Opinion
1:24-CV-391-TLS-JEM
12-20-2024
HARRIE LEE REMBERT, Plaintiff, v. FORT WAYNE POLICE DEPT., et al., Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
THERESA L. SPRINGMANN, JUDGE
Harrie Lee Rembert, proceeding without counsel, initiated this case by filing a complaint [ECF No. 1] and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF 2]. The Court screened Rembert's original complaint and determined it lacked sufficient merit. See ECF No. 3; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Accordingly, he was ordered to file an amended complaint and to clarify whether he was incarcerated at the time he filed his original complaint. ECF No. 3. Rembert has submitted his Amended Complaint on the non-prisoner form [ECF No. 6], so the Court will proceed accordingly.
When presented with an IFP application filed by a non-prisoner, the district court makes two determinations: (1) whether the suit has sufficient merit; and (2) whether the plaintiff's poverty level justifies IFP status. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 27 (1992); Smith-Bey v. Hosp. Adm'r, 841 F.2d 751, 757 (7th Cir. 1988). If a court finds that the suit lacks sufficient merit or that an inadequate showing of poverty exists, the court must deny the IFP petition. See Smith-Bey, 841 F.2d at 757. A court must dismiss a case at any time if it determines that the suit is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To determine whether the suit states a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), a court applies the same standard as it would to a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Tate v. SCR Med. Transp., 809 F.3d 343, 345 (7th Cir. 2015). In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Luevano v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1027 (7th Cir. 2013). To survive dismissal, a “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). However, “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (cleaned up).
The entirety of Rembert's Amended Complaint consists of the following verbatim sentence:
In the month of April 2022 I was [assaulted] by an unknown officer under [surveillance] of another kicked repeatedly and chocked with left in front and right behind in presence of the Rescue Mission here in Allen County.
ECF No. 6 at 2. He has sued the Fort Wayne Police Department for monetary damages, and he asks that the officers resign from their positions.
Rembert's original complaint provided slightly more detail. See generally, ECF No. 1. In it, he alleged that he had been “wrongfully exited” from the Mission. Id. at 2. He later went back to the Mission to have them call EMS because he was dehydrated from not eating or drinking, but instead they called the police. When the police arrived, he was falsely accused of spitting on the officers, and those officers responded by kicking and choking him. He was dragged to a police car in handcuffs, kicked, and thrown on the seat. Rembert was ultimately arrested. He needed medical attention, but no medic was present.
Excessive-force claims that occur during the course of an arrest or apprehension of a suspect “are governed by the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard, which turns on the totality of the circumstances confronting [the officers] viewed from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.” Dockery v. Blackburn, 911 F.3d 458, 464 (7th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). “Whether a particular use of force was objectively reasonable ‘is a legal determination rather than a pure question of fact for the jury to decide.'” Id. (quoting Phillips v. Cmty. Ins. Corp., 678 F.3d 513, 520 (7th Cir. 2012)). In analyzing these claims, the court must “consider the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Bayon v. Berkebile, 29 F.4th 850, 854 (7th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). Even the use of deadly force may be reasonable if an officer has probable cause to believe the suspect is armed and poses a threat of physical harm or is about to escape. See Siler v. City of Kenosha, 957 F.3d 751, 759 (7th Cir. 2020). The perspective as viewed from a reasonable officer on the scene is critical. Id.
Although Rembert was given an opportunity to amend his complaint, he has not resolved the defects previously pointed out by the Court. See generally, ECF No. 3. Again, he has not named a defendant who can be held liable for any excessive force claims against him. The Fort Wayne Police Department is not a suable entity under Indiana law and thus cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See IND. CODE § 36-1-2-10; Sow v. Fortville Police Dep't, 636 F.3d 293, 300 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he Indiana statutory scheme does not grant municipal police departments the capacity to sue or be sued.”). Additionally, even if he had named a proper defendant, his allegations regarding excessive force by the officers are far too vague to state a claim. Rembert was told he must “explain in his own words what happened, when it happened, where it happened, who was involved, and how he was personally injured by the events that transpired, providing as much detail (including any relevant state court case details and numbers) as possible.” ECF No. 3 at 5. Rembert's threadbare facts do not meet that standard. See Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff must do better than putting a few words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has happened to her that might be redressed by the law.”); Bissessur v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602 (7th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a claim must be plausible on its face and the complaint must provide adequate factual content). Because his amended complaint lacks sufficient merit, it must be dismissed, and his IFP petition must be denied.
For these reasons, the Court:
(1) DENIES the motion to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No. 2]; and
(2) DISMISSES the amended complaint [ECF No. 6] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) because it does not state any claims.
SO ORDERED.