Also the mere allegation of "badmouthing" is not sufficient. Plaintiff does not allege any fraud, defamation, or bad motive on the part of defendant or even that the statements made were untrue, Regal Home Distributors, Inc v Gordon, 45 Del. 49; 66 A.2d 754 (1949). Even accepting the allegations as true, and realizing that such a practice is of questionable ethics, it does not amount to an improper or illegal method of competition, 45 Am Jur 2d, Interference, § 31, p 308.

These elements direct the Court's analysis of the viability of Plaintiffs' claim here. DeBonaventura v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 419 A.2d 942 (1980) (citing Bowl-Mor, supra; Regal Home Distribs., Inc. v. Gordon, Del. Super., 66 A.2d 754 (1949)). a. The Existence of Prospective Business Relations

Although the Supreme Court of Delaware has not yet opined on the tort of intentional interference with prospective contractual relations, the "Delaware courts have long recognized the persuasiveness of the Restatement of Torts in the area of contractual interference." American Original Corp. v. Legend, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 962, 969 (Del. 1986) (citing Bowl-Mor Co., Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 297 A.2d 61, 64 (Del.Ch. 1972); Regal Home Distributors v. Gordon, 66 A.2d 754 (Del.Super. 1949)); see also, e.g., Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 652 A.2d 578, 589-90 (Del.Ch. 1994); Hursey Porter Assocs. v. Bounds, Civ. A. No. 93C-01-091, 1994 WL 762670, at *13-14 (Del.Super. Dec. 2, 1994). The relevant provision of the Restatement provides:

The Trial Court correctly delineated the elements of this cause of action as follows: "[A] showing of deliberate interference with a prospective business opportunity requires (a) the reasonable probability of a business opportunity, (b) the intentional interference by defendant with that opportunity, (c) proximate causation, and (d) damages, all of which must be considered in light of a defendant's privilege to compete or protect his business interests in a fair and lawful manner, Bowl-Mor Company, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., Del. Ch. , [6 Terry 49] 297 A.2d 61 (1972), and Regal Home distributors, Inc. v. Gordon, Del.Super., 66 A.2d 754 (1949)." 419 A.2d at 947.

"To sustain a claim for intentional interference with prospective contractual relations, a plaintiff must establish: '(a) the reasonable probability of a business opportunity, (b) the intentional interference by defendant with the opportunity, (c) proximate causation, and (d) damages, all of which must be considered in light of defendant's privilege to compete or protect his business interests in a fair and lawful manner....'"Lipson v. Anesthesia Services, P.A., 790 A.2d 1261, 1285 (Del. Super. 2001)(quoting DeBonaventura v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 419 A.2d 942, 947 (1980)(citing Bowl-Mor Company, Inc., v. Brunswick Corp., 297 A.2d 61 (Del. Ch. 1972); Regal Home Distribs., Inc. v. Gordon, 66 A.2d 754 (Del. Super. 1949))); see also Beard Research, Inc. v. Kates, 8 A.3d 573, 608 (Del. Ch. 2010). In Kuroda v. SPJS Holdings, LLC, the plaintiff alleged that defendants interfered with plaintiff's future business relations by making disparaging remarks about plaintiff's business acumen.

To sustain a claim for intentional interference with prospective contractual relations, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the reasonable probability of a business opportunity, (2) the intentional interference by defendant with the opportunity, (3) proximate causation, and (4) damages, all of which must be considered in light of defendant's privilege to compete or protect his business interests in a fair and lawful manner.DeBonaventura v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 419 A.2d 942 (1980)(citing Bowl-Mor, supra; Regal Home Distribs., Inc. v. Gordon, Del.Super., 66 A.2d 754 (1949)). To survive a motion for summary judgment for failure to state a breach of contract claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) the existence of the contract, whether express or implied; 2) the breach of an obligation imposed by that contract; and 3) the resultant damage to Plaintiff.

The elements for establishing a claim for tortious interference have been described as follows: [A] showing of deliberate interference with a prospective business opportunity requires (a) the reasonable probability of a business opportunity, (b) the intentional interference by defendant with that opportunity, (c) proximate causation, and (d) damages, all of which must be considered in light of a defendant's privilege to compete or protect his business interests in a fair and lawful manner, Bowl-Mor Company, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., Del. Ch. , 297 A.2d 61 (1972), and Regal Home Distributors, Inc. v. Gordon, Del.Super., 66 A.2d 754 (1949).DeBonaventura v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., Del. Ch. , 419 A.2d 942, 947 (1980).

The elements of the two species of torts above outlined are similar but not identical, the principal distinction between them being the availability to the defendant of a privilege to interfere within the limits of fair competition with prospective business opportunities. Thus, while interference with an existing contract requires (a) an intent to induce a breach (b) of an existing contract, (c) proximate causation, and (d) damages; a showing of deliberate interference with a prospective business opportunity requires (a) the reasonable probability of a business opportunity, (b) the intentional interference by defendant with that opportunity, (c) proximate causation, and (d) damages, all of which must be considered in light of a defendant's privilege to compete or protect his business interests in a fair and lawful manner, Bowl-Mor Company, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., Del. Ch. , 297 A.2d 61 (1972), and Regal Home Distributors, Inc. v. Gordon, Del.Super., 66 A.2d 754 (1949). The resolution of the fundamental dispute between the parties to this action is thus found in the answer to the question of whether or not Nationwide's activities are privileged because of its economic interest in settling claims as economically as possible.

See 9 A.L.R.2d 255. The privilege available to a competitor, as expressed in § 768, has judicial approval in Delaware. Regal Home Distributors, Inc. v. Gordon, Del. Super, 6 Terry (45 Del.) 49, 66 A.2d 754 (1949). Bowl-Mor and Brunswick were competitors. Brunswick was, therefore, entitled to the privilege of a competitor.