Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Ct. No. BC367413, William F. Fahey, Judge.
Baute & Tidus, Jeffrey A. Tidus and David P. Crochetiere for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Duc T. Le for Defendants and Respondents.
JOHNSON, J.
Regency Outdoor Advertising, Inc., and its co-owners Drake and Brian Kennedy (collectively Regency) appeal from the adverse judgment of the trial court in Regency’s contract action against Jon Keith Stephens (Stephens) and Stephens’s company, Valley Outdoor, Inc. (Valley Outdoor). Regency argues that the trial court’s grant of summary adjudication was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel, and the grant of judgment on the pleadings was in error. Regency also appeals the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Stephens and Valley Outdoor. We affirm the judgment and the award of attorney’s fees, and grant Stephens’ and Valley Outdoor’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal.
FACTS
Stephens worked for Regency, a billboard company in Los Angeles County. After Stephens resigned in April 2002, a tangled series of lawsuits ensued.
I. The Initial Lawsuit and the July 2002 Settlement Agreement
On April 22, 2002, Valley Outdoor (a Los Angeles billboard company of which Stephens was president) and Stephens filed suit against Regency. The first amended complaint alleged fraud, wrongful termination and unfair business practices, and breach of contract, and requested declaratory relief to determine the ownership of various billboards. The parties settled, executing an agreement dated July 18, 2002 (July 2002 Settlement Agreement).
The July 2002 Settlement Agreement defined the parties as Valley Outdoor, Inc. and J. Keith Stephens, on the one hand, and Regency Outdoor Advertising, Inc., Drake Kennedy and Brian Kennedy, on the other hand. The agreement contained a mutual release: “Valley Outdoor and Stephens, individually and collectively, release and forever discharge Regency, Drake Kennedy and Brian Kennedy, individually and collectively, of and from any and all manner of action or actions, cause or causes of action, in law or in equity, in any suits, debts, liens, contracts, agreements, promises, liabilities, claims, demands, losses, costs, or expenses, or any nature whatsoever, known or unknown, fixed or contingent (“Claims”), that Valley Outdoor and Stephens each now have against Regency, Drake Kennedy and Brian Kennedy, or any of them, by reason of any matter, cause, or thing whatsoever concerning Claims arising out of, based upon, or in any way relating to the Action, or any Claims raised or which could be raised therein, including any employment claims of any kind.” (A subsequent paragraph provided that Regency, Drake Kennedy and Brian Kennedy released Valley Outdoor and Stephens, using identical language to describe the scope of the release.) The July 2002 Settlement Agreement also contained an attorney’s fees clause: “In the event of any action to enforce this Agreement or interpret its terms, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in connection with said proceeding.”
II. The 2003 Virtual Action
In March 2003, another billboard company, Virtual Media Group, Inc. (Virtual), filed suit against Regency. Virtual was the sole named plaintiff. The fourth amended complaint alleged that Stephens was the president and chief executive officer of Virtual, and alleged that Regency and the other companies had engaged in widespread misconduct, including fraud, negligent misrepresentation, interference with contract, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, unfair business practices, and violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. § 1962) (RICO), in connection with five billboard sites that Virtual claimed Regency had transferred to Virtual in an oral agreement. Regency allegedly made the oral contract to transfer the billboards to Virtual in consideration for Virtual’s participation as a coplaintiff with Regency in federal litigation challenging the constitutionality of the City of Los Angeles sign ordinance.
After a 32-day bench trial, the court ruled in May 2007 that Virtual was owned by the Kennedys, not by Stephens (“[a]t no time has Jon Keith Stephens (“Stephens”) ever had any ownership interest in Virtual”), and that there was no contract to transfer the billboard sites to Stephens or to any entity owned by Stephens. The court also concluded that “Stephens’ claim in this lawsuit that Regency gave him the rights to five wall sign sites is a compensation-related claim which arose before the July 2002 settlement, ” and “[t]he July 2002 Settlement Agreement bars the claims brought by Stephens in this case.” The trial court adopted its special verdict and findings of fact and conclusions of law as its statement of decision, and entered judgment in Regency’s favor.
Virtual filed an appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in concluding that the Kennedys, not Stephens, owned Virtual. We affirmed the judgment in an unpublished decision on June 3, 2009, concluding that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that the Kennedys owned Virtual. (Virtual Media Group, Inc. v. Regency Outdoor Advertising, Inc. (June 3, 2009, B199008) [nonpub. opn.].)
III. The 2005 Valley Outdoor Federal Action
In April 2005, while the 2003 Virtual action was pending, Valley Outdoor (as sole plaintiff) filed a complaint against Regency and other billboard companies (allegedly owned and operated by the Kennedys) in federal district court, alleging in its first amended complaint violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. § 1962, subds. (a)–(d)), through acts of bribery, illegal payments to public officials, and extortion, among other acts, and unfair business practices under Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. After Regency filed a motion for summary judgment based in part on the July 2002 Settlement Agreement, the parties filed a stipulation to dismiss the action with prejudice, agreeing that “a stipulation should not waive Defendants’ right to move for attorney’s fees and costs, nor would a stipulation give to Defendants the right to recover attorney’s fees and costs, but rather the issue of attorney’s fees and costs would be determined by way of noticed motion.” The parties stipulated “Defendants reserve the right to file a motion of attorney’s fees and costs, with the Court reserving jurisdiction to hear such a motion.” Regency and the other defendants filed a motion for attorney’s fees relying in part on the July 2002 Settlement Agreement and Civil Code section 1717.
The motion for summary judgment is not in the record on appeal. Both parties cite to Regency’s second amended complaint in the case on appeal, in which one of the factual allegations is that “the summary judgment motion was based in part on the fact that the alleged predicate acts that purported to support Valley’s RICO claim in the federal lawsuit, all occurred during Stephens’ employment at Regency, which predated the July Settlement Agreement. As a result, the July Settlement Agreement barred the entirety of the Valley [federal] action.” We decline to accept factual allegations in an unverified complaint as record evidence of the contents of the summary judgment motion.
The district court denied Regency’s motion for attorney’s fees on September 10, 2007, concluding that fees were not available under California law for the single state-law claim for unfair business practices. The district court also concluded: “Because this is not an action on any contract, California Civil Code section 1717 is inapplicable. [¶] Not only is this not an action ‘on a contract’ within the meaning of section 1717, but the contractual provision in question that purports to provide for attorney fees does not apply. Defendants point to the attorney fees provision in a July 2002 settlement agreement as authority for the attorney fees they seek and invocation of section 1717. The pertinent provision in that agreement provides as follows: [¶] ‘In the event of any action to enforce this Agreement or interpret its terms, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in connection with said proceeding [emphasis added]. [¶] Plaintiff’s case plainly is not an ‘action to enforce [the July 2002 settlement agreement] or interpret its terms.’ While Defendants may have relied upon that agreement for purposes of persuading Plaintiff that its case had no merit, that does not convert Plaintiff’s case into an action to ‘enforce’ the agreement or to ‘interpret its terms.’” The district court also noted that a stipulated dismissal precluded it from determining that any party was a prevailing party, and concluded that the defendants’ attorney’s fees motion was untimely. Although the court allowed the Regency defendants to file a “proper supplemental submission” regarding costs, the defendants did not submit an application for costs and failed to appear at a subsequent status conference, and the district court closed the action on November 1, 2007.
In a footnote, the district court made it clear that “contrary to Defendants’ assertion in their opening brief, this Court did not rule that the claims Plaintiff brought ‘were barred by the settlement agreement.’ [Citation.] As Defendants elsewhere acknowledged, the parties stipulated to dismiss this action before the Court considered the pending summary judgment motion.”
IV. The 2007 Regency Action
In March 2007, Regency filed the lawsuit that is the subject of this appeal, against Stephens and Valley Outdoor.
A. The first amended complaint and the motion for summary adjudication
The first amended complaint alleged that the filing of the 2003 Virtual action and the 2005 Valley Outdoor federal action “by Stephens [and] Valley” each constituted a breach of the July 2002 Settlement Agreement and a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The complaint alleged that the breaches of the July 2002 Settlement Agreement had “caused Regency to incur reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees and costs to defend the Virtual action in excess of $2.5 million, plus prejudgment interest, ” (the first and second causes of action), and $600,000 plus prejudgment interest to defend the 2005 Valley Outdoor federal action (the third and fourth causes of action). The first amended complaint also alleged as to the first and second causes of action that “plaintiffs were forced to spend substantial time away from their business affairs and personal lives, and instead to devote their time and energy to defending [the actions], again to their financial detriment.” The complaint requested a preliminary and permanent injunction to prevent Stephens from continuing to use the name of Virtual, damages, and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.
The complaint further alleged “Valley is the alter ego of the defendant Stephens” and that Stephens (who was not a named party in the 2003 Virtual action) “caused a company he knew to be owned by Drake and Brian Kennedy, Virtual Media, to act as the nominal plaintiff in an action against the plaintiffs herein. Stephens... improperly used Virtual Media as part of a plot to extort money from the plaintiffs herein. He filed the lawsuit in the name of Virtual Media in an unsuccessful bid to avoid the bar of the July Settlement Agreement.” The complaint also alleged “the trial court in the Virtual action expressly found that Drake and Brian Kennedy were the co-owners of Virtual Media at all times and that Stephens had no ownership interest in Virtual Media. [¶]... The trial court further found that Stephens was the real plaintiff/real party-in-interest, not Virtual Media.” The complaint quoted the findings of fact in the 2003 Virtual action, which was attached as an exhibit.
Stephens and Valley Outdoor filed a motion for summary adjudication on the first and second causes of action, arguing that the 2003 Virtual action was not barred by the July 2002 Settlement Agreement because Virtual, the only plaintiff in that action, was not a party to the agreement, and the claims in the 2003 Virtual action did not involve the signs covered by the July 2002 Settlement Agreement and were outside the agreement’s scope. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion in an order filed April 17, 2008.
The trial court noted that the July 2002 Settlement Agreement recited the parties as “‘Valley Outdoor, Inc. and J. Keith Stephens, on the one hand, and Regency Outdoor Advertising, Inc., Drake Kennedy and Brian Kennedy, on the other hand’” and nowhere named Virtual. The trial court’s decision in the 2003 Virtual action remained on appeal, and the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the 2003 Virtual action “are on appeal and therefore are not final nor admissible in opposing the motion.” The other exhibits provided by the plaintiffs in opposition to the motion were not admissible. “In substance, the plaintiffs allege that, by filing [the 2003 Virtual action], defendants Stephen and Valley breached the July 15, 2002 Settlement Agreement and, therefore, plaintiffs are entitled to be reimbursed for the attorney’s fees incurred in defending that case.” The motion for summary adjudication argued that the July 2002 Settlement Agreement bound only Stephens and Valley Outdoor but not Virtual, which was the only plaintiff in the 2003 Virtual action. “[P]laintiffs have failed to provide any admissible evidence that Stephens was the true plaintiff in [Virtual Media], as plaintiffs now contend, ” and there was “no evidence whatsoever” that Valley Outdoor was involved in the 2003 Virtual action. The court granted summary adjudication to Stephens and Valley on the first and second causes of action.
B. The second amended complaint and the motion for judgment on the pleadings
Regency filed a second amended complaint on April 17, 2008, again alleging that Stephens and Valley Outdoor breached the July 2002 Settlement Agreement when they filed the 2005 Valley Outdoor federal action, causing Regency to incur $600,000 in attorney’s fees and other damages. The complaint also requested a preliminary and permanent injunction barring Stephens and Valley Outdoor from using “the name and corporate form of Virtual Media.” On August 26, 2008, Stephens and Valley Outdoor filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The first cause of action in the second amended complaint repeated the allegation that the July 2002 Settlement Agreement was breached when Stephens and Valley Outdoor filed the 2003 Virtual action, but the parties agreed that this cause of action was dismissed by the trial court’s earlier grant of summary adjudication.
The court granted the motion on the breach of contract claim, because even if Stephens and Valley Outdoor breached the July 2002 Settlement Agreement by prosecuting the 2005 Valley Outdoor federal action, the June 13, 2007 stipulation to dismiss that action provided that Regency reserved the right to file for attorney’s fees and costs in the federal court. Regency did so, and the district judge denied the motion. “In their second cause of action in the [second amended complaint] these plaintiffs seek the same attorneys fees for defending the Valley action. But this second ‘bite of the apple’ was not agreed to in the June 13, 2007 Stipulation by which the parties agreed to permit an application for fees only on a motion filed in the federal Valley action.”
The court also granted the motion on the third cause of action because there were no allegations in the second amended complaint which would confer on Regency or the Kennedys standing to enjoin the defendants’ activities with respect to Virtual. The court gave Regency until October 28, 2008 to file a third amended complaint on the claim for injunctive relief only.
C. The third amended complaint and the judgment
Regency filed a third amended complaint on October 28, 2008. Stephens and Valley filed a demurrer. On November 24, 2008, the trial court filed a judgment in Stephens’ and Valley Outdoor’s favor. The court concluded that the first two causes of action in the third amended complaint were adjudicated when the court granted the motion for summary adjudication on April 17, 2008. Regency had filed a request for dismissal without prejudice of the third cause of action, and the court entered an order of dismissal. The court ordered the entry of judgment against Regency on the first and second causes of action. Regency later dismissed with prejudice the third cause of action.
D. The motion for attorney’s fees
Stephens and Valley Outdoor filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $171,462.50 (plus $4,200 for preparing the motion) as the prevailing party, citing the July 2002 Settlement Agreement’s attorney’s fees provision (“In the event of any action to enforce this Agreement or interpret its terms, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in connection with said proceeding”). In opposition, Regency claimed some of the fees were not “reasonable and appropriate.” The trial court awarded $144,952.50 in fees to Stephens and Valley Outdoor.
Regency filed notices of appeal from the judgment on January 21, 2009 and from the order awarding attorney’s fees on April 3, 2009.
DISCUSSION
Regency argues that the res judicata effect of the final judgment in the 2003 Virtual action requires that we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary adjudication on the first and second causes of action in the first amended complaint. Regency also argues that the court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings as to the second cause of action in the second amended complaint. Finally, Regency argues that the award of attorney’s fees was also barred by res judicata, and that there were specific errors in the attorney’s fees award.
I. Motion for Summary Adjudication
“A trial court properly grants summary judgment where no triable issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) We review the trial court’s decision de novo. [Citations.]” (Westoil Terminals Co., Inc. v. Industrial Indemnity Co. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 139, 145.) We may affirm the grant of a motion for summary adjudication on any ground supported by the record, “whether that ground was the legal theory adopted by the trial court or not, and whether it was raised by defendant in the trial court or first addressed on appeal.” (Ibid.; see Lindstrom v. Hertz Corp. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 644, 648 [review standards for summary adjudication are the same as for summary judgment].)
The first and second causes of action in Regency’s first amended complaint alleged that Stephens and Valley Outdoor breached the July 2002 Settlement Agreement and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing when they filed the 2003 Virtual action, and asked for monetary damages in the form of the attorney’s fees Regency spent in defending the action. A breach of contract claim requires proof of recoverable damages. (Acoustics, Inc. v. Trepte Constr. Co. (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 887, 913.) A plaintiff suing for breach of contract is not entitled to damages in the form of the attorney’s fees incurred to enforce the contract unless the contract contains an attorney’s fees clause. (Sessions Payroll Management, Inc. v. Noble Construction Co. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 671, 677.) There is an attorney’s fees clause in the 2002 Settlement Agreement, but Regency did not seek fees under that clause in the 2007 Regency action. As Regency states in its brief on appeal, “[i]n this case, attorney’s fees and costs are being sought as damages for breach of contract, and the attorney’s fees clause is irrelevant.”
This is a breach of contract claim, as a tort action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies only in the context of insurance contracts. (Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 85, 102.)
Attorney’s fees are not recoverable solely as damages flowing from a breach of contract. (Olson v. Arnett (1980)113 Cal.App.3d 59, 67 (Olson).) In Olson, the respondents contended that when “appellant repudiated the settlement, respondents were forced to continue to employ attorneys and that therefore their attorney fees logically flow as damages from the breach. (See Civ. Code, § 3300.)... However, to allow respondents to recover their attorney’s fees would be contrary to the well-established rule that in the absence of a special statute or a contractual provision for attorney’s fees, the prevailing party is not entitled to recover attorney’s fees from his opponent. [Citations.] [¶] The instant case is based on a contract, the agreement to settle the underlying action. There is no contention or evidence there was any provision in the contract for attorney’s fees. Appellant breached his contract, and respondents had to employ attorneys in order to enforce that contract. We think this case is not basically different from any other contract action where the nonbreaching party is forced to employ an attorney to enforce the contract but is not entitled to his attorney’s fees as damages.” (Id. at pp. 67–68.)
As in Olson, Regency’s complaint alleged that when Stephens breached the July 2002 Settlement Agreement by filing the 2003 Virtual action, the breach caused Regency to incur attorney’s fees to defend the action. Although in this case there is a contractual provision for attorney’s fees in the 2002 Settlement Agreement, the complaint does not refer to the provision except in support of Regency’s claim for attorney’s fees incurred if it prevailed in prosecuting “this lawsuit” (the 2007 Regency action which is the subject of its appeal.) In its briefs on appeal, Regency repeatedly disavows any reliance on the attorney’s fees provision in its claim for $2.5 million in fees it expended in the 2003 Virtual action.
In the trial court and on appeal, Regency thus claims those attorney’s fees only as damages for breach of contract. Yet the cases Regency cites for the proposition that California courts have awarded attorney’s fees spent defending an action as damages all involved tort actions. (See, e.g., Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813, 815 [attorney’s fees recoverable as element of damages resulting from insurer’s tortious conduct in withholding benefits].) Regency cites Olson for the proposition that Regency could recover attorney’s fees if Regency were relying on the attorney’s fees provision in the 2002 Settlement Agreement. As we state above, however, Regency sought attorney’s fees only as damages for the breach, not under the attorney’s fees provision. Regency thus “cite[s] no controlling authority which supports... recovery of attorney’s fees in these circumstances.” (Olson, supra, 113 Cal.App.3d at p. 68.)
Regency also claimed “financial detriment” from the time and energy spent in defending the Virtual Action. This does not state a claim for damages for breach of contract. “[W]hen appellant alleges that he will incur additional expense and attorney’s fees” because he must defend an action, “he raises no issue of compensable damages. These types of damages are not normally compensable. It has always been understood in our system that attorney’s fees and the mental stress of litigation are burdens which the parties must ordinarily bear themselves.” (MacCharles v. Bilson (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 954, 958.)
“Damages are, of course, a necessary element of the breach of contract cause of action....” (Navellier v. Sletten (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 763, 775.) Because Regency cannot recover its attorney’s fees in the 2003 Virtual Action as damages for breach of contract, Regency has not alleged undisputed facts sufficient to state a necessary element of the claim for breach of contract. We affirm the grant of summary adjudication on the first and second counts on the ground that Regency has not stated a claim for legally recoverable damages.
Given our conclusion that Regency did not allege sufficient undisputed facts to support a claim for damages for breach of contract, we do not address the argument that the trial court’s grant of summary adjudication was barred by res judicata.
II. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
“‘A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘“Our only task in reviewing a ruling on a demurrer is to determine whether the complaint states a cause of action.’” [Citation.] ‘“[W]e are not bound by the determination of the trial court, but are required to render our independent judgment on whether a cause of action has been stated.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘We accept as true the complaint’s factual allegations and give them a liberal construction. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] [¶] Because a motion for judgment on the pleadings, like a demurrer, raises only questions of law, we may consider new theories on appeal to challenge or justify the trial court’s ruling. [Citation.]” (Burnett v. Chimney Sweep (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1064–1065.)
The second cause of action in the second amended complaint for breach of written contract alleged that Stephens and Valley Outdoor breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by filing the 2005 Valley Outdoor federal action, causing the same damages as alleged in the first and second causes of action in the first amended complaint (attorney’s fees and “financial detriment” for the time need to defend the lawsuit). Like the first amended complaint, the second amended complaint did not cite the attorney’s fees clause in the agreement as a basis for recovering fees incurred in the 2005 Valley Outdoor action. The complaint invokes the attorney’s fees clause only as a basis for attorney’s fees if Regency prevailed in the 2007 Regency action that is the subject of this appeal. As we explained above, attorney’s fees cannot be recovered as contract damages in the absence of reliance on an attorney’s fees clause in the contract. On the face of the second amended complaint, Regency’s second cause of action failed to state a claim for damages, and “[a] breach of contract claim is not actionable without damage.” (Bramalea California, Inc. v. Reliable Interiors, Inc. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 468, 473.)
This may have been a strategy to attempt to avoid the possible res judicata effect of the federal district court’s conclusion that Regency was not entitled to attorney’s fees under the contract provision in the 2005 Valley Outdoor federal action. The district court concluded that the action was not an action “on a contract” under Civil Code section 1717, and that it was not covered by the July 2002 Settlement Agreement’s attorney’s fees provision.
We affirm the trial court’s grant of the motion for judgment on the pleadings on the second cause of action in the second amended complaint.
The materials that are the subject of Regency’s second request for judicial notice are unnecessary to our disposition. We therefore deny the request.
III. Attorney’s Fees Awarded to Stephens and Valley
Because we affirm the grant of summary adjudication and the grant of the motion for judgment on the pleadings, Stephen and Valley Outdoor continue to be the prevailing parties in the trial court, and we decline Regency’s invitation to reverse the trial court’s order granting attorney’s fees to Stephen and Valley Outdoor.
Regency argues that the trial court erred in awarding certain categories of attorney’s fees to Stephens and Valley Outdoor. “‘[T]he determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court.... [Citations.] The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court has its own expertise. [Citation.]’” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1096.)
Regency first argues that the fees incurred in defense of the third cause of action in the second amended complaint were not recoverable under the July 2002 Settlement Agreement attorney’s fees clause as fees spent by the prevailing party “[i]n the event of any action to enforce this Agreement or interpret its terms.” The third cause of action was for an injunction preventing Stephens and Valley Outdoor from using the name and corporate entity of Virtual. The trial court considered and rejected Regency’s argument because the issues covered by the July 2002 Settlement Agreement were “intertwined” with the issues related to the claim for injunctive relief. It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to consider the issue of whether Stephens should be enjoined from using the name of Virtual as connected to the July 2002 Settlement Agreement. The circumstances under which Virtual was created were related to Stephens’ employment at Regency, and the mutual release in the July 2002 Settlement Agreement included “any employment claims of any kind.” (See Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1133 (Akins) [when issues are intertwined precise allocation is not required].)
Regency also points to individual items on the bills submitted by Stephens and Valley Outdoor, claiming that fees should have been disallowed for work on an earlier motion for judgment on the pleadings that was not filed, a motion to disqualify which the trial court denied as untimely, and a motion to correct the judgment. Regency argues that fees should not have been awarded because the work performed produced no benefit or was done to correct a mistake. The trial court rejected these arguments, apparently concluding that the work was nevertheless compensable. There is no requirement that attorney’s fees can only be awarded for work that produces an immediate favorable result. “[L]itigation may involve a series of attacks on an opponent’s case. The final ground of resolution may become clear only after a series of unsuccessful attacks. Compensation is ordinarily warranted even for those unsuccessful attacks, to the extent that those attacks led to a successful claim.” (Akins, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 1133.) Awarding these fees was not an abuse of discretion.
Finally, Regency argues that it was an abuse of discretion to award fees for times spent on other cases. The trial court rejected Regency’s arguments for the reasons advanced by Stephens and Valley Outdoor in the trial court, which were that the other actions referenced overlapped considerably with the 2007 Regency Action. Given what we have described as the tangled series of lawsuits engaged in by these parties, it was not an abuse of discretion to allow fees for items on billing statements referencing related cases. “The only proper basis of reversal of the amount of an attorney fees award is if the amount awarded is so large or small that it shocks the conscience and suggests that passion and prejudice influenced the determination.” (Akins, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 1134.)
The attorney’s fees award was not an abuse of discretion.
IV. Attorney’s Fees on Appeal
Stephens and Valley Outdoor request that we award them attorney’s fees as the prevailing parties on appeal, under the attorney’s fees clause of the July 2002 Settlement Agreement and Civil Code section 1717. We agree that Stephens and Valley Outdoor are entitled to fees as the prevailing parties on appeal. On remand, the trial court shall determine Stephens and Valley Outdoor’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs on appeal, and enter an order awarding such fees and costs. (See Akins, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 1134.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents’ request for attorney’s fees on appeal is granted. The matter is remanded to the trial court to determine the amount of attorney‘s fees and costs.
We concur: MALLANO, P. J., ROTHSCHILD, J.