[¶ 5] A single set of facts provided the basis for the court's decisions as to both (1) Sloan's Cove's motion to dismiss and (2) Sloan's Cove's motion for summary judgments on Oceanic's breach of contract claim and Sloan's Cove's counterclaim. Although we apply different standards of review to Oceanic's separate challenges to the court's decisions at each of these two stages, in both instances, we view, respectively, the allegations in Oceanic's complaint, and the facts established by the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to Oceanic. See, e.g., Remmes v. Mark Travel Corp., 2015 ME 63, ¶ 3, 116 A.3d 466 (viewing the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to the nonprevailing party); Ramsey v. Baxter Title Co., 2012 ME 113, ¶ 6, 54 A.3d 710 (viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff in an appeal from a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal). Viewed in the light most favorable to Oceanic, therefore, the record establishes the following set of facts.
We draw the facts from the parties' statements of material facts, all of which are supported by references to the evidentiary record, viewing them in the light most favorable to Lee as the nonprevailing party. SeeRemmes v. Mark Travel Corp. , 2015 ME 63, ¶ 3, 116 A.3d 466.[¶3] From 2003 to 2014, Lee worked under a written employment contract with the Town to serve as a part-time Code Enforcement Officer (CEO).
[¶ 3] The following facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Diviney—the party against whom summary judgment was entered. SeeRemmes v. Mark Travel Corp. , 2015 ME 63, ¶ 18, 116 A.3d 466.[¶ 4] On January 17, 2014, Aleshia D. Diviney was injured when she slipped and fell on ice outside of her dormitory, located on the University of Southern Maine (USM) Gorham campus.
[¶ 2] “Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the non-prevailing part[y], the summary judgment record contains the following facts, which are undisputed unless otherwise noted.” Remmes v. Mark Travel Corp. , 2015 ME 63, ¶ 3, 116 A.3d 466 (citation omitted).[¶ 3] Frost, who was born in 1933, executed a will in March 2000, naming her half-sister, Gamash, as her sole beneficiary.
[¶ 2] Viewed in the light most favorable to Day's Auto, the nonprevailing party, the summary judgment record establishes the following facts. See Remmes v. Mark Travel Corp., 2015 ME 63, ¶ 3, 116 A.3d 466. While responding to a fire at Day's Auto's shop on October 3, 2011, the Town's fire department filled hoses with water before the nozzles were opened, refused to allow firefighters to enter the building, sprayed water on a fireproof door, refilled fire trucks from a single hydrant instead of from two other available hydrants or from the nearby Penobscot River, drove a truck toward a water holding tank in such a way that it would be impossible to unload water into the holding tank, and connected a water hose to a nozzle improperly. These actions allegedly prevented the Town from limiting the damage that the fire caused to Day's Auto's property.
[¶2] Viewing the summary judgment records in the light most favorable to the Estate, the following facts are undisputed for purposes of summary judgment. See Remmes v. Mark Travel Corp., 2015 ME 63, ¶ 18, 116 A.3d 466 (stating the rule that on review of entry of a summary judgment, the record is considered in the light most favorable to the nonprevailing party). [¶3] Edward Grant worked for Bath Iron Works from August 19, 1964, to June 9, 1970, and again from August 24, 1978, to February 1, 1994. During Grant's first period of employment, asbestos was a common component of the insulation and other materials used at Bath Iron Works, including use in the construction and renovation of ships.
"Apparent authority is authority that, although not actually granted, the principal knowingly permits the agent to exercise or that the principal holds the agent out as possessing." Remmes v. Mark Travel Corp., 2015 ME 63, ¶ 22,116 A.3d 466. Unlike actual or implied authority,
Apparent agency and apparent authority relate to situations in which an agency relationship is ostensibly created and an agent's actions are apparently supported by the principal. Remmes v. Mark Travel Corp., 2015 ME 63, ¶ 22,116 A.3d 466. Apparent authority exists only when the conduct of the principal leads a third party to believe that a given party is the principal's agent.
That doctrine is applicable when, even though actual authority to perform some act has not been granted, the conduct of the principal leads third parties to believe that the agent has such authority. See, e.g., Remnes v. Mark TravelCorp., 2015 ME 63 ¶ 22, 116 A.3d 466. The second is whether Budd had actual authority to execute the Settlement Agreement. The question of Budd's authority was only litigated in the prior proceedings before the Probate Court, and it is evident that Probate Judge Patterson relied on the apparent authority doctrine in determining that Anderson and Collins were parties bound by the Settlement Agreement. See January 12, 2010 Probate Court Order (Exhibit D to Defendants' SMF) at 2-3, referring to evidence of what Anderson and Collins had stated to Crouter when they left the mediation.
[¶9] Because there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute, we review de novo the trial court's interpretation and application of the relevant statutes, and we evaluate whether Broadreach is entitled to a summary judgment as a matter of law. See Remmes v. Mark Travel Corp., 2015 ME 63, ¶¶ 18-19, 116 A.3d 466. "Summary judgment is properly granted when the plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case for each element of [her] cause of action."