Reid v. Reid

6 Citing cases

  1. Jacobsen v. Muller

    181 Ga. App. 382 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 31 times
    Explaining the interaction of OCGA ยง 9โ€“11โ€“56(c) and USCR 6.2 and 6.3

    See also Ga. Intl. Life Ins. Co. v. Huckabee, 175 Ga. App. 343, 345 ( 333 S.E.2d 618) (1985). On motion for summary judgment, the movant must negate every theory of recovery which the non-moving party might have. Reid v. Reid, 246 Ga. 592 (2) ( 272 S.E.2d 685) (1980). We are of the opinion that summary judgment was warranted for the reason that plaintiff condoned the breach of contract, if any, and assumed the risk of the tort, if any, committed when Muller deviated from accepted professional standards of a job counselor and used the professional relationship to create and foster an illicit personal relationship with the client.

  2. Haney v. Development Authority

    271 Ga. 403 (Ga. 1999)   Cited 10 times

    The issue is whether the trial court correctly concluded that it was in the "public interest" to require a surety bond in this validation proceeding. See Ebon Foundation v. Oatman, 269 Ga. 340 ( 498 S.E.2d 728) (1998); Hardin v. State, 251 Ga. 533 ( 307 S.E.2d 669) (1983); Reid v. Reid, 246 Ga. 592 ( 272 S.E.2d 685) (1980). Because we reverse the surety bond order based on our interpretation of the "public interest," we need not address whether the trial court erred in setting the bond at three million dollars based on the authority's evidence of damages and costs.

  3. Tabernacle Baptist Church v. Dorsey

    278 S.E.2d 378 (Ga. 1981)   Cited 1 times

    We adhere to the rule that the grantor and grantee are indispensable parties in an action for cancellation of a deed. Reid v. Reid, 246 Ga. 592 ( 272 S.E.2d 685) (1980). The trial court correctly held that Gladys' claim against the church and Angerlard for cancellation of the deeds must be dismissed for lack of an indispensable party.

  4. Baxter v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC

    301 Ga. App. 577 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 16 times
    Finding issues of fact existed as to whether party had constructive notice of lis pendens; title search performed for the party did not reveal the lis pendens and record was incomplete on reasons why the lis pendens was not discovered during title search

    Berry v. City of East Point, 277 Ga. App. 649, 650 (1) ( 627 SE2d 391) (2006).Reid v. Reid, 246 Ga. 592, 593 (4) ( 272 SE2d 685) (1980).Ebon Foundation v. Oatman, 269 Ga. 340, 344 (3) (e) ( 498 SE2d 728) (1998).

  5. Fudge v. Colonial Baking Company of Atlanta

    367 S.E.2d 814 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 5 times

    Fiumefreddo v. Scudder, 252 Ga. 279, 282 ( 313 S.E.2d 683) (1984). On motion for summary judgment, the movant must negate every theory of recovery which the non-moving party might have. Reid v. Reid, 246 Ga. 592 (2) ( 272 S.E.2d 685) (1980). Construing the evidence most strongly against appellee and giving the benefit of all reasonable doubts and favorable inferences to appellant, we conclude that a theory of recovery can be drawn from the pleadings and the evidence of record, and that appellee failed to produce evidence that conclusively negates an essential element of appellant's case.

  6. Stroup v. Castellucis

    293 S.E.2d 523 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 1 times

    After a careful review of the record, and construing the evidence most favorably for appellant and against appellee as we must on summary judgment, we conclude that the evidence contained therein does not pierce appellant's pleadings as to his counterclaim against appellee. Therefore, the grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee on appellant's counterclaim was also error. Code Ann. ยง 81A-156 (c); Griffin v. Wittfeld, 143 Ga. App. 485 (2) ( 238 S.E.2d 589) (1977); Reid v. Reid, 246 Ga. 592 (2) ( 272 S.E.2d 685) (1980). Judgment reversed. Quillian, C. J., and Shulman, P. J., concur.