Opinion
1:20-CV-026-RP
2020-08-31
Jacqueline REESE, Plaintiff, v. SUN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA and Sandra Tedd, Defendants.
Jon Michael Smith, Jon Michael Smith, Attorney, Austin, TX, for Plaintiff. Sandra Tedd, Del Valle, TX, pro se.
Jon Michael Smith, Jon Michael Smith, Attorney, Austin, TX, for Plaintiff.
Sandra Tedd, Del Valle, TX, pro se.
ORDER
ROBERT PITMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court are Interpleader-Defendant Sun Life Assurance Company's ("Sun Life") motion for discharge from suit, (Mot. Discharge, Dkt. 15), and Plaintiff Jacqueline Reese's ("Reese") motion for summary judgment against Defendant Sandra Tedd ("Tedd"), (Mot. Summ. J., Dkt. 6). Tedd is proceeding pro se and has not responded to either motion. Having considered the motions, the record, and the relevant law, the Court finds that Sun Life's motion for discharge and Reese's motion for summary judgment should be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
This case involves two competing claims to Eugene Reese's ("Eugene") life insurance benefits. Sun Life issued a group term insurance policy (the "Policy") to Asphalt Inc. LLC ("Asphalt"). Eugene, as a benefit of his employment with Asphalt, had a total of $10,000.00 in coverage under the Policy. (Answer, Dkt. 4, at 3–4). The Policy, as amended, contains the following provision:
Benefits payable upon the death of the Employee are payable to the Beneficiary living at the time (other than the Employer). Unless otherwise specified, if more than one Beneficiary survives the Employee, all surviving Beneficiaries will share equally.
(Policy Am., Dkt. 4-3, at 1). The amendment further specifies that if the insured did not elect a beneficiary at the time of death, the Policy proceeds are payable to the surviving spouse. (Id. at 1).
Eugene died on June 22, 2017. (Death Cert., Dkt. 6, at 17). He did not designate a beneficiary. (Orig. Pet., Dkt. 1-1, at 2; Answer, Dkt. 4, at 4). Both Reese and Tedd claim they are entitled to the Policy benefits as Eugene's surviving spouse. (Orig. Pet., Dkt. 1-1, at 2–3). In light of these competing claims, Sun Life did not disburse the benefits to either claimant. (Answer, Dkt. 4, at 5).
Reese then filed a lawsuit in state court, naming both Sun Life and Tedd as Defendants. (Orig. Pet., Dkt. 1-1, at 1). She alleges that Sun Life's refusal to pay her the life insurance benefits under the Policy amounted to a breach of the insurance contract and violated the Texas Insurance Code. (Id. at 3). Reese also seeks a declaration under the Texas Declaratory Judgment Act that she is entitled to the Policy proceeds. (Id. ). Sun Life removed the case to federal court, asserting federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e), as Eugene's life insurance plan is an employee welfare benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 – 1461. (Not. Removal, Dkt. 1, at 2).
Sun Life removed this action to federal court without Tedd's consent. (See Not. Removal, Dkt. 1, at 3). However, Reese has waived this argument by not filing a motion to remand on the basis of this procedural defect within thirty days of removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) ("A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal."). And the Court has federal question jurisdiction in this case irrespective of any error in removal procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ; see also Johnson v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc. , 892 F.2d 422, 423 (5th Cir. 1990) ("The failure of all the defendants to join in the removal petition is not a jurisdictional defect."). Accordingly, Tedd's lack of consent to removal is no barrier to the Court's adjudication of this dispute.
Shortly thereafter, Sun Life filed an answer, seeking interpleader through a counterclaim against Reese and a crossclaim against Tedd. (Answer, Dkt. 4). Sun Life noted that it was "unable to determine the proper beneficiary under the policy and [was] at risk of multiple liability," and, as a disinterested stakeholder, requested leave to interplead the disputed insurance proceeds pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22 and 67. (Id. at 5). Sun Life then filed a motion to deposit the $10,000.00 in dispute under the Policy into the Court's registry, which the Court granted. (Mot. Deposit, Dkt. 10; Order, Dkt. 11). Sun Life issued the check, delivered it to the Clerk's office, and received confirmation that the disputed Policy proceeds were deposited into the Court's registry. (Mot. Discharge, Dkt. 15, at 2; Deposit Receipt, Dkt. 15-1, at 1).
As a disinterested stakeholder, Sun Life now moves for dismissal from this lawsuit with prejudice. (Mot. Discharge, Dkt. 15, at 2). Sun Life requests that the Court dismiss it from this action, dismiss all asserted claims against it with prejudice, and permanently enjoin Reese and Tedd from asserting any further claims against it for the recovery of the disputed funds. (Id. at 2–3 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2361 )).
Meanwhile, Reese moves for summary judgment, asking the Court to declare that she is Eugene's surviving spouse and is therefore entitled to the death benefits under the Policy. (Mot. Summ. J., Dkt. 6, at 3). She has not moved for summary judgment on her breach of contract or Texas Insurance Code claims against Sun Life. (See id. at 1–3). The Court will address each motion in turn, beginning with Sun Life's motion for discharge.
II. SUN LIFE'S MOTION FOR DISCHARGE
A. Applicable Law
"Interpleader is a device that allows a party in possession of money or property belonging to another to join two or more parties asserting mutually exclusive claims to the property or fund in a single suit, thereby freeing the stakeholder from multiple liability or multiple lawsuits with respect to the property or fund." State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Bryant , No. 3:18-CV-1628-L, 2019 WL 7938266, at *9 (N.D. Tex. May 16, 2019) (quoting Corrigan Dispatch Co. v. Casa Guzman, S.A. , 696 F.2d 359, 363–64 (5th Cir. 1983) ). "The general purpose of interpleader is to ‘shield’ a plaintiff stakeholder—in this case, [Sun Life]—from liability arising from inconsistent claims to a single fund by ‘allowing the stakeholder to tender that fund to the court in lieu of defending against multiple possible lawsuits.’ " Id. (quoting Tittle v. Enron Corp. , 463 F.3d 410, 423 (5th Cir. 2006) ).
"An interpleader action typically involves two stages." Rhoades v. Casey , 196 F.3d 592, 600 (5th Cir. 1999). "In the first stage, the district court decides whether the requirements for rule or statutory interpleader action have been met by determining if there is a single fund at issue and whether there are adverse claimants to that fund." Id. "In determining whether interpleader is proper in the first stage, the district court does not ‘consider whether the competing claims are meritorious,’ as the first stage of this analysis concerns only ‘whether multiple claims have been asserted, or may be asserted, against a disinterested stakeholder, not whether those claims have merit.’ " Bryant , 2019 WL 7938266, at *9 (quoting Auto Parts Mfg. Mississippi, Inc. v. King Const. of Houston, L.L.C. , 782 F.3d 186, 194 (5th Cir. 2015) ). The party seeking interpleader "must demonstrate that it legitimately fears double or multiple claims directed against a single fund." Id. (citing Airborne Freight Corp. v. United States , 195 F.3d 238, 240 (5th Cir. 1999) ). However, "claims for interpleader are to be construed liberally" and "even the mere threat of multiple vexation by future litigation provides sufficient basis for interpleader." Connecticut Gen. Life Insur. Co. v. Wermelinger , 114 F.3d 1181 (5th Cir. 1997) ; Tittle , 463 F.3d at 424 n.10.
If a court determines that the interpleader action has been properly brought, it "may enter an order discharging a disinterested stakeholder, who has no claim itself to the disputed funds and has tendered the disputed fund into the court registry, from liability from further claims to the disputed fund and claims regarding entitlement to the disputed fund and the stakeholder's failure to resolve the dispute in the claimant's favor." Bryant , 2019 WL 7938266, at *9. Then, the court will proceed to the second step of the process and "make a determination of the respective rights of the claimants." Rhoades , 196 F.3d at 600. "When there is no genuine issue of material fact the second stage may be adjudicated at summary judgment." Id.
B. Analysis
This is a proper interpleader action. After Eugene's death, Sun Life faced competing claims from Reese and Tedd for a single fund—the life insurance proceeds under the Policy. (Answer, Dkt. 4, at 5; see also Orig. Pet., Dkt. 1-1, at 2–3; Tedd Letter, Dkt. 4-4, at 1). By the time Sun Life sought interpleader, Reese had already filed suit against Sun Life in state court, asserting her entitlement to the disputed funds as Eugene's surviving spouse, and Tedd had written Sun Life a letter contending that she was entitled to Eugene's life insurance benefits as Eugene's common law spouse. (See Orig. Pet., Dkt. 1-1; Tedd Letter, Dkt. 4-4, at 1). Sun Life indisputably faced "competing claims and [a] threat of multiple litigation over the same policy proceeds." Bryant , 2019 WL 7938266, at *10 ; (see also Reese & Tedd Letter, Dkt. 4-5, at 2 ("Given the competing claims to the death benefit, we are unable to determine, as a matter of law, which party is entitled to it.")). Therefore, Sun Life properly sought interpleader in this matter. (Answer, Dkt. 4); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 22(a)(2) (allowing a defendant exposed to double or multiple liability to seek interpleader through a crossclaim or counterclaim). Having determined that Sun Life has properly sought interpleader in this action, the Court may now consider whether Sun Life should be discharged from this matter as a disinterested stakeholder. Bryant , 2019 WL 7938266, at *9 (explaining that the court may enter an order discharging a disinterested stakeholder "who has no claim itself to the disputed funds and has tendered the disputed fund into the court registry"). Sun Life has shown that it is a disinterested stakeholder and has deposited the disputed funds with the Court's registry so that the Court may distribute them to the rightful beneficiary. (Order, Dkt. 11, at 1–2 (granting motion to deposit funds); Deposit Receipt, Dkt. 15-1, at 1). Though Reese has asserted claims for breach of contract and insurance code violations against Sun Life, those claims are barred by interpleader because the "factual allegations underlying those claims are based on nothing more than Sun Life's ‘failure to resolve its investigation in [Reese's] favor and pay out the life insurance benefits to [her.]’ " Berry v. Banner Life Ins. Co. , 718 F. App'x 259, 262 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (quoting Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hovis , 553 F.3d 258, 264 (3d Cir. 2009) ); see also Bryant , 2019 WL 7938266, at *19 (concluding a claim for breach of contract against the disinterested stakeholder was barred by interpleader because it stemmed from the claimant's contention that she was entitled to the policy proceeds but had not been paid them). Exposing Sun Life to liability on Reese's state-law claims—when those claims derive from the central question of which claimant is entitled to the life insurance proceeds—"would run counter to the very idea behind the interpleader remedy—namely, that a ‘stakeholder should not be obliged at its peril to determine which claimant has the better claim.’ " Berry , 718 F. App'x at 262 (quoting Bierman v. Marcus , 246 F.2d 200, 202 (3d Cir. 1957) ).
Thus, the Court concludes that Sun Life is entitled to be released from all liability for claims pertaining to Reese and Tedd's dispute over the policy proceeds and its alleged handling of the insurance claim submitted by Reese and Tedd. 28 U.S.C. § 2361 ("In any civil action of interpleader ... [the] district court ... may discharge the plaintiff from further liability, make the injunction permanent, and make all appropriate orders to enforce its judgment."); see also Berry , 718 F. App'x at 263 ("Once a district court concludes that the requirements for interpleader have been met, it may discharge the plaintiff-stakeholder if the stakeholder is a disinterested party willing to tender the disputed funds."). Now that Sun Life has "tendered the funds from the [policy]" there is "no reason to keep [Sun Life] in a dispute solely between the adverse claimants." Berry , 718 F. App'x at 263.
Accordingly, Sun Life's request to be discharged from this suit and from further liability for any claims that pertain directly to the policy proceeds, including claims against it regarding Reese and Tedd's entitlement to the policy proceeds and its alleged mishandling or denial of the insurance claims by either Reese or Tedd, is granted. Sun Life is dismissed and Reese and Tedd are permanently enjoined from filing any lawsuit against Sun Life related to the disputed Policy proceeds. See 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (authorizing a district court to issue a permanent injunction in an interpleader action when it discharges the disinterested stakeholder from further liability); see also Auto Parts , 782 F.3d at 192 ("A permanent injunction is necessary to give meaning to the plaintiff's discharge and to encourage interpleader actions.").
III. REESE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Having concluded that this is a proper interpleader action, the Court will proceed to the second step of the process: Determining the respective rights of the adverse claimants. See Rhoades , 196 F.3d at 600. Reese argues that because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to her status as Eugene's surviving spouse, she is entitled to the benefits under the Policy as a matter of law. (Mot. Summ. J., Dkt. 6, at 1); see also Rhoades , 196 F.3d at 600 ("When there is no genuine issue of material fact the second stage may be adjudicated at summary judgment.").
A. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is genuine only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "A fact issue is ‘material’ if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action." Poole v. City of Shreveport , 691 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 2012).
If the burden at trial rests on the nonmovant, the movant must merely demonstrate an absence of evidentiary support in the record for the nonmovant's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the movant does so, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P. , 864 F.3d 326, 335 (5th Cir. 2017). After the nonmovant has been given the opportunity to raise a genuine factual issue, if no reasonable juror could find for the nonmovant, summary judgment will be granted. Miss. River Basin All. v. Westphal , 230 F.3d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 2000). The nonmovant must "identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the manner in which that evidence supports that party's claim." Johnson v. Deep E. Tex. Reg'l Narcotics Trafficking Task Force , 379 F.3d 293, 301 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
In responding to a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party cannot rest on the mere allegations of its pleadings. Duffie v. United States , 600 F.3d 362, 371 (5th Cir. 2010) ; see also Larry v. White , 929 F.2d 206, 211 n.12 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Unsworn pleadings, memoranda, or the like are not, of course, competent summary judgment evidence."). Tedd did not respond to Reese's motion for summary judgment. Despite her failure to respond, however, the Court may not automatically grant summary judgment without assuring that no material fact issues exist. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's note; Eversley v. MBank of Dall. , 843 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1988). If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden, the court must deny the motion for summary judgment even if there is no response. Baton Rouge Oil & Chem. Workers Union v. ExxonMobil Corp. , 289 F.3d 373, 375 (5th Cir. 2002). However, when no response is filed to a motion for summary judgment, the Court may take the movant's uncontroverted factual assertions as true. Eversley , 843 F.2d at 174.
Before reaching the merits, the Court will address the threshold question of whether Tedd was properly served with Reese's motion for summary judgment. (See Notice Attempted Service, Dkt. 16).
B. Service
Reese filed her motion for summary judgment on February 24, 2020 and subsequently attempted to send Tedd a copy of the motion via certified mail to the same address in San Marcos, Texas that Reese had used to successfully serve Tedd with the original petition. (Notice Attempted Service, Dkt. 16, at 2; see also Citation, Dkt. 16, at 7). But Reese's motion for summary judgment went unclaimed and USPS did not have a forwarding address. (Notice Attempted Service, Dkt. 16, at 2; see also Tracking History, Dkt. 16, at 9; Aff. Non-Service, Dkt. 16, at 13). In June, Reese attempted to serve Tedd once more, this time through a process server. (Notice Attempted Service, Dkt. 16, at 2). The process server discovered that Tedd no longer lived at the address on file with the Court and had reason to believe Tedd had moved to Beaumont, Texas. (2d. Aff. Non-Service, Dkt. 16, at 13).
After Reese received a possible Beaumont address for Tedd from known friends and family, she hired a process server to make a third service attempt. (Notice Attempted Service, Dkt. 16, at 2). But when the process server arrived at the Beaumont address, the home was vacant and under remodel by the Beaumont Housing Authority. (Id. ; see also 3d. Aff. Non-Service, Dkt. 16, at 15). The Beaumont Housing Authority informed the process server that it did not know the former resident and that the home had been vacant for at least a month. (3d. Aff. Non-Service, Dkt. 16, at 15).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2)(C) provides that a paper is deemed served "by mailing it to the person's last known address—in which event service is complete upon mailing." Reese sent a copy of her motion for summary judgment to Tedd at her last known address via certified mail. (Compare Summons, Dkt. 16, at 7, with Cert. Service, Dkt. 6, at 4; see also Tracking History, Dkt. 16, at 9–10). And even if Tedd never received a copy of Reese's motion, "[r]eceipt is not required to perfect service by mail." Myles v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers #132 , No. 3:14-CV-985-M-BN, 2014 WL 12531170, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 2014). Thus, service of Reese's motion for summary judgment was complete on the date it was mailed via certified mail to Tedd's last known address. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C) ; see also Christiana Tr. v. Jacob , No. 7:15-CV-033-DAE, 2016 WL 11580300, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2016) (citing Rule 5(b)(2)(C) and finding service of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was complete upon mailing even though the certified mail receipt indicated defendant's home was vacant); Stevenson v. Anderson , 178 F. App'x 339, 340 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (concluding motion for summary judgment was properly served upon its mailing to the nonmovant's last known address).
Even though service of Reese's motion for summary judgment was complete upon mailing, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), Reese still engaged a process server and made two additional attempts to serve Tedd in person. (See 2d. Aff. Non-Service, Dkt. 16, at 13; 3d. Aff. Non-Service, Dkt. 16, at 15).
Tedd, a properly served Defendant, never responded to Reese's motion for summary judgment and the deadline to do so has long passed. See Fed. Civ. R. P. 5(b)(2)(C); W.D. Tex. Loc. R. CV-7(e) ("A response to a dispositive motion shall be filed not later than 14 days after the filing of the motion."). Because Tedd did not respond, the Court treats Reese's facts as "undisputed for the purposes of the motion." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) ; Eversley , 843 F.2d at 174.
C. Reese's Undisputed Facts
Reese married Eugene on August 12, 1983 in Travis County, Texas. (Reese Aff., Dkt. 6, at 6; Marriage License, Dkt. 6, at 9). They had two sons together and remained legally married until Eugene died on June 22, 2017. (Reese Aff., Dkt. 6, at 6; Orig. Pet., Dkt. 1-1, at 2; see also Death Cert., Dkt. 6, at 17 (naming Reese as the surviving spouse)). Reese made all the arrangements for Eugene's funeral and burial and, with the help of Eugene's mother, covered all associated costs. (Reese Aff., Dkt. 6, at 6).
During their marriage, Eugene obtained the life insurance policy at issue, but did not name a beneficiary. (Mot. Summ. J., Dkt. 6, at 2). After Eugene died, Reese applied for the death benefits under the Policy as Eugene's surviving spouse. (Id. ). In a letter to Sun Life, Tedd made a competing claim to the benefits, contending she was Eugene's common law spouse at the time of his death. (Tedd Letter, Dkt. 4-4, at 2). Though Tedd stated that she and Eugene had been "living together as husband and wife for over 14 years," she conceded that Eugene remained "legally married" to Reese at the time of his death. (Tedd Letter, Dkt. 4-4, at 1). After Sun Life received Tedd's letter, it informed both Reese and Tedd of the competing claims to the proceeds. (Reese & Tedd Letter, Dkt. 4-5, at 1–2).
Reese moves for summary judgment on her declaratory judgment claim. (Mot. Summ. J., Dkt. 6, at 2). She asks the Court to declare that she is entitled to the death benefit payable under the Policy as a matter of law because she is Eugene's surviving spouse. (Id. ).
D. Analysis
The terms of the Policy at issue state that if the insured did not elect a beneficiary at the time of death, the Policy proceeds are payable to the surviving spouse. (Policy Am., Dkt. 4-3, at 1). The question the Court must answer then is whether Reese has demonstrated that she is Eugene's surviving spouse as a matter of law.
Under Texas law, a person cannot be married to two people at the same time. Tex. Fam. Code § 6.202(a) ("A marriage is void if entered into when either party has an existing marriage to another person that has not been dissolved by legal action or terminated by the death of the other spouse."). Reese married Eugene in 1983 and they remained legally married until Eugene died in June 2017. (Mot. Summ. J., Dkt. 6, at 2; Marriage License, Dkt. 6, at 9). Eugene's death certificate names Reese as his surviving spouse. (Cert. Death, Dkt. 6, at 17). Eugene and Reese never dissolved their marriage by legal action, so as to validate any informal marriage between Eugene and Tedd. Tex. Fam. Code § 2.401(d) ("A person may not be a party to an informal marriage or execute a declaration of an informal marriage if the person is presently married to a person who is not the other party to the informal marriage.").
Based on the evidence marshaled by Reese, no reasonable jury could find for Tedd. Reese has demonstrated that she is Eugene's surviving spouse as a matter of law. Accordingly, under the terms of the Policy, Reese is entitled to summary judgment and to the disputed death benefit under the Policy.
IV. ATTORNEY'S FEES
As a final matter, Reese also seeks "reasonable and necessary attorney's fees as well as any and all other relief to which she may be entitled." (Mot. Summ. J., Dkt. 6, at 3). While it is well settled in the Fifth Circuit that a district court has the authority "to award reasonable costs and attorney's fees to the disinterested stakeholder in rule interpleader actions," Reese points to no authority and makes no argument as to why the Court should award her, the claimant, attorney's fees in this matter. Gen. Elec. Capital Assur. v. Van Norman , 209 F. Supp. 2d 668, 672 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (citing Rhoades , 196 F.3d at 603 ). Accordingly, Reese's request for attorney's fees is denied.
In its Answer, Sun Life also requests an award of its "reasonable fees and costs in connection with this action." (Answer, Dkt. 4, at 6). Though the Court has authority to award Sun Life its reasonable cots and attorney's fees, such an award is by no means automatic. Van Norman , 209 F. Supp. 2d at 672. Instead, "the decision to make such an award is a matter that is ultimately vested within the sound discretion of the trial judge." Id. (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Olivier , 412 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1969) ). Because Sun Life has not specifically stated why it is entitled to attorney's fees, did not mention attorney's fees in its motion for discharge, and never provided a detailed accounting of the attorney's fees and costs it incurred in litigating this matter, the Court cannot make such an award at this time.
To assess whether Sun Life is entitled to an award of fees and costs, Sun Life is ordered to submit a motion for its attorney's fees and costs within 7 days of this Order that (1) specifically states why it is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs from the Policy proceeds; and (2) provides a detailed accounting of the attorney's fees and costs that it expended in litigating this matter. Reese may respond to Sun Life's motion within the timeframe contemplated by the Local Rules. See W.D. Tex. Loc. R. CV-7(e). After considering the parties’ submissions, the Court will determine whether Sun Life is entitled to its fees and costs and in what amount. The interpleaded funds shall not be distributed to Reese until the Court has considered Sun Life's request for attorney's fees and costs. (See Answer, Dkt. 4, at 6). Should Sun Life fail to timely file a motion for attorney's fees, the Court will order the Clerk of Court to distribute the policy proceeds to Reese.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, IT IS ORDERED that Reese's motion for summary judgment, (Dkt. 6), is GRANTED . As Eugene's surviving spouse, Reese is entitled to the death benefit payable under the Policy as a matter of law.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Sun Life's motion for discharge from suit, (Dkt. 15), is GRANTED . Sun Life is discharged from all liability related to the disputed Policy proceeds except to Reese, whom the Court has determined is entitled to the policy proceeds at issue.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Sun Life is DISMISSED from this lawsuit with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Reese and Tedd are permanently enjoined from instituting any action against Sun Life for the recovery of the Policy proceeds at issue.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Sun Life shall file any motion for its attorney's fees and costs by September 7, 2020 . If Sun Life does not file a motion by that deadline, the Court will order the Clerk to distribute the policy proceeds to Reese.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the interpleaded funds shall not be distributed to Reese until the Court resolves the matter of Sun Life's attorney's fees and costs.