Opinion
No. ED 86818
June 13, 2006
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis Honorable David L. Dowd.
George O. Suggs, Attorney at Law, St. Louis, MO, for Appellant.
Kenneth C. Brostron, James C. Hetlage, Attorneys at Law, St. Louis, Missouri, for Respondent.
Before Gary M. Gaertner, Sr., P.J., George W. Draper III, J., and Kenneth M. Romines J.
Appellants, Larry Reichert, et al, appeal the judgment of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis finding in favor of Respondent, the Board of Education of the City of St. Louis ("the Board"). The trial court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction and the petition for breach of contract and permanent injunction filed by Appellants. Appellants sought to enjoin the Board from terminating, suspending, or placing Appellants on leave of absence without pay from their employment as stationary engineers. We affirm.
The Board is an administrative body existing by virtue of Missouri statute. The Board is vested with the supervision and governing of the public schools in the City of St. Louis. Appellants are twenty-five individuals who were employed by the Board as stationary engineers. Appellants are represented by the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 2 ("Local 2"). Appellants' job tasks included maintaining and operating high pressure boilers within the City of St. Louis.
In 2003, representatives of the Board and Local 2 met, conferred, and discussed proposals related to the stationary engineers' salaries and conditions of employment. On or about July 1, 2003, an agreement ("the agreement") was reached between the Board and Local 2. The agreement was adopted by the Board as a policy statement with a term through June 30, 2008. However, during a meeting on June 29, 2005, representatives of Local 2 were notified of the Board's intention to: (1) limit the job duties of stationary engineers to those duties that are required by city ordinance; (2) reduce the number of stationary engineers based on the Board's determination that it had insufficient funds to continue to employ its own stationary engineers; and (3) outsource the stationary engineers' duties to Sodexho Operations, L.L.C ("Sodexho").
The Board contends that it is incorrect to label the results of the discussion as an "agreement." However, for purposes of this appeal, we will assume arguendo that the results of the discussion were an "agreement."
At the Board's meeting on July 12, 2005, it voted to amend the agreement and implement the above listed changes. The Board determined that Appellants would be placed on a leave of absence without pay pursuant to section 168.291, RSMo 2000, and informed Appellants they would be paid through July 31, 2005. On July 25, 2005, Appellants filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and a petition for breach of contract and permanent injunction. Appellants requested that the court enjoin the Board from terminating, suspending, or placing Appellants on leave of absence without pay.
All statutory references are to RSMo 2000, unless otherwise indicated.
On August 8, 2005, the trial court issued its judgment in favor of the Board denying Appellants' request for an injunction. The trial court found that "[Appellants] presented no competent evidence contradicting the Board's determination that it has insufficient funds to continue to employ the stationary engineers. . . ." The trial court also found that the Board had the authority to unilaterally amend the agreement. This appeal followed.
Appellants sought judicial review of the Board's decision with the trial court in a non-contested case pursuant to section 536.150. On appeal of a judgment entered in a non-contested case, we review the judgment of the trial court rather than the agency's decision. Smith v. Housing Auth. of St. Louis County, 21 S.W.3d 854, 856 (Mo.App.E.D. 2000). We will affirm the judgment of the trial court unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, it erroneously declares the law, or it erroneously applies the law. Id.
In their first point on appeal, Appellants assert the trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of the Board because they were entitled to a permanent injunction. Specifically, Appellants argue that because the Board has sufficient funds to pay Sodexho to perform the work that was performed by the Appellants, we should not find that the Board could place Appellants on leave of absence without pay due to insufficient funds.
Pursuant to section 168.291, "[w]henever it is necessary to decrease the number of employees because of insufficient funds . . . the board of education may cause the necessary number of employees . . . to be placed on leave of absence without pay. . . ." Section 168.291. Nonetheless, "[n]o new appointments shall be made while there are available employees on leave of absence who have not attained the age of seventy years and who are adequately qualified to fill the vacancy. . . ." Id.
The St. Louis Public School District ("the District") has been labeled a financially stressed district pursuant to section 161.520. As of July 1, 2005, the District had a fund deficit of approximately $26.5 million. In the Fiscal Year 2006 Budget, the Board proposed overall major expense reductions of approximately $21.2 million, including the outsourcing of stationary engineer work to Sodexho. The Board found that it would be unable to fund planned academic investments for Fiscal Year 2006 if it was unable to cut expenses. The Board further determined that it would save over $1.2 million by eliminating stationary engineer positions in the District and outsourcing the stationary engineer duties to Sodexho.
Appellants do not dispute that the District has been labeled financially distressed and that outsourcing the stationary engineer work will save the Board a significant amount of money. Furthermore, the Board has not hired new employees to work for the District as stationary engineers. There is no language in section 168.291 preventing the Board from placing employees on leave of absence without pay and subsequently outsourcing the work in order to save money. The Board concedes that if it later decides to terminate its contract with Sodexho and employ stationary engineers, it will be required under section 168.291 to reinstate the laid off employees in inverse order of their placement on leave of absence.
There is substantial evidence to support a finding that the Board had insufficient funds to continue to employ Appellants. Furthermore, the decision to put Appellants on leave of absence without pay as a result of insufficient funds and then outsource the stationary engineering work was within the Board's statutory authority. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Appellants' request for a permanent injunction. Point denied.
In their second point on appeal, Appellants contend the trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of the Board because the agreement was binding upon the parties and could not be unilaterally altered by the Board.
When a proposal is presented by an exclusive bargaining representative to a public body, representatives of the public body "shall meet, confer and discuss such proposals relative to salaries and other conditions of employment of the employees of the public body with the labor organization which is the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees in a unit appropriate." Section 105.520. When the discussions are completed, the results "shall be reduced to writing and be presented to the appropriate administrative, legislative or other governing body in the form . . . required for adoption, modification or rejection." Section 105.520.
If a public body decides to adopt a proposal arising out of negotiations pursuant to section 105.520, the result will not be a binding collective bargaining contract. Sumpter v. City of Moberly, 645 S.W.2d 359, 363 (Mo.banc 1982). If the legislature had intended through enactment of section 105.520 to provide for and authorize a binding contract, it would have so stated. Id.
A claim that the Missouri Supreme Court incorrectly decided a previous case is not cognizable in the Missouri Court of Appeals.Independence-Nat. Educ. v. Independence Sch., 162 S.W.3d 18, 21 (Mo.App.W.D. 2005).
Appellants challenge the notion that a public employer is not bound by an agreement it reaches through the meet and confer process of section 105.520. The trial court found that the Board could unilaterally alter the agreement citing to Sumpter. InSumpter, the plaintiffs alleged that the City of Moberly should be enjoined from making any unilateral changes to an agreement adopted through an ordinance by the Moberly City Council after discussions pursuant to section 105.520. Sumpter, 645 S.W.2d at 360-61. The Missouri Supreme Court held that the agreement did not constitute a binding collective bargaining contract. Id. at 363.
Appellants argue that the intent of the legislature was to authorize binding agreements and that Sumpter was incorrectly decided. However, we will not recognize Appellant's claim that the Missouri Supreme Court incorrectly decided a previous case. Therefore, the trial court did not err in holding that the Board had the right to unilaterally change the terms of the agreement. Point denied.
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.