Opinion
Civil Action No. 96-7564-A-1
March 30, 2001
NOTICE
Please take notice that the attached Magistrate Judge's Report has been filed with the Clerk of the U.S. District Court.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), you have ten days after being served with the attached report to file written objections to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations set forth therein. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations within ten days after being served will bar you, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court.
ABSOLUTELY NO EXTENSION OF TIME SHALL BE GRANTED TO FILE WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT
This matter is before the court on motions for partial summary judgment filed by the defendant Albemarle Corporation. The motions are opposed.
Ten plaintiffs filed this action against the defendant alleging discrimination in employment under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. Plaintiffs Reginald F. Clark, David Claypool, Thomas M. Collins, Thomas R. Grossheim, Philip Jackisch, James McKechnie, Robert C. Reid, Edward D. Sellers, Dorothy Taylor and Mack Webster, all alleged adverse employment actions by the defendant against them in connection with a reorganization and reduction in force that occurred in late 1993. Defendant contended that the employment actions in question were motivated by legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reasons and that the age of the plaintiffs was not a determinative factor in their decisions. Defendant relied upon statements of undisputed facts and voluminous deposition excerpts, affidavits and other evidence to support its position. Defendant also submitted expert evidence in the form of a declaration and report by Bernard R. Siskin, Ph.D.
Jackisch is deceased and his claim was brought by his daughter Rita Pawlack.
Defendant filed a copy of the declaration and report in support of each motion. See, record document number 170, defendant's exhibit number 3 in globo(reference to one of the copies filed).
Plaintiffs opposed the motion relying upon a general statement of material facts applicable to all plaintiffs, and each plaintiff filed a separate response to the defendant's statement of uncontested material facts. Plaintiffs also responded with affidavits, deposition testimony and other relevant documents as well as their own expert evidence in the form of a report by Thomas R. Daymont, Ph.D. and an affidavit executed by S. Layne Lee.
Record document number 112.
Record document numbers 113-122.
In a ruling filed December 8, 1999, the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiffs' expert evidence was denied. Record document number 164. That ruling is on appeal. At this point since the plaintiffs' expert evidence has not been stricken, it must be considered in deciding the motions for partial summary judgment.
Summary judgment is only proper when the moving party, in a properly supported motion, demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P.; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). If the moving party carries its burden under Rule 56(c), the opposing party must direct the court's attention to specific evidence in the record which demonstrates that it can satisfy a reasonable jury that it is entitled to verdict in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512. This burden is not satisfied by some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions or only a scintilla of evidence. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). In resolving the motion the court must review all the evidence and the record taken as a whole in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513. The court may not make credibility findings, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes. Id.; Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2110 (2000).
The substantive law dictates which facts are material. Canady v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 240 F.3d 437, 439 (5th Cir. 2001). In this case the court must apply the law applicable to federal age discrimination claims. Under the ADEA it is unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against any individual because of such individual's age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). The well-established McDonnell Douglas framework is applied to consideration of claims brought under the ADEA. To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination in the context of a reduction in force, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she (1) is within the protected age group under the ADEA; (2) was adversely affected by the employer's decision; (3) was qualified to assume another position at the time of the discharge or demotion; and (4) present evidence, either circumstantial or direct, from which a factfinder might reasonably conclude that the employer intended to discriminate in reaching its decision. Woodhouse, 92 F.3d at 253. A plaintiff's prima facie case creates an inference of discrimination that shifts the burden of production to the defendant to come forward with evidence that the plaintiff was rejected or someone else was preferred for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The burden is one of production, not persuasion, and "can involve no credibility assessment." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142, 120 S.Ct. at 2106, citing, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2748 (1993); Crawford v. Formosa Plastics Corp., La., 234 F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir. 2000). Once the employer articulates a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason and produces competent summary judgment evidence in support, the inference created by the prima facie case drops out of the picture. Russell v. McKinney Hospital Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 222 (5th Cir. 2000). The McDonnell Douglas framework with its presumptions and burdens disappears, and the only remaining issue is discrimination vel non. The fact finder must decide the ultimate question of whether the plaintiff has proven intentional discrimination. Id.; Reeves, supra.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (1973).
See, Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141-42, 120 S.Ct. at 2105-06; Woodhouse v. Magnolia Hospital, 92 F.3d 248, 252, n. 3 (5th Cir. 1996); Evans v. City of Bishop, 238 F.3d 586, 591 n. 8 (5th Cir. 2000).
When a plaintiff alleges disparate treatment, liability depends on whether the protected trait, in this case age, actually motivated the employer's decision. That is, the plaintiff's age must have actually played a role in the employer's decision and had a determinative influence on the outcome. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141, 120 S.Ct. at 2105.
In Reeves, an ADEA case, the Supreme Court addressed the evidentiary burden borne by plaintiffs attempting to prove intentional discrimination through indirect evidence under Rule 50 and Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court specifically repudiated the "pretext-plus" approach. Russell, 235 F.3d at 223. The Fifth Circuit has stated recently: "Reeves is the authoritative statement regarding the standard for judgment as a matter of law in discrimination cases." Id., at 223, n. 4. The Reeves' principles are applicable to motions for summary judgment in the context of claims of intentional discrimination.
Reeves addressed the sufficiency of the evidence under Rule 50, but its principles apply in the "analogous context of summary judgment under Rule 56." Reeves, 120 S.Ct. at 2110; Blow v. City of San Antonio, Texas, 236 F.3d 293, 297, n. 2 (5th Cir. 2001).
The plaintiff may attempt to establish that he was the victim of intentional discrimination by offering evidence that the employer's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is unworthy of belief. The trier of fact may also consider the evidence establishing the plaintiff's prima facie case and inferences properly drawn from it, on the issue of whether the defendant's explanation is pretextual. Reeves, supra; Russell, 235 F.3d at 222-23. Thus, a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated. Reeves, 120 S.Ct. at 2108-09; Russell, 235 F.3d at 223.
Whether summary judgment is appropriate in any particular case will depend on a number of factors including the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other evidence relevant to the employer's motive. Reeves, 120 S.Ct. at 2109; Evans, 238 F.3d at 592; Crawford, 234 F.3d at 902; Evans, 238 F.3d at 591-92. The ultimate determination in every case is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable fact finder could infer discrimination.Crawford, supra.
Defendant did not dispute that the plaintiffs were all within the class of persons protected by the provisions of the ADEA, and clearly has come forward with evidence of its legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment actions in question. Under these circumstances it is unnecessary to separately analyze the evidence in terms of whether the plaintiffs have or have not presented evidence of a prima facie case. Therefore, in each plaintiff's case the large volume of evidence was examined in light of the ultimate issue which must be resolved by the trier of fact — did age play a role and have a determinative influence in the defendant's employment decision.
A review of each of the defendant's motions shows that it does not dispute that any of the plaintiffs have established the first two elements of their prima facie case. They were all subject to adverse employment actions and at the time of those actions their ages placed them in the class of persons protected under the ADEA. The evidence specifically relevant to the third and fourth elements of the plaintiff's prima facie case goes directly to the issue of whether the defendant's explanations and actions were a pretext for age discrimination.
At this point the court must consider all the evidence submitted by the parties, including the statistical evidence, in making its determination. Considering this evidence and the summary judgment record as a whole it is evident that summary judgment cannot be granted in favor of the defendant as to any of the plaintiffs. Reeves makes it clear that if the plaintiff presents enough evidence from which a trier of fact can reasonably infer that the defendant's explanation for its actions is false, that is sufficient to a demonstrate a genuine issue for trial on the question of whether the defendant's actions were motivated by unlawful discrimination. Plaintiffs have come forward with such evidence in each of their cases. In order to grant summary judgment on the claims as urged by the defendant, the court would have to engage in the very type of analysis that is prohibited in evaluating a motion for summary judgment. The court would have to weigh the evidence, resolve factual disputes and make credibility findings in the defendant's favor. This the court simply cannot do.
Recommendation
It is the recommendation of the magistrate judge that the motions for partial summary judgment filed by the defendant Albemarle Corporation be denied.
Record document numbers 68, 71, 75, 79, 83, 89, 92, 95, 98, and 101.