Reed v. Thomas

6 Citing cases

  1. Whitten v. Moorman

    973 So. 2d 159 (La. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 2 times
    Applying 5-year prescription period for allegations of fraud in the inducement

    Claims of fraud and coercion are grounds of relative nullity. Reed v. Thomas, 355 So.2d 277 (La.App. 2 Cir.), writ denied, 357 So.2d 1153 (1978); Currie v. Matson, 33 F.Supp. 454 (W.D.La. 1940). The procedural requirements for pleading and proving prescription were summarized in Carter v. Haygood, supra, as follows:

  2. Coutee v. Rapides Healthcare Sys.

    CA 19-577 (La. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2020)

    The same is true here. Reed v. Thomas, 355 So.2d 277 (La.App. 2 Cir.), writ denied, 357 So. 2d 1153 (La. 1978), however, addressed a situation more similar to the one presented here. In Reed, the issue was whether a landowner knowingly sold the land at issue, not just the standing timber thereon.

  3. Albritton v. Albritton

    591 So. 2d 357 (La. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 3 times

    Prescription begins to run from the time the ground for nullity ceases or from the time a plaintiff is aware or should have been aware of the "errors." See New Hotel Monteleone, Inc. v. First National Bank of Commerce, 423 So.2d 1305 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1982); Reed v. Thomas, 355 So.2d 277 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1978). The plaintiff was aware that property other than Stoney Point was covered by the trust extension in 1980.

  4. Hogan v. McKeithen

    527 So. 2d 982 (La. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 8 times

    The only declarations by a person since deceased which are admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule are dying declarations, statements against interest, and in rare instances, statements pertaining to family history or relationships. Miller v. Miller, 226 La. 273, 76 So.2d 3 (1954); Reed v. Thomas, 355 So.2d 277 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1978), writ denied, 357 So.2d 1153 (La. 1978). The only other evidence supporting the contention that the Stones intended to donate their property to McKeithen is the copy of the unsigned promissory note drawn as an obligation of McKeithen in favor of the Stones, and the wills of Barton Stone and Inez Stone, both leaving their interest in this note to McKeithen.

  5. Whittington v. Sowela Tech. Institute

    438 So. 2d 236 (La. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 39 times
    In Whittington v. Sowela Technical Institute, 438 So.2d 236 (La.App. 3d Cir.), writs denied, 443 So.2d 591 592 (La. 1983), a lower court found a passing reference to the insurance policy sufficient to satisfy paragraph three of ยง 628.

    "The only declarations by a person since deceased, which are admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule, are dying declarations, statements against interest and in rare instances pertaining to family history, relationship and pedigree, where they are received as a matter of necessity." Miller v. Miller, 226 La. 273, 76 So.2d 3 (1954); Heap v. Newark Ins. Co., 129 So.2d 801 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1961); Reed v. Thomas, 355 So.2d 277 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1978); writ denied, 357 So.2d 1153 (La. 1978); Baker v. Life General Sec. Ins. Co., 405 So.2d 1162 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1981). The testimony in this case was hearsay and did not fall within any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule.

  6. Marshall v. Wells

    381 So. 2d 551 (La. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 5 times
    In Marshall v. Wells, 381 So. 2d 551 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1980), this Court considered a claim of absolute nullity with regard to a contingency fee agreement.

    Accordingly, the contract and deeds, although perhaps voidable under the allegations of the petition, are not absolutely null and imprescriptible. See Reed v. Thomas, 355 So.2d 277 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1978), writ denied 357 So.2d 1153 (La. 1978). See also Fried v. Bradley, 219 La. 59, 52 So.2d 247 (1950) and Whitney National Bank of New Orleans v. Schwob, 203 La. 175, 13 So.2d 782 (1943).