It has consistently been held that the grounds to set aside a judgment under Rule 60 are the same defenses to enforcement of a foreign judgment under Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-6-104(c). Frazier v. Frazier, 72 S.W.3d 333, 335 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2001); Hart v. Tourte, 10 S.W.3d 263, 269 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1999); Remington v. Obenauf, 1 S.W.3d 666, 669 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1999); Coastcom, Inc., 981 S.W.2d at 181; Biogen Distributors, 842 S.W.2d at 256. It should be noted, however, that a Tennessee court does not have jurisdiction to set aside a foreign judgment.
Consequently, the grounds and procedures for vacating, reopening, or setting aside a foreign judgment are those set out in Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. Remington Investments, Inc. v. Obenauf, 1 S.W.3d 666, 668 (Tenn. Ct. App 1999); Bailey, 49 S.W.3d at 329; Coastcom, Inc. v. Cruzen, 981 S.W.2d 179, 181 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1998); Biogen Distributors, Inc. v. Tanner, 842 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1992). Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part:
The grounds to set aside a judgment under Rule 60 are the same defenses to enforcement of a foreign judgment under Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-6-104(c). Frazier v. Frazier, 72 S.W.3d 333, 335 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001); Hart v. Tourte, 10 S.W.3d 263, 269 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); Remington v. Obenauf, 1 S.W.3d 666, 669 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); Coastcom, Inc., 981 S.W.2d at 181; Biogen Distribs. Inc. v. Tanner, 842 S.W.2d, 253, 256 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). Rule 60.02 provides in pertinent part:
Weber claims that Cadlerock, as an assignee, does not qualify as a "judgment creditor" within the meaning of the Act. Also finding no case law in support of this contention, we note that in the case of Remington Investments, Inc. v. Obenauf, 1 S.W.3d 666, 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), an assignee to a Connecticut judgment, satisfied the statutory requirements to permit domestication of the judgment. As stated earlier, an attack on the validity of a foreign judgment is subject to the same procedures and grounds contained in Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60. Weber's contentions regarding the assignment of the judgment would relate to the enforcement of the judgment, but not the enrollment of it.
This supports defendant's position that it is specific pending actions in the case of which the defendant must have notice. Plaintiff cites three other cases in support of his position: Remington Investments, Inc v Obenauf, 1 SW3d 666 (Tenn App, 1999); Bank of Montreal v Rough, 430 F Supp 1243 (ND Cal, 1977), aff'd 612 F2d 467 (CA 9, 1980); and Julen v Larson, 25 Cal App 3d 325; 101 Cal Rptr 796 (1972). All three cases are materially distinguishable: the defendants in those cases had never been properly served with process, so the relevant courts never obtained personal jurisdiction over the defendants.
R. Civ. P. 60.02. Remington Investments, Inc. v. Obenauf, 1 S.W.3d 666, 668 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1999); Bailey v. Sneed, 49 S.W.3d 327, 329 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2001); Coastcom, Inc. v. Cruzen, 981 S.W.2d 179, 181 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1998); Biogen Distributors, Inc. v. Tanner, 842 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1992). Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part:
A foreign judgment properly domesticated is presumed to be valid, and the burden rests heavily upon the party assailing the judgment to show its invalidity. Dement v. Kitts, 777 S.W.2d 33, 36 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1989); Remington Inves., Inc. v. Obenauf, 1 S.W.3d 666, 669 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1999). We then turn to the record of the testimonial hearing before Judge Bruce E. Williams, Circuit Judge of Madison County, Alabama of July 11, 1997, upon which was predicated that court's Order entered July 14, 1997 overruling and denying the Motion of Anne P. Cleve to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction.
Therefore, the grounds and procedures for vacating or reopening foreign judgments are those contained in Rule 60.02. Coastcom, Inc. v. Cruzen, 981 S.W.2d 179, 181 (Tenn.App. 1998) (citations omitted); see also Remington Investments, Inc. v. Obenauf, 1 S.W.3d 666, 669 (Tenn.App. 1999). Under Rule 60.02, one must obtain relief from a final judgment procured by fraud within a year after the judgment.