Opinion
May 8, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Edward H. Lehner, J.).
Plaintiff was injured while a passenger on a bus owned and operated by the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA). Plaintiff served a notice of claim and summons and complaint on Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority (MABSTOA).
MABSTOA and NYCTA are separate entities (Rosas v. Manhattan Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth., 109 A.D.2d 647). Public Authorities Law § 1212 (2) requires that a tort action against the NYCTA be commenced within one year and 90 days of the date the cause of action accrued, or that the plaintiff move for leave to serve a late notice of claim within that same period. The court does not have the discretion to extend this statutory period of time (Pierson v. City of New York, 56 N.Y.2d 950). Therefore, plaintiff's cross motion was untimely.
Nor under these circumstances may the doctrine of equitable estoppel be invoked to overcome the constraints of Pierson (supra). This doctrine is applicable only "where a governmental subdivision acts or comports itself wrongfully or negligently, inducing reliance by a party who is entitled to rely and who changes his position to his detriment or prejudice" (Bender v New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 662, 668; Luka v New York City Tr. Auth., 100 A.D.2d 323, 325, affd 63 N.Y.2d 667). Here, defendant did not act wrongfully or negligently but, instead, put plaintiff on notice that it was the wrong party, when it denied payment of plaintiff's medical claims because the injuries occurred not in the use and/or operation of its bus, well within the prescribed one-year-and-120-day statutory period.
Concur — Ross, J.P., Asch, Kassal, Wallach and Smith, JJ.