Opinion
14-21-00251-CV
05-19-2022
REHARTING, INC. D/B/A TECH AUTO MAINTENANCE, Appellant v. EDWARD HEAP, Appellee
On Appeal from the 80th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2020-05062-A.
Panel consists of Jewell, Zimmerer, and Hassan Justices.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Jerry Zimmerer, Justice.
Appellee Edward Heap filed suit against appellant Reharting, Inc. d/b/a Tech Auto Maintenance ("Reharting") and Robert E. Harting, Reharting's owner, alleging numerous causes of action arising out of an agreement to replace the motor in Heap's automobile. Harting filed an answer pro se. Harting also tried to file an answer on behalf of Reharting. Believing Reharting had not timely filed an answer, Heap moved for a default judgment against the company, which the trial court granted. Reharting filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, which the trial court denied. The trial court subsequently severed Heap's claims against Reharting into a separate lawsuit. Reharting appealed. Among other arguments, Reharting asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Heap's motion to sever. Concluding the trial court did abuse its discretion when it granted Heap's motion to sever, we vacate the severance order, and, because there is no longer an appealable final judgment, we dismiss Reharting's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Background
Heap filed suit against Harting and Reharting alleging that he contracted with one or both of the defendants to replace the motor in his automobile with a rebuilt motor. Heap further alleged that he instructed the defendants that he wanted to keep the original motor. When the work was completed, Heap paid the bill in full. Heap alleged that the parties agreed Heap would return the next week to pick up the old motor. Heap alleged that he returned to the shop location two more times, but the defendants did not return the original motor to him. Heap asserted claims for breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, deceptive trade practices, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. Harting filed a pro-se answer. According to Harting, he believed the answer was effective both for him personally and also for his company.
Heap filed a motion for default judgment against Reharting. The trial court granted Heap's motion and awarded Heap all of the monetary relief he requested in the motion. The trial court's default judgment stated that it did "not dispose of all claims and all parties, and is not appealable." At that point, Heap moved to sever the default judgment against Reharting from the claims against Harting.
Harting filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. Harting asserted that his answer "was for myself and for my company." Heap opposed Harting's motion arguing that Harting was not the proper party to file the motion to set aside the default judgment against Reharting.
Harting eventually learned that, as a non-lawyer, he could not represent his company in court. Harting retained counsel on behalf of himself and Reharting, and an amended answer was filed for both defendants. Reharting subsequently filed a second motion to set aside the default judgment. The trial court ultimately denied the motions to set aside the default judgment. At this point, the trial court granted Heap's severance motion purporting to make the default judgment against Reharting final and appealable. See Franklin v. Am. Elevator Inspections, Inc., No. 14-16-00684-CV, 2017 WL 6553642, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] December 21, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) ("The trial court also granted American Elevator's unopposed motion to sever, making the trial court's orders granting summary judgment final and appealable."). This appeal followed.
Analysis
Reharting raises five issues in this appeal. We first address Reharting's fourth issue challenging the trial court's severance order because the resolution of this issue impacts our jurisdiction. In its fourth issue Reharting asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Heap's motion to sever because the claims against both defendants were so interwoven that they involved the same facts and issues.
I. Standard of review and applicable law
Rule 41 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure allows for any claim against a party to be "severed and proceeded with separately." See Tex. R. Civ. P. 41 . Rule 41 gives the trial court broad discretion to sever claims, and a trial court's order granting a severance will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 793 S.W.2d 652, 658 (Tex. 1990). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts contrary to guiding rules and principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985). "Severance is proper when (1) the controversy involves more than one cause of action, (2) the severed claim is one that would be the proper subject of an independently asserted lawsuit, and (3) the severed claim is not so interwoven with the remaining action that they involve the same facts and issues." State v. Morello, 547 S.W.3d 881, 889 (Tex. 2018); see State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Cotner, 845 S.W.2d 818, 819 (Tex. 1993) (holding trial court erred in severing claim where third criterion was not met); Owens v. Owens, 228 S.W.3d 721, 726 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. dism'd) (noting trial court abuses its discretion in granting severance when one of the three criteria is not met); Dalisa, Inc. v. Bradford, 81 S.W.3d 876, 881 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.) (noting trial court's discretion may not be exercised in manner contrary to rule forbidding severance of claim that is interwoven with remaining claims to extent that they involve the same facts and issues). When a trial court severs a lawsuit, two or more independent lawsuits result, and each is resolved by its own final appealable judgment. In re Henry, 388 S.W.3d 719, 725 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, orig. proceeding). A judgment or order generally becomes final upon severance if it disposes of all claims and parties in the severed action, unless the order of severance indicates that further proceedings are to be had in the severed action. Offord v. West Houston Trees, Ltd., No. 14-16-00532-CV, 2018 WL 1866044, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] April 19, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
II. The trial court abused its discretion when it severed Heap's claims against Reharting into a separate lawsuit.
Reharting argues in its fourth issue on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion when it severed Heap's claims against it into a separate lawsuit because the claims against both defendants are so interwoven that they involve exactly the same facts and issues. We agree.
Heap's lawsuit is based on a single transaction, Harting and his company replacing the motor in Heap's automobile and then holding the old motor for Heap to pick up a week later. Heap alleges that Reharting and Harting failed to hold the motor for Heap to pick up. In his lawsuit Heap alleged the same causes of action based on this alleged failure to hold the motor for Heap against both Reharting and Harting. Heap's claims against Reharting necessarily involve the same facts and issues as the claims against Harting. As a result, we conclude that the claims against Reharting are so interwoven with the claims against Harting that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Heap's motion to sever. See Alanis v. Wells Fargo Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. 04-16-00121-CV, 2016 WL 7234047, at *2 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Dec. 14, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("Therefore, because we hold the claims against HomeEq are so interwoven with the claims against Wells Fargo that they involve the same facts and issues, the trial court abused its discretion in severing the claims."); Dalisa, 81 S.W.3d at 881 ("It is difficult to conceive how these opposing actions do not involve the same facts and issues. We conclude from the face of the parties' pleadings that they do."). We sustain Reharting's fourth issue.
III. Because the underlying default judgment is interlocutory, we lack jurisdiction to consider the remainder of Reharting's issues.
Having determined that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Heap's motion to sever, we must now determine whether we have jurisdiction to consider the remainder of Reharting's issues on appeal. See State v. Naylor, 466 S.W.3d 783, 805 (Tex. 2015) (appellate courts have affirmative duty to confirm jurisdiction); MO. Dental Lab. v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Tex. 2004) (appellate courts have duty to assess own jurisdiction sua sponte). As explained below, we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction to address Reharting's remaining issues. See Tilger v. Samson Homes, Inc., No. 14-97-0361-CV, 1999 WL 160995, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] Mar. 25, 1999, pet. denied) (not designated for publication) ("Having determined severance in the court below was improper, we do not reach the remaining issues.").
Generally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). In this case, the severance order purported to render the default judgment against Reharting final. See Offord, 2018 WL 1866044, at *2 ("In general, a judgment or order becomes final upon severance if it disposes of all the claims and parties in the severed action, unless the order of severance indicates that further proceedings are to be had in the severed action."). But, since we vacated the severance order as improper, we must examine the language of the default judgment to determine whether it is a final appealable judgment. See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 200 (stating that to be final, a judgment either must state clearly and unequivocally that it disposes of all claims and parties, or it must dispose of every pending claim and party regardless of its language).
In this case Heap sued two parties asserting the same causes of action against both. He obtained a default judgment against only one of those parties. In addition, the default judgment itself states that it did "not dispose of all claims and all parties, and is not appealable." We therefore conclude that it is not a final appealable judgment and we do not have jurisdiction to address Reharting's issues challenging it. See Bertucci v. Watkins, No. 03-20-00058-CV, 2022 WL 261563, at *4 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Jan. 28, 2022, n0 pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction after vacating trial court's severance order); Lousteau v. Noriega, No. 01-15-00254-CV, 2016 WL 4537371, at *6 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist] Aug. 30, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (concluding that because the trial court erred in entering severance order, appellate court lacked jurisdiction because the underlying judgment was interlocutory); Dalisa, 81 S.W.3d at 881 (vacating severance order that resulted from abuse of discretion and then concluding that it was "prejudicial because it converted into a final judgment a judgment that is interlocutory," and dismissing appeal for lack of appealable judgment).
Conclusion
Because the severance order was the result of an abuse of discretion by the trial court, we vacate it, and dismiss Reharting's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.