Opinion
February 10, 1971
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court at Special Term, entered June 19, 1970 in Rensselaer County, which denied a motion for judgment dismissing the complaint. Respondent brought this negligence action for injuries he sustained on December 24, 1968 when he slipped and fell on ice or snow on a parking lot owned and operated by appellant. A notice of claim was served June 9, 1969 after which appellant moved to dismiss for failure to file a notice of claim within 90 days pursuant to section 50-e Gen. Mun. of the General Municipal Law. Respondent contends that the filing of claim requirement is governed by section 1569-q Pub. Auth. of the Public Authorities Law which provides for a six-month period during which such claim may be filed. The notice provision of section 50-e supersedes "inconsistent provisions of any general, special or local law, or charter provisions" and is therefore controlling at least as to any previously enacted statutory provision (L. 1945, ch. 694, § 13). However, title 8 of article 7 of the Public Authorities Law was enacted in 1960, subsequent to section 50-e. When a general law and a subsequently enacted special law are in conflict, the special enactment supersedes the general law (McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 1, Statutes, §§ 397, 398; East End Trust Co. v. Otten, 255 N.Y. 283; Matter of Seligman v. Wickham, 33 A.D.2d 840, affd. 27 N.Y.2d 993). Furthermore, section 1569-t Pub. Auth. of the Public Authorities Law states: "In so far as the provisions of this title are inconsistent with the provisions of any other act, general or special, or of any local law of the city, the provisions of this title shall be controlling." We therefore conclude that section 1569-q supersedes the notice provision of section 50-e. Respondent's claim was therefore timely filed. Order affirmed, with costs. Herlihy, P.J., Reynolds, Greenblott, Cooke and Sweeney, JJ., concur.