitled to assert and litigate the rights of the owner of Parcel 1. On the basis of the record before us, we agree. (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 737.) However, we acknowledge that, as parties to the instant action, defendants have standing to challenge the first paragraph of the trial court’s order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 902.)
Defendants effectively concede that the trial court had authority to order defendants not to interfere with plaintiffs’ access to Castro Motorway. Defendants do not advance any contentions or arguments with respect to the March 9, 2005 order or the remainder of the March 25, 2005 order. By addressing only the Parcel 1 provision, defendants have waived any contentions regarding any other portion of the March 25, 2005 order or any portion of the March 9, 2005 order. (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785; Stoll v. Shuff (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 22, 25, fn. 1.) As more specifically set forth below, we modify the March 25, 2005 order by striking the Parcel 1 provision and making appropriate related changes in the remainder of the order, affirm the order as modified, and affirm the March 9, 2005 order.
Standard of Review
On appeal, review is under the standard applicable to enforcement of stipulations or other settlement agreements pursuant to section 664.6. Our determination is whether the trial court’s ruling on the section 664.6 motion was supported by substantial evidence. (Fiore v. Alvord (1985) 182 Cal.App.3d 561, 565.) “Even where there are disputed facts, on a motion to enforce a settlement agreement pursuant to section 664.6, the trial court has the authority to determine whether the parties entered into a valid and binding settlement of all or part of the case. [Citation.] In making such a determination, the court sits as a trier of fact and its ruling on all factual issues must be upheld where supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] [¶] A settlement agreement is in the nature of a contract and is therefore governed by the same legal principles applicable to contracts generally. [Citation.] In interpreting the agreement, the court must consider all of the terms thereof, together with the circumstances and conduct surrounding its execution. [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Hasso (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1174, 1180-1181.)
The Parcel 1 Provision
There is no question that the trial court had jurisdiction to issue an order for the enforcement of the stipulation. The parties included in the stipulation a provision that the trial court would maintain jurisdiction under section 664.6. Defendants contend, however, that the trial court erred in including the Parcel 1 provision in the March 25, 2005 order. Plaintiffs claim that the Parcel 1 provision is consistent with the “Maintenance” provision of the stipulation and, therefore, the trial court properly included it in the order. We disagree.
It is undisputed that the stretch of Castro Motorway covered by the “Maintenance” provision passes over Parcel 1. The intent of the parties shown by the “Maintenance” provision is to allocate responsibilities for certain maintenance activities along Castro Motorway and payment for them between defendants and plaintiffs and provide that if a party fails to fulfill its maintenance responsibilities, then the other party may undertake them. The inference is that the parties intend to cooperate in order to assure that Castro Motorway is maintained between their respective parcels and communications towers near the top of Castro Peak.
Defendants indicate that the “Maintenance” provision allowed grading “starting on Parcel 2 and extending up to the border of Parcel 9.” Defendants submitted a map as an exhibit to a surveyor’s declaration in opposition to plaintiffs’ motion in the trial court. The map shows Castro Motorway stretching through Parcel 2 near the communications towers atop Castro Peak, next over the Harris Parcel (Parcel 3) and then through Parcel 1 to Parcel 4 where it continues over other parcels to Parcel 9, the SoCal Parcel.
No part of the “Maintenance” provision or any other provision of the stipulation and judgment makes any express reference to Parcel 1 or to the “entitlement” of either plaintiffs or defendants to maintain Castro Motorway over Parcel 1. The parties concede that neither of them is the owner of Parcel 1 and the owner of Parcel 1 is not a party to the instant action or the stipulation and judgment therein. Accordingly, there is no provision in the stipulation which is subject to an interpretation that either plaintiffs or defendants have been granted any “entitlement” to Parcel 1 for any purpose. We conclude, therefore, that the first paragraph of the March 25, 2005 order, the Parcel 1 provision, is not supported by substantial evidence. (Fiore v. Alvord, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d at p. 565.)
See footnote 1, ante.
Consistent with the parties’ intent shown by the “Maintenance” provision, the written order entered by the trial court on March 25, 2005 shall be modified to read in full as follows: “1. That neither SoCal Communication Sites, LLC, LT-WR, LLC, nor James A. Kay Jr. shall do any act to prevent Plaintiffs from having access to Castro Motorway for maintenance; and [¶] 2. That the current owner of the parcel designated by APN 4464-022-016, Yogibear Properties, LLC, by and through its manager James A. Kay, Jr., being subject to the access rights of Plaintiffs, shall continue to provide access through the gate across Castro Motorway, located on that parcel.”
We affirm the March 25, 2005 order as modified and the March 9, 2005 order. Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
We concur: MALLANO, Acting P. J., VOGEL, J.