Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:03-CV-294-A
August 28, 2003
This cause of action was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), as implemented by an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge are as follows:
I. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
B. PARTIES
Petitioner Craig William Reeves, TDCJ-ID #673286, was incarcerated in the Sanders Estes Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division in Venus, Texas at the time he filed the instant petition. Reeves is no longer confined.
Respondent Douglas Dretke is the Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 16, 1994, Reeves pleaded guilty to possession of amphetamine, and the trial court sentenced him to 25 years' confinement. (Resp't Answer at Ex. A.) Reeves did not appeal his conviction. (Federal Pet. at 3.) At the time he was admitted to custody, Reeves received confinement credit from May 2, 1993. (Resp't Answer at Ex. B.) However, the trial court later corrected that to allow Reeves credit only from May 12, 1994. (Id.) On April 25, 2002, Reeves filed a time-credit dispute with TDCJ, challenging the recalculation of his minimum discharge date, which was denied. (4 State Habeas R. at 24.) On February 5, 2003, Reeves filed a state application for habeas corpus relief, challenging his minimum discharge date, which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied without written order. Ex parte Reeves, No. 19, 709-04 (Tex. Grim. App. Mar. 12, 2003) (not designated for publication). Reeves filed his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth Division, on April 7, 2003. See Spotville v. Cain, 149 F.3d 374, 377 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding pro se habeas petition filed when papers delivered to prison authorities for mailing). On June 21, 2003, Reeves was released to mandatory supervision. (Aug. 26, 2003 phone call to TDCJ.) He properly notified this court of his change of address.
Although Reeves initially filed his federal petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, the petition was transferred to this division. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d).
D. ISSUE
Reeves argues that he was denied due process in the recalculation of his minimum discharge date from May 17, 2003 to June 21, 2003.
E. RULE 5 STATEMENT
Dretke believes Reeves has sufficiently exhausted available state remedies on all issues presented and, thus, does not move for dismissal on this ground.
F. DISCUSSION
At the time he filed his federal petition, Reeves challenged as unlawful his then confinement, arguing that his minimum discharge date was incorrectly calculated. Because he has been released to mandatory supervision, the question of mootness must be addressed.
The federal courts may not entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by a state prisoner unless the petitioner is in custody in violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Here, Reeves meets the in-custody requirement because at the time he filed the petition, he was in custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. See Van Zant v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 104 F.3d 325, 327 n. 2 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating jurisdiction attaches at time petition is filed).
But jurisdiction further hinges upon whether the petitioner's challenge to the sentence is moot because there is no live case or controversy. U.S. CONST, art. Ill, § 2; Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). A challenge to a criminal conviction itself presents a justiciable case or controversy even after expiration of the sentence that was imposed as a result of the conviction. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7. In cases involving a challenge to a criminal conviction, the Supreme Court has been willing to presume the existence of collateral consequences sufficient to satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement. Id. at 8. However, this presumption does not extend to other situations where a conviction is not being attacked. Id. at 7-8. Instead, an individual challenging the execution of his sentence and not the underlying conviction must show a concrete and continuing injury that flows from the revocation. Id. at 12-14. Thus, Reeves must show that the recalculation of his minimum discharge date will cause or is still causing him to suffer some actual, future harm and that a writ of habeas corpus can prevent this harm. United States v. Clark, 193 F.3d 845, 847 (5th Cir. 1999). In this case, Reeves has been released to mandatory supervision based on his minimum discharge date; thus, there are no collateral consequences that could flow from the alleged delay in releasing him from custody. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7-14; Johnson v. Riveland, 855 F.3d 1477, 1481-82 n. 4 (10th Cir. 1988); Bailey v. Southerland, 821 F.2d 277, 278 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); Brady v. United States Parole Comm'n, 600 F.3d 234, 236 (9th Cir. 1979); Weiss v. United States Bd. of Parole, 451 F.2d 1346, 1347 (5th Cir. 1971); Klossner v. Cockrell, No. 3:03-CV-862-D, 2003 WL 22005918, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 2003); Weeks v. Cockrell, No. 3:02-CV-1426-M, 2002 WL 31757652, at *1-2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2002). See generally United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59-60 (2000) (holding term of supervised release remains unaffected by reason of excess time served in prison). In other words, there is no relief that this court could grant Reeves. This case is moot.
II. RECOMMENDATION
Reeves's petition for writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.
III. NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO PROPOSED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBJECT
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), each party to this action has the right to serve and file specific written objections in the United States District Court to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation within ten (10) days after the party has been served with a copy of this document. The court is extending the deadline within which to file specific written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation until September 18, 2003. The United States District Judge need only make a de novo determination of those portions of the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation to which specific objection is timely made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure to file by the date stated above a specific written objection to a proposed factual finding or legal conclusion will bar a party, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice, from attacking on appeal any such proposed factual finding or legal conclusion accepted by the United States District Judge. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en bane); Carter v. Collins, 918 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1990).
IV. ORDER
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, it is ORDERED that each party is granted until September 18, 2003 to serve and file written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation. It is further ORDERED that if objections are filed and the opposing party chooses to file a response, the response shall be filed within seven (7) days of the filing date of the objections.
It is further ORDERED that the above-styled and numbered action, previously referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for findings, conclusions, and recommendation, is returned to the docket of the United States District Judge.