Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 03-794.
June 27, 2003.
MEMORANDUM/ORDER
On May 22, 2003, this court issued an opinion and order that granted Defendant C.P. Allstar Corporation's ("Allstar's") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff s Complaint Pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3). Relm Wireless Corporation ("Relm") has now filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
The crux of Allstar's argument in favor of dismissal was that the following venue selection cause in its contract with Relm precludes suit in this court (which is located in Philadelphia County):
This Agreement shall be construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania with venue in Chester County.
The 12(b)(3) motion was granted because the quoted clause makes perfectly clear that venue for any dispute shall be in Chester County — and this courthouse is not in Chester County.
Relm's motion for reconsideration cites a case — Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873 (3d Cir. 1995) — not mentioned in its previous submissions on this issue, and then asserts that this court "has ruled in direct contradiction [to] the Third Circuit's ruling."
I find nothing in Relm's motion that alters my view of this case. In Jumara, the Third Circuit had before it a very different venue provision, which provided that if the parties could not mutually select a third arbitrator for a dispute, "either party may request a judge of a court of record in the county in which the arbitration is pending to select a third one." Id. at 881. The Third Circuit held "that the phrase `a court of record in the county' includes the Middle District of Pennsylvania, the federal judicial district that encompasses Luzerne County." Id.
The Jumara case is inapplicable to the case at bar. Extrapolating Judge Becker's opinion in that case to the facts here yields the unobjectionable proposition that this federal court is a "court of record" for Chester County — in fact, it may be said properly that the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is a "court of record" for all nine of the counties in its jurisdiction. However, it does not follow that this court can be said to have a Chester County venue. The differences in language between the contractual forum references in Jumara and in this case are subtle but nonetheless significant.
As a final matter, Relm suggests that this court's opinion of May 22, 2003 incorrectly cited 28 U.S.C. § 1404 — the change-of-venue provision — as its justification for dismissing the lawsuit. A careful reading of that opinion reveals that § 1404 was quoted not as the statutory basis for the outcome, but only to illustrate the elementary concept that Relm still refuses to embrace — that there is a difference between a court's jurisdiction and its venue. The truth of that proposition is evident from § 1404, which provides for venue changes within a district. Section 1404 appears in the opinion only to support the conclusion that a court may have jurisdiction over a county and not be a venue in that county, for otherwise it would be impossible to change venue without transferring a case to another district. There should be no inference that this court, by making reference to that statute, expressed an intent to transfer the case to any other venue. Indeed, no suitable venue exists in the federal court system, as there is no federal courthouse in Chester County.
It is hereby ORDERED that the Motion for Reconsideration (Docket # 10) is DENIED.