Opinion
4809-19L
01-26-2022
Wendy Reiners & Kendall C. Hochman Petitioners v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Respondent
ORDER
Lewis R. Carluzzo Chief Special Trial Judge.
This I.R.C. section 6330(d) case is before the Court on petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the Court's order, filed November 3, 2021. See Rule 161. On December 9, 2021, respondent filed a response to petitioners' motion for reconsideration. In his response, respondent objects to the granting of petitioners' motion. For the reasons set forth below, we deny petitioners' motion.
Under Rule 161, reconsideration is intended to correct substantial error, either of fact or law, and also facilitates the introduction of new evidence the moving party could not have previously introduced with due diligence. See, e.g., Estate of Quick v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 440, 441 (1998). The Court has discretion to grant a motion for reconsideration but generally will not do so absent a showing of unusual circumstances or substantial error. Id. A motion for reconsideration "is not the appropriate forum for rehashing previously rejected legal arguments or tendering new legal theories to reach the end result desired by the moving party." Id. at 441-442.
We think it significant that petitioners do not suggest that the power of attorney relied upon by respondent was in one way or another invalid under state law. Otherwise, in their motion for reconsideration, petitioners contend that the Court's conclusion with respect to Mrs. Reiners' authority to act as an agent of Mr. Hochman to sign the Form 4549, Income Tax Examination Changes, on his behalf was "made without any support or authority (other than to state that the power of attorney is governed and construed in accordance with the laws of the [sic] Connecticut)." Ironically, petitioners provide no support or authority for their position, and nothing else need be said on the point.
Petitioners also claim in their motion that "the Court erred in concluding that Treas. Reg. § 601.503 is not applicable in this case because the State * * * [power of attorney] was sufficient enough to support the Taxpayer's Wife authority" to act as an agent of Mr. Hochman to sign the Form 4549 on his behalf.
It is well settled that the Internal Revenue Service Statement of Procedural Rules, including section 601.503, Statement of Procedural Rules, constitutes procedural, rather than mandatory, rules laid down by respondent for the regulation of the affairs of his own office rather than formal regulations with the force and effect of law. See Wing v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 17, 37 (1983); see also Mossie v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1974-75; Abeson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-190 (procedural rules relating to powers of attorney are directory and have no legal effect), aff'd without published opinion sub nom. Rivera v. Commissioner, 959 F.2d 241 (9th Cir. 1992). As such, respondent's purported failure to follow the requirements set forth in section 601.503(a), Statement of Procedural Rules, is of no consequence here. Moreover, section 601.503(e), Statement of Procedural Rules, allows respondent to "substitute a requirement(s) other than provided herein for a power of attorney as evidence of the authority of the representative." Again, we point out that petitioners have not suggested, much less established, that the power of attorney relied upon by respondent was insufficient to grant the authority for the challenged action taken by Mrs. Reiners.
We have considered petitioners' remaining contentions in their motion and, to the extent they are not addressed by this Order, we find them to be irrelevant or without merit.
That being so, it is
ORDERED that petitioners' motion is denied.