Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BC355559. Joanne O’Donnell, Judge.
Law Offices of Nejat Kohan and Nejat Kohan for Defendant and Appellant.
Katten Muchin Rosenman, Thomas J. Leanse, Joshua D. Wayser and Helen M. Cho for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ZELON, J.
Hormoz Ramy appeals a judgment in favor of Related Urban Management Company (“Related”), claiming that there was insufficient evidence to support the judgment and the damages award. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Related sued Ramy for breach of two guaranties of a lease. The First Guaranty guaranteed the tenant’s “payment of all rentals and other charges.” The Second Guaranty, dated October 22, 2002, replaced the First Guaranty and guaranteed the tenant’s “payment of all rentals and other charges” as well as a “Tenant Loan.” Related sought $2,336,541.14 under the Second Guaranty, plus attorney fees; or, in the alternative, if the Second Guaranty was deemed unenforceable, it sought $1,627,099.60 plus attorney fees. Ramy denied liability, claiming that his signature on the Second Guaranty was forged and that the First Guaranty had expired.
At a bench trial, Related produced the Second Guaranty, with Ramy’s notarized signature. Ramy denied that the signature was his, claiming that in 2001 he had changed his signature because it was simple to copy and had been forged. Ramy first testified that he had been in Hawaii when the Second Guaranty was purportedly signed, but then on cross-examination admitted that he did not know whether he had been in Hawaii on that date, just that he travels there annually in the second half of October. Sia Amiri, a business associate who testified that he was familiar with Ramy’s signature, testified that the signature on the Second Guaranty was not Ramy’s.
The trial court concluded that the signature was Ramy’s based on the fact that the signature was notarized by a commissioned notary public. The court explained, “The notarized signature of defendant on the Second Guaranty gave rise to the presumption that the signature was authentic. Cal. Evid. Code § 1451. Defendant’s evidence, which consisted of his own testimony and the testimony of Sia Amiri, was insufficient to rebut the presumption that defendant’s notarized signature on the Second Guaranty was authentic. [¶] Defendant’s testimony that the signature on the Second Guaranty is not his was incomprehensible and not credible. Defendant’s testimony that he was in Hawaii on the date the Second Guaranty was signed, rather than in California, was ambivalent and self-contradictory. He ultimately testified that he did not know if he had been in Hawaii on that date. Defendant also had a motive to claim that the signature on the Second Guaranty was forged, even though it was not, in order to avoid his payment obligation. [¶] The testimony of Sia Amiri was also unpersuasive. Mr. Amiri testified that he was a business associate of defendant, but did not demonstrate sufficient familiarity with defendant’s signature to provide a foundation for his testimony. The only substantive business transactions with defendant that Mr. Amiri testified to were the very transactions at issue in this lawsuit. [¶] Defendant produced no other witness, family member, friend or co-worker, to attest to the falsity of the signature. Defendant failed to offer handwriting exemplars and failed to offer testimony of a handwriting expert.”
The trial court concluded that the Second Guaranty was enforceable and that Ramy owed Related $2,336,541.14 plus attorney fees. Ramy appeals.
DISCUSSION
The sole issue on appeal is whether there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that Ramy signed the Second Guaranty. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “[w]e look at the evidence in support of the successful party, disregarding any contrary showing, and we resolve all conflicts in favor of the respondent, indulging in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the verdict if possible. [Citation.] When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, we do not substitute our deductions for those of the finder of fact. [Citation.] We must affirm if substantial evidence supports the trier of fact’s determination, even if other substantial evidence would have supported a different result. [Citation.].” (Canister v. Emergency Ambulance Services (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 388, 394.) We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the judgment.
Here, Related produced the Second Guaranty, which included Ramy’s notarized signature. Under Evidence Code section 1451, this constituted prima facie evidence of the authenticity of the writing and of Ramy’s signature. Ramy argues that his denial that he signed the document, however, defeated the presumption that this was his signature. He likens his denial to the evidence of forgery that defeated the presumption of validity in Wilson v. Nichols (1940) 39 Cal.App.2d 527. In Wilson v. Nichols, the notary public whose name appeared on a deed as having taken the acknowledgement of the three grantors testified that his notarial records showed that the deed he had notarized that day did not include the parcel of land at issue, nor was the name of the grantee on the deed he notarized the same as that on the deed now presented. (Id. at p. 531.) The notary also testified that he clearly recalled the occasion and that only one grantor, not three, came to his office to have his signature acknowledged; he had neither acknowledged the other two grantors’ signatures nor acknowledged a second deed that day. (Ibid.) In light of the notary’s “unequivocal testimony that the deed was a forgery,” the trial court concluded that the presumption had been rebutted and that “the burden of going forward with the evidence returned to the defendants.” (Id. at p. 532.) Ramy characterizes his denial that he signed the document as similarly “unequivocal testimony” that the Second Guaranty was forged, defeating the Evidence Code section 1451 presumption here. Accordingly, Ramy argues, his liability is limited to the $1,627,066.90 provided for by the First Guaranty.
This case is not like Wilson v. Nichols, supra, 39 Cal.App.2d 527. There, a disinterested third party provided documentary evidence that the deed was forged by demonstrating that the deed he notarized did not include the tract of land at issue in the lawsuit, that he had acknowledged the signature of only one of the deed’s grantors, and that the grantee was not the grantee in the deed in question—conclusive and unequivocal evidence of forgery. Here, the rebuttal evidence was far less conclusive: A highly interested party—who stood to owe approximately $700,000 more if the Second Guaranty was determined to be valid—simply denied in court that a signature was his. Ramy’s claim that he could not have signed the document on the date in question because he was out of the state at the time was unpersuasive because he admitted on cross-examination that he had no idea whether he was in Hawaii when he was supposed to have signed the Second Guaranty. Amiri’s testimony concerning Ramy’s signature lacked strong foundation and was similarly unconvincing to the trial court, for, as the court noted, his familiarity with Ramy’s signature was limited and arose from the transactions in question in the lawsuit.
Ultimately, the trial court determined that Ramy’s testimony was not credible. The trial court was not required to accept as true Ramy’s denial that he signed the Second Guaranty or Amiri’s testimony that the signature was not Ramy’s. “[I]t is the duty of the trial court to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses and to determine the weight to be given their testimony. In evaluating the testimony, the trial court is entitled to take into account the motive of the witness and his interest in the outcome of the case [citation].” (Spurgeon v. Buchter (1961) 192 Cal.App.2d 198, 205.) On appeal, “we defer to the trier of fact on issues of credibility. [Citation.]” (Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 959, 968.) Sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s determination that the Second Guaranty was signed by Ramy and therefore that Related’s damages were to be calculated as provided in that document.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal.
We concur: PERLUSS, P. J., JACKSON, J.