§144. Those liens are effective from the date of the furnishing of the first item of material and the date of the performance of the first labor. Reeves v. Jenkins, 1968 OK 46, ¶8, 439 P.2d 941, 944. Section 287.8 provides in pertinent part as follows:
“Such lien shall be preferred to all other liens or encumbrances which may attach to or upon said leasehold for oil and gas purposes ...” § 144. Those liens are effective from the date of the furnishing of the first item of material and the date of the performance of the first labor. Reeves v. Jenkins, 1968 OK 46, ¶ 8, 439 P.2d 941, 944..Section 287.8 provides in pertinent part as follows:
The Viersens argue that the fact that the trustee was served should not affect the outcome because the bankruptcy court would have had to give him permission to take corrective action. Hall v. Main, 34 F.2d 528 (E.D. Ill. 1929); Rhodes v. Elliston, 29 F.2d 737; Reeves v. Jenkins, 1968 OK 4, 439 P.2d 941. This is precisely the point.
Association of St. Croix Condominium Owners v. St. Croix Hotel Corp., 682 F.2d 446, 448 (3rd Cir. 1982); In re Lampkin, 116 B.R. 450 (D.Md. 1990); In re: White Motor Credit Corp., 37 B.R. 631 (N.D. Ohio 1984), aff'd, 761 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1985); [1978] U.S. Code Cong. Ad. News 5787, 5963, 6296-97.Reeves v. Jenkins, 439 P.2d 941, 945 (Okla. 1968).Viersen v. Boettcher, 387 P.2d 133, 137 (Okla.
Thus, Loffland pleaded and established a valid and subsisting debt against Overstreet, under this State's laws.Hedlund v. Brogan, 167 Okla. 393, 30 P.2d 164 (1934); Reeves v. Jenkins, 439 P.2d 941 (Okla. 1968). Loffland's petition did not expressly request pre-judgment interest.
The undisputed evidence shows that Tiger pleaded and established a valid and subsisting debt against each individual appellant. Hedlund v. Brogan, 167 Okla. 393, 30 P.2d 164 (1934); Reeves v. Jenkins, 439 P.2d 941 (Okla. 1968). In view of the fact the OPEC Group admitted it never intended to pay its share of unit expenses, and never attempted to remove themselves from unit participation, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion.
Disposition is equated with surrender or abandonment elsewhere in the law. See Reeves v. Jenkins, 439 P.2d 941, 945 (Okla. 1968) (stating that "[a] bankruptcy receiver ordinarily has no power to surrender, abandon, or make some other disposition of property"); see also Regents of the Univ. of N.M. v. N.M. Fed'n of Teachers, 1998-NMSC-020, ¶ 27, 125 N.M. 401, 962 P.2d 1236 (recognizing that the plain language of a statute is the primary indicator of legislative intent). Second, Defendant cannot simply ignore the fact that if the Road were truly abandoned, title to the Road would revert to another, which we assume, without deciding, would be Defendant as the abutting landowner.