Numerous Florida cases have recognized the distinction between substantive versus technical/nonsubstantive violations set forth in the statute at issue here. See, e.g., Wilkey v. State, 712 So.2d 847 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing in a post conviction proceeding where youthful offender challenged length of sentence imposed after probation violation because record did not reveal whether violation was substantive or technical); see also Quiles v. State, 777 So.2d 992 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Escutary v. State, 753 So.2d 650 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000);Johnson v. State, 736 So.2d 708 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Robinson v. State, 702 So.2d 1346 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Hill v. State, 692 So.2d 277 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Johnson v. State, 678 So.2d 934 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Dunbar v. State, 664 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Reeves v. State, 605 So.2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). While no Florida decision until Meeks had undertaken the task of specifically defining "substantive" or "technical/nonsubstantive," we do gain some insight through an analysis of how specific violations have been classified by various courts.

The resolution of this controversy depends on which version of section 958.14 should apply — the version in effect at the time Windom committed his original offenses, or the amended version, which was in effect that the time Windom violated his probation. In Reeves v. State, 605 So.2d 562, 563 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), the court held that the application of the amended statute would constitute an ex post facto violation: The amended version of section 958.14 operates to subject a youthful offender to the general provisions of section 948.06(1) beyond the normal six-year cap for such an offender when the offender commits a substantive violation of probation or community control.

See § 958.14, Fla. Stat. (1989); Gardner v. State, 656 So.2d 933, 937 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). Although the statute was subsequently amended to allow for a longer sentence for a substantive probation violation, the state recognizes that the amended statute cannot be applied to appellant, because of the ex post facto prohibition. See § 958.14, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1990); Reeves v. State, 605 So.2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). The state notes, however, that the trial court was not limited by the youthful offender act as to the new offenses, but that, based upon the facts alleged by appellant, the case should be remanded to the trial court for attachment of portions of the record which refute his claim.

However, section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1991), permits sentences in excess of the six-year cap for youthful offenders who commit substantive violations of probation. Moreover, this provision was in effect in 1992 when Hill committed the underlying offense and thus, is not an impermissible ex post facto law, as Hill suggests.Cf. Reeves v. State, 605 So.2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). § 958.04(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (1991).

Subsequent to the issuance of the mandate, the state filed a motion to recall mandate and for rehearing, asserting that its previous confession of error was itself erroneous. It had failed to realize that the holding of Arnette was based upon the pre-1990 version of section 958.14. Under amended section 958.14, a youthful offender can be sentenced in excess of six years after revocation of probation if the violation was substantive rather than technical. See § 958.14, Fla. Stat. (1995); Dunbar v. State, 664 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Darden v. State, 641 So.2d 431 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Reeves v. State, 605 So.2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). We recalled the mandate and accepted the motion for rehearing as timely filed and received no response from the defendant.

State v. Arnette, 604 So.2d 482 (Fla. 1992); Young v. State, 654 So.2d 1206 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Darden v. State, 641 So.2d 431 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). A youthful offender can be sentenced in excess of six years after revocation of probation if the violation was substantive. See § 958.14, Fla. Stat. (1993); Reeves v. State, 605 So.2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). The consecutive sentences are reversed with directions to impose concurrent sentences with the appropriate credit for time served.

Section 958.14 of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990), as amended, effective October 1, 1990, operates to subject a youthful offender to the provisions of section 948.06(1), Florida Statutes, beyond the six-year cap of community control or probation. However, application of the statute as amended after Darden's offense in 1988, would constitute an impermissible ex post facto law under both the Florida and United States Constitutions. Reeves v. State, 605 So.2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). Therefore, Darden must be resentenced within the limitations of the Youthful Offender Act at the time of his original offense.