We find no error in the court's exclusion of the various exhibits described. Evidence which is immaterial or remote to the issues, or so unimportant that a jury cannot reasonably draw inferences from it respecting the issues, should be excluded. St. Paul Mercury Ind. Co. v. Lyell, 216 Minn. 7, 11 N.W.2d 491; Reek v. Reek, 184 Minn. 532, 239 N.W. 599; Watre v. G. N. Ry. Co. 127 Minn. 118, 149 N.W. 18. The law affords no specific or definite test for determining whether evidence is conjectural or remote. The question must be left to the practical judgment of the trial court and rests largely in its discretion.
In that situation the offer of proof of his admissions that he wilfully set fire to the insured property was properly excluded as hearsay. The ruling was correct also on the ground of the well established rule that a party after parting with his title or interest in property cannot by statements or admissions out of court disparage the title to or interest in the property not then his. Sons v. Sons, 145 Minn. 367, 177 N.W. 498; Crispo v. Conboy, 153 Minn. 343, 190 N.W. 541; Russell v. Roach, 173 Minn. 314, 217 N.W. 115; Reek v. Reek, 184 Minn. 532, 239 N.W. 599. As between plaintiffs and A.J. Rick, the settlement and stipulation of November 5, 1930, unquestionably transferred and vested all of A.J. Rick's interest in the insurance policies and the adjusted loss, the $1,200, in plaintiffs. This is not at all a parallel case to Dow v. State Bank of Sleepy Eye, 88 Minn. 355, 93 N.W. 121, cited by defendant.