The defendant filed an appeal in the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Rego v. Connecticut Insurance Placement Facility, 22 Conn. App. 428, 577 A.2d 1105 (1990). We granted certification, limited to the following issues: "(1) Was the Appellate Court correct in determining that an insurer's special defense of material misrepresentation must by proven by clear and convincing evidence? (2) Was the Appellate Court correct in determining that the trial court's limiting instruction to the jury to consider only misrepresentations `related to the cause and origin of the fire' as proof of the special defense, thereby excluding certain evidence, was not likely to have misled the jury."
Decided October 23, 1990 The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 22 Conn. App. 428, is granted, limited to the following issues: "1. Was the Appellate Court correct in determining that an insurer's special defense of material misrepresentation must be proven by clear and convincing evidence?
The trial court considered the affidavits submitted by the plaintiffs as insufficient evidence to meet the high standard of proof required to prove fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation by clear, precise, and unequivocal evidence. See Bound Brook Assn. v. Norwalk, 198 Conn. 660, 666, 504 A.2d 1047, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 819, 107 S.Ct. 81, 93 L.Ed.2d 36 (1986); Rego v. Connecticut Insurance Placement Facility, 22 Conn. App. 428, 430, 577 A.2d 1105 (1990). This appeal ensued.
Unlike a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, the standard of proof for a negligent misrepresentation claim is that of a preponderance of the evidence. Rego v. Connecticut Ins. Placement Facility, 22 Conn.App. 428, 430, 577 A.2d 1105 (1990), revโd on other grounds, 219 Conn. 339, 593 A.2d 491 (1991). Regardless, LCA has not proved its claim whether it pleaded fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations on the part of Bambino, Palma and Francia because no evidence was submitted that Palma or Francia ever made any oral representations to LCA other than Palmaโs instructions to LCA to issue the two $5000 checks to Bambino instead of Francia.
Unlike a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, the standard of proof for a negligent misrepresentation claim is that of a preponderance of the evidence. Rego v. Connecticut Ins. Placement Facility, 22 Conn.App. 428, 430, 577 A.2d 1105 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, 219 Conn. 339, 593 A.2d 491 (1991). Based on the facts found by the court, the defendant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff made a misrepresentation by negligently withholding information from the defendant in order to induce it to purchase the machine.
In addition, the standard of proof for a negligent misrepresentation claim is that of a preponderance of the evidence. Rego v. Connecticut Insurance Placement Facility, 22 Conn.App. 428, 430, 577 A.2d 1105 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, 219 Conn. 339, 593 A.2d 491 (1991). Moreover, "[t]he plaintiff need not prove that the representations made by the [defendant] were promissory. It is sufficient . . . that the representations contained false information."
Id. Unlike a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, the standard of proof for a negligent misrepresentation claim is that of a preponderance of the evidence. Rego v. Connecticut Insurance Placement Facility, 22 Conn.App. 428, 430, 577 A.2d 1105 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, 219 Conn. 339, 593 A.2d 491 (1991). A recent pronouncement on the issue of liability for negligent misrepresentation was made as follows: "[The Supreme Court] has long recognized liability for negligent misrepresentation . . . The governing principles [of negligent misrepresentation] are set forth in similar terms in ยง 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977): One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment . . . supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information . . . As a result, [w]e have held that even an innocent misrepresentation of fact may be actionable if the declarant has the means of knowing, ought to know, or has the duty of knowing the truth."
Unlike a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, the standard of proof for a negligent misrepresentation claim is that of a preponderance of the evidence. Rego v. Connecticut Insurance Placement Facility, 22 Conn.App. 428, 430, 577 A.2d 1105 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, 219 Conn. 339, 593 A.2d 491 (1991). D. Innocent Misrepresentation
"Unlike a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, the standard of proof for a negligent misrepresentation claim is that of a preponderance of the evidence. Rego v. Connecticut Ins. Placement Facility, 22 Conn.App. 428, 430, 577 A.2d 1105 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, 219 Conn. 339, 593 A.2d 491 (1991)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
The standard of proof for negligent misrepresentation merely requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Rego v. Connecticut Insurance Placement Facility, 22 Conn.App. 428, 430 (1990), reversed on other grounds, 219 Conn. 339 (1991); Calabro v. Calabro, 33 Conn.App. 842, 846 (1994). The court has reviewed the plaintiff's financial affidavits contained in the court file.