” Id. A contract for the provision of legal services constitutes “commercial activity” under section 1605(a)(2). Embassy of the Fed. Republic of Nigeria v. Ugwuonye, 901 F.Supp.2d 136, 141 (D.D.C.2012) (“Contracts for legal services have been found to constitute commercial activity when the claim against the foreign state arose from the state's failure to pay legal fees.... In retaining Defendants' services for various legal transactions and services in the United States, the Embassy engaged in commercial activity. As a result, the commercial activity exception to immunity under FSIA applies....”); Reichler, Milton & Medel v. Republic of Liberia, 484 F.Supp.2d 1, 2 (D.D.C.2007) (concluding that Liberia's contracts for legal services constituted “commercial activity” under the FSIA). LJDA argues that the Engagement Agreement can be considered a commercial activity that was “carried on in the United States.”

Nnaka v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 238 F.Supp.3d 17, 27 (D.D.C. 2017) (first citing Embassy of Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Ugwuonye, 901 F.Supp.2d 136, 141 (D.D.C. 2012); and then citing Reichler, Milton & Medel v. Republic of Liberia, 484 F.Supp.2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2007)). Here, there is clear evidence that Iraq entered the MLG Engagement Agreement for the express purpose of retaining MLG as counsel to defend it in the Wye Oak litigation. Therefore, this civil action 'Lis based on a commeicial activity-i.e., the MLG Engagement Agreement-and the Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the underlying claims under the first prong of § 1605(a)(2).

Nnaka v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 238 F.Supp.3d 17, 27 (D.D.C. 2017) (first citing Embassy of Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Ugwuonye, 901 F.Supp.2d 136, 141 (D.D.C. 2012); and then citing Reichler, Milton & Medel v. Republic of Liberia, 484 F.Supp.2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2007)). Here, there is clear evidence that Iraq entered the MLG Engagement Agreement for the express purpose of retaining MLG as counsel to defend it in the Wye Oak litigation.

This Court has repeatedly held that a "contract for the provision of legal services constitutes 'commercial activity' under section 1605(a)(2)." Lanny J. Davis & Assocs. LLC v. Republic of Equatorial Guinea, 962 F. Supp. 2d 152, 159 (D.D.C. 2013); Dentons US LLP v. Republic of Guinea, 134 F. Supp. 3d 5, 9 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting same); see also Nnaka v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 238 F. Supp. 3d 17, 28 (D.D.C. 2017); Embassy of Fed. Republic of Nigeria v. Ugwuonye, 901 F. Supp. 2d 136, 141 (D.D.C. 2012); Reichler, Milton & Medel v. Republic of Liberia, 484 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2007). And, there is nothing about this case that counsels in favor of a different result.

Moreover, and significantly, RAKIA's engagement of Azima's services with respect to the negotiations constituted commercial activity for the purpose of the FSIA. Cf. Lydia Nussbaum, Mediation As Regulation: Expanding State Governance Over Private Disputes , 2016 Utah L. Rev. 361, 369–370 (2016) ("[M]ediation now has widespread application in a range of disputes: small claims, family, business ... [a]nd in the private sector, businesses now include mediation clauses in contracts with each other, with their customers, and with their employees[.]"). Courts have long held that contracts for legal services to resolve disputes are commercial in nature, see, e.g.,Dentons U.S. LLP v. The Republic of Guinea , 134 F.Supp.3d 5, 9 (D.D.C. 2015) ; Reichler, Milton & Medel v. Republic of Liber. , 484 F.Supp.2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2007) ; see alsoNnaka , 238 F.Supp.3d at 28 ("[R]etaining an attorney is the type of activity by which private parties engage in commerce."), and so, too, is the engagement of a mediator by private parties, who routinely turn to mediators in an effort to reach a negotiated resolution of their differences, see, e.g.,Hensel Phelps Constr. Co. v. Cooper Carry Inc. , 861 F.3d 267, 270 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (noting the frequent use of mediators); Demissie v. Starbucks Corporate Office and Headquarters , 118 F.Supp.3d 29, 31–32 (D.D.C. 2015) (same).

As other cases have recognized, retaining an attorney is the type of activity by which private parties engage in commerce. See Embassy of Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Ugwuonye , 901 F.Supp.2d 136, 141 (D.D.C. 2012) ; Reichler, Milton & Medel v. Republic of Liberia , 484 F.Supp.2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2007). Defendants object that Nnaka has defined the nature of the activity too narrowly: the alleged retainer does not merely hire an attorney, but hires an attorney to repatriate proceeds of official corruption —a purely sovereign activity.

Id. (internal citations omitted). Contracts for legal services have been found to constitute commercial activity when the claim against the foreign state arose from the state's failure to pay legal fees. Reichler, Milton & Medel v. Republic of Liberia, 484 F.Supp.2d 1, 2 (D.D.C.2007) (holding that contracts for legal representation in “major lawsuits” brought in United States courts constituted commercial activity under the FSIA). In Reichler, the court determined that, “because payment for the legal services was to be made to a banking institution in the United States,” the failure to pay “cause[d] a direct effect in the United States” under the FSIA.