Reed v. State

10 Citing cases

  1. Lane v. State

    No. 10-13-00380-CR (Tex. App. Aug. 27, 2015)

    We do not believe the legislature intended to subvert this purpose by engrafting a culpable mental state onto the statute when it was transferred to Section 49.04 of the Penal Code." (emphasis in original)); Chunn v. State, 923 S. W.2d 728, 729 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet. ref'd); Reed v. State, 916 S.W.2d 591, 592 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1996, pet. ref'd) (concluding that the Legislature "did not intend to require proof of a culpable mental state for the offense of driving while intoxicated"); see also Bigon v. State, Nos. 03-05-00692-CR & 03-05-00693-CR, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 8756, at *10 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006) ("In this instance, felony DWI does not require proof of a culpable mental state. Nor does the felony charge of DWI with a child passenger require proof of a culpable mental state.

  2. Lewis v. State

    951 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. App. 1997)   Cited 3 times

    Four other courts of appeals have addressed arguments identical to Lewis', all finding it without merit. Reed v. State, 916 S.W.2d 591 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1996, pet. ref'd); Sanders v. State, 936 S.W.2d 436 (Tex.App.-Austin 1996, pet. ref'd); Aguirre v. State, 928 S.W.2d 759 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no pet.); Chunn v. State, 923 S.W.2d 728 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet. ref'd). Each held section 49.04 does not require proof of a culpable mental state.

  3. Sanders v. State

    936 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. App. 1997)   Cited 5 times

    Three other courts of appeals have already addressed this issue. See Aguirre v. State, 928 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no pet. h.); State v. Sanchez, 925 S.W.2d 371 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet. h.); Chunn v. State, 923 S.W.2d 728 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet. ref'd); Reed v. State, 916 S.W.2d 591 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1996, pet. ref'd). Each of these courts has held that the DWI statute did not require proof of a culpable mental state; however, they have disagreed on the reasoning.

  4. Chunn v. State

    923 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. App. 1996)   Cited 8 times
    Relying on section 49.11 to conclude no culpable mental state required for a DWI

    Appellant argues that from the time the DWI statute was moved to the penal code in 1993 until article 49.11 was enacted in 1995, the offense of DWI required the State to prove a culpable mental element, i.e., intent, knowledge, or recklessness. In Reed v. State, 916 S.W.2d 591, 592 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1996, pet. filed), the court of appeals addressed the same issue. Citing the analogous case of Ex parte Ross, 522 S.W.2d 214, 218 (Tex.Crim.App. 1975), the court held that the addition and codification of the DWI statute to the Penal Code did not add a culpable mental state as an essential element of the offense. Id. at 593.

  5. Ruiz-Angeles v. State

    351 S.W.3d 489 (Tex. App. 2012)   Cited 6 times

    It has long been established, however, that speeding is a “strict liability” offense for which no such proof is required. See Zulauf v. State, 591 S.W.2d 869, 872 (Tex.Crim.App.1979); Reed v. State, 916 S.W.2d 591, 592 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1996, pet. ref'd). We accordingly overrule appellant's sixth issue.

  6. Opinion No. JC-0451

    Opinion No. JC-0451 (Ops. Tex. Atty. Gen. Jan. 14, 2002)

    See generallyAguirre v. State, 22 S.W.3d 463, 471-76 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) (en banc) (discussing factors used to determine whether offense imposes strict liability); Tovar v. State, 978 S.W.2d 584, 587-88 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998) (en banc) (holding that Open Meetings Act offense imposes strict liability). Although there is no case law on whether an offense under section 545.060(a) requires a culpable mental state, we believe a court would conclude that the statute prescribes a strict liability offense. Courts have held that at least three traffic-related offenses — speeding, driving while intoxicated, and driving with a suspended license — are strict liability offenses, seeZulauf v. State, 591 S.W.2d 869 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1979) (legislature dispensed with culpable mental state as element of the offense of speeding); Ex parte Ross, 522 S.W.2d 214, 217 (Tex.Crim.App. 1975) (culpable mental state is not an essential element of the offense of driving while intoxicated); Reed v. State, 916 S.W.2d 591, 592 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1996, pet. denied) (culpable mental state is not an element of offense of driving while intoxicated); Clayton v. State, 652 S.W.2d 810, 811 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1983, no pet.) (culpable mental state is not an element of offense of driving while license suspended), and have intimated that other traffic-related offenses may also impose strict liability, seeHoneycuttv. State, 627 S.W.2d 417, 424 n. 4 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981) ("a culpable mental state is not a requisite for charging the offense of driving an automobile while intoxicated, speeding, nor for many of the other traffic type offenses set out in art. 6701d, V.A.C.S."

  7. Jessup v. State

    935 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. App. 1996)   Cited 13 times
    Holding there was no causal connection between refusal and failure to give written warnings, because record showed oral warnings were given

    This court and several other courts have addressed this issue and held that a culpable mental state need not be alleged or proved in a driving while intoxicated charging instrument. Pedro Cardenaz Aguirre v. State, 928 S.W.2d 759 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, n.w.h.); Chunn v. State, 923 S.W.2d 728 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, n.w.h.); Reed v. State, 916 S.W.2d 591 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1996, pet. ref'd). See also Honeycutt v. State, 627 S.W.2d 417, 424 n. 4 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981).

  8. Aguirre v. State

    928 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. App. 1996)   Cited 8 times

    Thus, if the mental element required by Section 6.02(b) did not apply to DWI when the offense was defined outside the Penal Code, there is no reason to presume that the element has now attached by reason of the statutes' inclusion in the Penal Code. Relying upon Ross, two other courts have also considered and rejected the contention raised by appellant. See Reed v. State, 916 S.W.2d 591 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1996, pet. ref'd); Chunn v. State, 923 S.W.2d 728 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1996 n.w.h.). The object of the DWI statute is to prevent men, women, and children from being maimed or killed by intoxicated drivers.

  9. Burke v. State

    930 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. App. 1996)   Cited 20 times

    Thus, appellant contends that the state was required to prove "recklessness" in order to sustain the conviction. The argument that the state is required to prove a culpable mental state to obtain a driving while intoxicated conviction was rejected by the Amarillo Court of Appeals in Reed v. State, 916 S.W.2d 591 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1996, pet. ref'd.). This panel followed the Amarillo court's decision in another case also decided today.

  10. State v. Sanchez

    925 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. App. 1996)   Cited 2 times

    Id., at 728. Relying on Ex parte Ross, 522 S.W.2d 214 (Tex.Crim.App. 1975), and Reed v. State, 916 S.W.2d 591 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1996, pet. ref'd), we affirmed, holding that Penal Code section 6.02 does not require proof of a culpable mental state for conviction of DWI. Id., at 728-29. This case is also controlled by Ex parte Ross.