Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. BS096090 David P. Yaffe, Judge. Dismissed.
Michael Regan, in propria persona, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Stephen P. Acquisto and Jeffrey I. Bedell, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.
Bergman & Dacey, Inc., Gregory M. Bergman, Mitchell C. Frederick and Michele M. Goldsmith for Real Party in Interest.
WILLHITE, Acting P. J.
INTRODUCTION
This purported appeal challenges a trial court order finding that it had no jurisdiction to consider a motion to vacate a judgment which had been unqualifiedly affirmed on appeal. We conclude that the trial court’s ruling was correct and that it does not constitute an appealable order. We therefore dismiss the purported appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2002, the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) initiated proceedings to fire appellant Michael Regan from his position as a permanent certificated teacher. In 2004, a four-day administrative hearing was conducted before the Commission on Professional Competence (COPC). COPC found multiple instances of Regan’s professional incompetence, specifically rejecting Regan’s attack on the credibility of LAUSD’s witnesses. In addition, COPC rejected Regan’s claims that his irritable bowel syndrome (IBS) constituted a disability that LAUSD had failed to accommodate and that his IBS excused his professional deficiencies. COPC concluded that good cause existed to fire Regan.
In 2005, Regan filed a petition for a writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) in the superior court to challenge his dismissal. He alleged that there was no evidence to support his discharge and that COPC had erroneously credited the testimony of LAUSD’s witnesses. The trial court reviewed the administrative record, including exhibits. Exercising its independent review of the record, it found that the evidence supported the decision to fire Regan. The trial court therefore denied Regan’s petition.
In 2006, Regan prosecuted an appeal from the trial court’s denial of his petition. In an unanimous opinion, we unqualifiedly affirmed the judgment. (Regan v. Office of Administrative Hearings and Los Angeles Unified School District, B187992.) We denied Regan’s subsequent petition for rehearing and the California Supreme Court denied his petition for review. On January 24, 2007, we issued the remittitur to the trial court.
In August 2008, Regan filed a document in the trial court entitled “Motion in Equity for an Order of Relief from Judgment on Petitioner’s Verified Petition of Writ of Mandamus on Grounds of Mistake of the Court in Missing Law In a Number of Rulings and Denial of Fair Hearing.” The document was filed under the same case number as Regan’s initial petition, case BS096090. Essentially, the motion alleged that the trial court had erred when it had denied his mandate petition in 2005. In particular, Regan again urged that LAUSD’s witnesses had been improperly credited.
LAUSD filed opposition to Regan’s motion. It argued that Regan had failed to establish the right to equitable relief (no showing of extrinsic mistake or fraud) so that his motion was nothing more than an untimely motion to vacate the judgment.
Regan failed to appear at the hearing on his motion. On October 8, 2008, the trial court (the same judge who had previously ruled on Regan’s writ petition) issued the following minute order:
“Hearing on [Regan’s] motion in equity for relief from judgment is ordered off calendar.
“The affirmance of this court’s judgment by the Court of Appeal deprives this court of jurisdiction over any subsequent proceeding. This court cannot reopen the case on the facts, allow the filing of amended or supplemental pleadings, nor retry the case, and if it does so the judgment rendered thereon would be void. Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 701.
“Regan is ordered to file no further papers of any kind in this proceeding, BS096090. Violation of this order will result in monetary sanctions against Regan which will have the force and effect of a judgment.”
This purported appeal by Regan follows.
DISCUSSION
In Regan’s appeal from the trial court’s judgment denying his petition for a writ of mandate, we rendered an unqualified affirmance of the judgment. (Regan v. Office of Administrative Hearings and Los Angeles Unified School District, supra, B187992.) That judgment disposed of all issues in Regan’s action because it completely resolved Regan’s core allegation that good cause did not exist to fire him. Consequently, our unqualified affirmance ended the litigation. The trial court therefore lacked any authority to reopen or retry the case based upon allegations already determined in its judgment which we had affirmed. Any further proceedings would have been void. (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 699, 701.) The trial court’s order that it could not entertain Regan’s motion was correct.
To avoid this conclusion, Regan argues that the trial court had the equitable power to hear his motion because he had alleged the judgment was the result of extrinsic mistake. (Weitz v. Yankosky (1966) 63 Cal.2d 849, 855.) Not so. The touchstone of that theory is that an extrinsic mistake deprived a party of the opportunity to present his claim to the court. (See In re Marriage of Stevenot (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1051, 1068-1070.) That is not what Regan’s motion claims. Fairly read, it is nothing more than attempt to reargue the merits of his initial petition to the trial court, the denial of which we unqualifiedly affirmed. The trial court therefore properly concluded that it had no jurisdiction to entertain Regan’s motion and placed the matter off calendar.
Further, the trial court’s order does not constitute an appealable order. Unless expressly made appealable by statute, a court order is not appealable. (Caruso v. Snap-Tite, Inc. (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 211, 213.) Orders made after judgment are appealable in limited circumstances. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(2); see discussion in Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2008) ¶¶ 2:149 to 2:151, pp. 2-72.7, 2-72.8.) The trial court’s minute order in this case does not meet any of those criteria. (See Wickware v. Tanner (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 570, 574.)
DISPOSITION
The purported appeal from the trial court’s October 8, 2008 minute order is hereby dismissed. LAUSD shall recover its costs on appeal.
We concur: MANELLA, J., SUZUKAWA, J.