Because the admissibility of testimony about property seized in a search is not tested by a motion to suppress under OCGA § 17-5-30, which applies only to suppression of tangible physical evidence, a pretrial motion in limine may be employed to seek a ruling on the admissibility of the testimonial evidence. State v. Johnston, 249 Ga. 413 ( 291 SE2d 543) (1982); Reid v. State, 129 Ga. App. 660, 662-663 ( 200 SE2d 456) (1973). In Reid, we noted that, "[i]f an order [suppressing the physical evidence pursuant to OCGA § 17-5-30] has been granted it affords a basis or ground for making the objection to the testimony."

No "substantial rights" of appellee under the Fourth Amendment have been affected, since the warrant was issued by a neutral and detached judicial officer who was otherwise authorized to find the existence of probable cause based upon the affidavit that the officers presented to him. Compare Reid v. State, 129 Ga. App. 660 (2a) ( 200 S.E.2d 456) (1973); Pruitt v. State, 123 Ga. App. 659 ( 182 S.E.2d 142) (1971). Likewise, no "substantial rights" of appellee under applicable state statutory provisions are affected, since the warrant was not obtained and executed by private citizens for personal reasons, but by certified officers who were otherwise authorized to obtain and execute search warrants for reasons of law enforcement.

It is incumbent upon a magistrate to make an independent determination of probable cause before he issues a search warrant. In Reid v. State, 129 Ga. App. 660 ( 200 S.E.2d 456), we held that an affidavit, sufficient both as to form and content, could not support a search warrant where the issuing magistrate testified that he had not made any decision from reading the sheriff's affidavit but had signed the warrant after ascertaining that the sheriff was sworn and his affidavit was signed. In the case before us, the issuing justice of the peace stated in an affidavit that "[i]n cases ... involving State Revenue Officers, it is my procedure to check the technical correctness of the warrant, read the warrant thoroughly, however, in cases ... such as these ... I leave the determination of probable cause to the determination of the agent involved.

But on those appeals where there has been a trial and conviction, we deem it proper to note for the benefit of bench and bar the procedure necessary to preserve the accused's rights where there has been an in limine hearing on the suppressal motion. Such procedure is set forth in our recent decision of Reid v. State, 129 Ga. App. 660 ( 200 S.E.2d 456). There this court points out that "When testimony is tendered relative to the property seized its admissibility is not tested by a motion under the provisions of § 27-313, but by a proper objection made when it is tendered at the trial. If an order has been granted it affords a basis or ground for making the objection to the testimony. If the motion was denied an objection may nevertheless be lodged on the ground that the testimony relates to property which was illegally seized during an unlawful search, and if the objection is overruled the ruling may become a proper subject of an enumeration of error on appeal.

The overruling of a motion to suppress evidence becomes moot when the evidence is not introduced at trial. See Reid v. State, 129 Ga. App. 660 (2b) ( 200 S.E.2d 456). The only remaining item for consideration is the defendant's confession (admission, statement).

Thus, the state may not use against an accused the fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege. Reid v. State, 129 Ga. App. 660 (5) ( 200 S.E.2d 456). In the context of this case, it is clear that the witness was explaining the circumstances leading up to the actual confession and pointing out that though appellant was warned of his rights at both the bank and the police station, the actual confession occurred at the police station and not at the bank.

Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 ( 88 SC 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067); Brisendine v. State, 130 Ga. App. 249 ( 203 S.E.2d 308). Even if there had been error in denying the motion to suppress, the error would be harmless because the car seat was never introduced into evidence. Walker v. State, 130 Ga. App. 597 ( 203 S.E.2d 890); Reid v. State, 129 Ga. App. 660 ( 200 S.E.2d 456); Bass v. State, 117 Ga. App. 89 ( 159 S.E.2d 299). It would not have been "reversible error until and unless evidence seized during an illegal search was tendered and admitted against the defendant, though properly and timely objected to." Reid v. State, 129 Ga. App. 660, 661, supra.

Baker v. State, 230 Ga. 741, 742 (1) ( 199 S.E.2d 252). See also the discussion in Reid v. State, 129 Ga. App. 660 ( 200 S.E.2d 456). However, the motion also seeks to suppress "any evidence including any sums of money" used in the transaction, and since money must be considered as "property" under Code Ann. § 27-313, we will attempt to follow defendants' arguments with respect to the motion to suppress considered in this division of the opinion.

Moreover, since § 27-313 speaks of "the return of property" it is clear that it contemplates the suppression only of tangible physical evidence. See, Jarrell v. State, 234 Ga. 410 (3) ( 216 S.E.2d 258) (1975); Reid v. State, 129 Ga. App. 660 ( 200 S.E.2d 456) (1973). We will not follow the expansive interpretation given to Code Ann. § 27-313 by the Court of Appeals in the case before us.

Walker v. State, 277 Ga. App. 485, 488 (3) ( 627 SE2d 54) (2006).Reid v. State, 129 Ga. App. 660, 663, n. 1 ( 200 SE2d 456) (1973). Here, Fraser waived formal arraignment and pleaded not guilty on October 12, 2004.