Opinion
03-23-00122-CV
08-09-2024
Michael Reeder, Appellant v. Everything Blockchain Inc., Appellee
FROM THE 353RD DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D-1-GN-19-007805, THE HONORABLE MARIA CANTÚ HEXSEL, JUDGE PRESIDING
Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Kelly and Theofanis
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Chari L. Kelly, Justice
Michael Reeder named Everything Blockchain Inc. (EB) as a defendant in his suit alleging fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and other claims over alleged business investments gone bad. EB moved for dismissal with prejudice of all Reeder's claims under Rule of Civil Procedure 91a. Its motion was properly set for hearing, but on the morning of the hearing date, Reeder sought to nonsuit his claims. Despite the nonsuit, the trial court granted EB's Rule 91a motion and awarded EB attorneys' fees. Reeder appeals, contending in two issues that the fee award must be reversed either (1) because of his nonsuit filing or (2) because the fees awarded were not reasonable and necessary. We affirm.
Reeder's first issue, about the nonsuit filing, fails because he missed the nonsuit deadline that applies in the context of Rule 91a motions. After such motions are filed, respondents to the motion have the chance to nonsuit the claims at issue at least three days before the hearing to prevent the trial court from ruling on the motion. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.5; In re Est. of Savana, 529 S.W.3d 587, 592 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). Any nonsuit attempted after that deadline cannot defeat the Rule 91a motion-the trial court "must rule" on the motion despite a post-deadline nonsuit. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.5; Est. of Savana, 529 S.W.3d at 592. And after the court's ruling creates a "prevailing party on the motion," the court may award that party attorneys' fees. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.7. Thus, although Reeder argues that his nonsuit filing on the day of the hearing on the motion defeated the trial court's ability to award EB fees for the motion, Reeder's position is foreclosed by the relevant rule. We overrule his first issue.
In his second, he argues simply that EB did not sufficiently prove its fee request under Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP. See generally 578 S.W.3d 469 (Tex. 2019). We conclude that EB's proof to support its fee request met at least the minimum that Rohrmoos Venture requires. To meet Rohrmoos Venture's standards, a fee claimant must at least put on evidence of the "lodestar method" for calculating fee awards. 578 S.W.3d at 501. "Under the lodestar method, the determination of what constitutes a reasonable attorney's fee involves two steps." Id. (quoting El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757, 760 (Tex. 2012)). "First, the [factfinder] must determine the reasonable hours spent by counsel in the case and a reasonable hourly rate for such work." Id. (quoting El Apple I, 370 S.W.3d at 760). "The [factfinder] then multiplies the number of such hours by the applicable rate, the product of which is the base fee or lodestar." Id. (quoting El Apple I, 370 S.W.3d at 760). "The [factfinder] may then adjust the base lodestar up or down (apply a multiplier), if relevant factors indicate an adjustment is necessary to reach a reasonable fee in the case." Id. (quoting El Apple I, 370 S.W.3d at 760). "[A] claimant seeking an award of attorney's fees must prove the attorney's reasonable hours worked and reasonable rate by presenting sufficient evidence to support the fee award sought." Id. at 501-02. "Sufficient evidence includes, at a minimum, evidence of (1) particular services performed, (2) who performed those services, (3) approximately when the services were performed, (4) the reasonable amount of time required to perform the services, and (5) the reasonable hourly rate for each person performing such services." Id. at 502.
EB's fee claim was supported by a declaration from its lead attorney. The declaration included expert testimony about why $17,430.80 in fees should be awarded, using recognized reasonableness-and-necessity factors, including for the timekeepers' billing rates, and explaining the legal services performed, who performed them, and how long the services took to perform. Attached to the declaration were the timekeepers' curricula vitae and detailed hourly billing records that themselves showed each timekeeper's legal services performed, approximately when they were performed, and how long it took to perform the services. Reeder's appellate brief does nothing by way of argument to show why this expert testimony and documentary evidence was insufficient. Because we conclude that EB's proof supporting its fee request at least met Rohrmoos Venture's minimum requirements, we overrule Reeder's second issue.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Affirmed