Accordingly, the trial court did not err in excluding the use of the technique guides. See Regas v. Linton , 72 Ill. App. 3d 7, 13, 28 Ill.Dec. 342, 390 N.E.2d 509 (1979) (where evidence sought to be introduced was not inconsistent with the witness's testimony, the trial court did not err in excluding such evidence as not impeaching); see also Ogg v. City of Springfield , 121 Ill. App. 3d 25, 39, 76 Ill.Dec. 531, 458 N.E.2d 1331 (1984) ("The test for determining whether a prior statement is sufficiently inconsistent to be used for impeachment purposes is whether the inconsistency is great enough to contravene the witness' direct testimony on a material matter."). ¶ 60
( Forney v. Calvin (1975), 35 Ill. App.3d 32, 340 N.E.2d 603.) These principles were brought into focus in Regas v. Linton (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 7, 390 N.E.2d 9. In Regas, this court reversed a jury verdict for the defendants, after considering the issue of whether the trial court had properly excluded testimony of the plaintiff's expert.
We note that Ehret failed to object to the trial judge's comment at the time it was made and did not raise this issue in the post-trial motion. Ehret cannot raise the issue for the first time on appeal. ( County of Cook v. Holland (1954), 3 Ill.2d 36, 47, 119 N.E.2d 760, 766; accord Forest Preserve District v. Wike (1954), 3 Ill.2d 49, 57-58, 119 N.E.2d 734, 738; Regas v. Linton (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 7, 14, 390 N.E.2d 509, 515.) Moreover, while there seems to be some possibility that this comment conveyed mild acerbity on the judge's part, its effect is diluted by the fact that it was uttered while ruling in Ehret's favor, and Ehret apparently did not think it harmful enough to take exception either at the time or shortly after trial.
However, even assuming that the answer may present a proper question of an admission, examination of the answer does not show that the statement, upon which plaintiff relies, was an unequivocal admission of a pertinent fact. (See Regas v. Linton (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 7, 13, 390 N.E.2d 509; Fountaine v. Hadlock (1971), 132 Ill. App.2d 343, 347, 270 N.E.2d 222; and Haskell v. Siegmund (1960), 28 Ill. App.2d 1, 11, 170 N.E.2d 393.) The crucial consideration in this case, as defined by the parties, is whether Greves had turned his car into the northbound traffic lane to make a left turn, thereby striking plaintiff, or whether, as Greves testified at trial, he remained in the southbound traffic lane in preparation of making that turn when plaintiff crossed into his traffic lane and struck his vehicle.