Opinion
C. A. 0:22-4616-CMC-PJG
01-27-2023
Phillip C. Reeves, Petitioner, v. State of South Carolina, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Petitioner Phillip C. Reeves, a self-represented state prisoner, filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.) for initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Having reviewed the Petition in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes that it should be summarily dismissed.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Petitioner filed this action on a standard complaint form for petitions for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner has been detained at the Greenville County Detention Center on state charges since November 2021. Petitioner raises several grounds for relief, though most of those grounds lack any coherent explanation or facts to support them. Petitioner claims that the detention center lacks access to courts, legal materials, or “outside persons,” preventing him from mounting a defense to his charges in violation of the Sixth Amendment. (Pet., ECF No. 1 at 4.) Petitioner also claims his detention violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause because of “undivine stress, anxiety, loss of family, rights, and irreparable injuries.” (Id.) Petitioner further claims that the seizure of his person and his property violated the Fourth Amendment because he was searched or arrested without a warrant and the evidence against him is conflicting and untrustworthy. (Pet., ECF No. 1-1 at 1.) Finally, Petitioner claims that he is being prejudiced by his detention because the crime he is accused of committing “never happened.” (Id.) Petitioner seeks to be released from custody.
Petitioner also filed a “Motion to Make Addendums” to the grounds for relief in the Petition that was docketed as a supplement to the Petition. (ECF No. 12.) In the supplement, Petitioner provides further argument that the evidence supporting his charges should not be believed (for instance, because the witnesses' original statements were made when the witnesses were drunk). (Id. at 2.) Therefore, Petitioner argues, the police lacked probable cause to arrest him or search his home. Petitioner also again claims that the detention center lacks adequate tools for him to mount a defense in his criminal case. (Id. at 12.)
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se petition filed in this case pursuant to the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. § 2254; the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214; and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983).
This court is required to liberally construe pro se petitions, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
B. Analysis
Initially, the court construes the Petition as seeking habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 rather than § 2241 because Petitioner is challenging his detention pursuant to state charges. See In re Wright, 826 F.3d 774, 783 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding § 2254 is the proper mechanism for challenging custody by state officials). A petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2254 allows a prisoner to challenge the legality of his custody or detention. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (“[A] district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus [on] behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”).
To the extent Petitioner raises claims about the conditions of his confinement, such claims are not properly brought in an action for a writ of habeas corpus. Cf. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973) (“[A section] 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or length of his custody.”); cf. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) (a prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge ‘the fact or duration of his confinement.' . . . He must seek federal habeas corpus relief (or appropriate state relief) instead.”) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, Petitioner's claims about his access to legal materials, counsel, and the courts are not cognizable in this case.
To the extent Petitioner raises claims about the validity of his criminal charges, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 cannot be used to prevent a state criminal prosecution, especially where the detainee can raise his claims in the court where his charges are pending. See Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 489 (1973); but see Id. at 489-90 (finding that pretrial detainees may seek federal habeas relief to assert their right for a speedy trial in limited circumstances); Allen v. Att'y Gen. of State of Me., 80 F.3d 569, 572 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding a pretrial detainee may assert double jeopardy violations in a federal habeas proceeding). Here, Petitioner claims that his constitutional rights are being violated because law enforcement violated the Fourth Amendment during Petitioner's arrest and the search of his home. Therefore, Petitioner does not raise a claim that is a cognizable exception to the rule that § 2254 generally cannot be used to prevent a state criminal prosecution.
Moreover, in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances. See Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44 (citation omitted). From Younger and its progeny, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
The first part of the test is satisfied in this case because Petitioner indicated he is currently detained on state criminal charges. The second part of the test is met because the Supreme Court has noted that “the States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The Court also addressed the third criterion in noting “that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.” Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975). Because Petitioner can pursue his Fourth Amendment claims in his pending state criminal matter in state court, especially considering that he indicates he has counsel in that matter, he is precluded from seeking federal habeas relief at this time. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. Thus, the court finds the Petition should be summarily dismissed because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The court further notes that this is the second habeas corpus petition filed by Petitioner raising mostly the same issues, C/A No. 0:22-4145, and Petitioner has also filed a civil rights action for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 about his arrest, 6:22-4145. The court summarily dismissed the habeas corpus petition for the same reasons provided in this Report and Recommendation. Petitioner is warned that filing duplicative lawsuits is a waste of judicial resources that justifies dismissal of these actions as frivolous. See Cottle v. Bell, 229 F.3d 1142 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Because district courts are not required to entertain duplicative or redundant lawsuits, they may dismiss such suits as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e).”) (citing Aziz v. Burrows, 976 F.2d 1158, 1158 (8th Cir. 1992)); McWilliams v. State of Colo., 121 F.3d 573, 574 (10th Cir. 1997) (“ ‘Repetitious litigation of virtually identical causes of action' may be dismissed under § 1915 as frivolous or malicious.”) (quoting Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir.1988)).
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the court recommends that the instant Petition for writ of habeas corpus be dismissed without prejudice and without requiring the Respondent to file a return.
The Petitioner is directed to the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' ” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).