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Reed v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas
Mar 15, 2005
No. 05-03-01632-CR (Tex. App. Mar. 15, 2005)

Opinion

No. 05-03-01632-CR

Opinion Filed March 15, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.

On Appeal from the 203rd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F02-01390-LP. Affirm.

Before O'NEILL, LANG, and LANG-MIERS.


OPINION


Arnold Ray Reed was indicted for the first degree felony offense of arson of a habitation enhanced by a prior felony conviction for aggravated robbery. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 28.02(a)(2)(A), 12.42(c)(1) (Vernon 2003 and Vernon Supp. 2004-05). Following a bench trial, the trial court found appellant guilty of arson, found the enhancement paragraph true, and sentenced appellant to fifteen years in prison. On appeal, appellant argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction for arson. We affirm.

Background

Appellant and Rose Angela Alfaro (Alfaro) lived together for two months in an apartment leased in appellant's name. The apartment was located on the second floor in a one-hundred plus apartment complex in Dallas, Texas. Appellant and Alfaro also worked together. On May 30, 2002, appellant was fired from his job and began acting "crazy." He cursed at Alfaro and other co-workers and had to be escorted from the building. Alfaro finished her work day and asked friends Misty and Stephon for a ride home. She told her friends she was afraid of appellant. When Alfaro arrived at the apartment, she realized appellant was still upset. She decided to move out because she was scared and four months' pregnant with someone else's child. Alfaro began moving her clothes from the apartment to her friend's car. Appellant attempted to stop her by pushing her, locking the door, and taking her clothes out of the car and throwing them on the "floor." Misty and Stephon were also in the apartment during this time and at some point, appellant pushed Misty against the wall. Alfaro's testimony is inconsistent about what happened next. She testified for the State that appellant told her he was going to burn her clothes and that she saw the bathroom on fire and called 9-1-1. At another point, Alfaro testified that she did not think she saw the burned bathroom until after the fire department arrived. On cross examination, Alfaro testified appellant did not say he was going to burn her clothes; he just did it. The next day, a fire and arson investigator inspected the apartment and observed burned clothing in the bathtub, soot marks on the tile, a partially melted shower curtain, damage to the bathroom, and smoke and soot residue throughout the apartment. The investigator testified that the fire was incendiary and that the burn pattern indicated the clothing in the bathtub was the point of origin. He was unable to determine whether an accelerant was used, but testified the fire could have been started with a lighter, cigarette or match.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellant appeals his conviction, arguing the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction. Specifically, appellant argues the state failed to prove the requisite intent to damage or destroy the habitation because there was only evidence that he intended to burn the clothes and that he did so in a noncombustible area, the bathtub.

Standard of Review

In a legal sufficiency challenge, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Young v. State, 14 S.W.3d 748, 753 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). In a factual sufficiency challenge, we view the evidence in a neutral light, not favoring either side, and determine whether the fact-finder was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). Evidence may be found factually insufficient when the evidence supporting the verdict, when considered alone, is too weak to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or when the evidence supporting the verdict does not outweigh evidence contrary to the verdict strongly enough to meet the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. Id. at 484-485. This review must employ appropriate deference to prevent an appellate court from substituting its judgment for that of the fact-finder, and any evaluation should not substantially intrude upon the fact-finder's role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the witnesses. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 648 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 832 (1997). The reviewing court must always remain cognizant of the fact-finder's role and unique position of judging witness credibility and disagree with the fact-finder's determination only when the record clearly indicates it is necessary to prevent the occurrence of a manifest injustice. Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 9. Otherwise, due deference must be accorded the fact-finder's determinations, particularly those determinations concerning the weight and credibility of the evidence. Id.; Jones, 944 S.W.2d at 648-49.

Applicable Law

A person commits arson if he starts a fire, regardless of whether the fire continues after ignition, or causes an explosion with intent to destroy or damage any building or habitation, knowing that it is within the limits of an incorporated city or town. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 28.02(a)(2)(A) (Vernon 2003). The offense of arson is complete when the actor starts a fire with the requisite culpable mental state, even if no damage actually occurs. Romo v. State, 593 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980) overruled on other grounds by Wagner v. State, 687 S.W.2d 303, 313 n. 7 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984); Beltran v. State, 593 S.W.2d 688, 689 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980). A person charged with arson acts with specific intent to damage or destroy a habitation if it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 6.03(a) (Vernon 2003); Beltran, 593 S.W.2d at 689; Prejean v. State, 704 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no pet.). Intent is almost always proved by circumstantial evidence and may be inferred from any facts that tend to prove its existence, such as the acts, words, and conduct of the accused. See Sadler v. State, 728 S.W.2d 829, 831 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, no pet.); Dominguez v. State, 125 S.W.3d 755, 761 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd); Krebsbach v. State, 962 S.W.2d 728, 734 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1998, no pet.). However, intent may not be inferred from the mere act of burning. Beltran, 593 S.W.2d at 689; Miller v. State, 566 S.W.2d 614, 618 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978).

Analysis

Appellant contends that by burning the clothes in the ceramic bathtub it was clear he did not intend to burn the apartment. But the statute does not require that the habitation actually be ignited, damaged or destroyed for a person to be convicted of arson. Beltran, 593 S.W.2d at 690. The arson is complete when the defendant starts the fire with the requisite mental state, even if no actual damage occurs. Romo, 593 S.W.2d at 693. And material need not be combustible to be damaged by a fire. Romo, 593 S.W.2d at 693; Beltran, 593 S.W.2d at 689. A fire may produce scorching and smoke damage without igniting the surrounding materials. Romo, 593 S.W.2d at 693; Beltran, 593 S.W.2d at 689. The evidence showed that appellant and Alfaro argued, that appellant was upset at Alfaro's moving out, that appellant pushed her and tried to lock her in the apartment, that Alfaro managed to take some of the clothes from the upstairs apartment to the car, that appellant grabbed the clothes from the car and threw them on the "floor," and that appellant took the clothes back to the apartment where he placed them in the bathtub and ignited them. Alfaro's testimony was inconsistent concerning whether appellant said he was going to burn her clothes. Additionally, there was no evidence that appellant tried to extinguish the fire or call for help. Alfaro and a neighbor called 9-1-1 while one of Alfaro's friends used water to extinguish the fire before the fire department arrived. The investigator testified that the fire was of incendiary origin and that fires of this type can easily spread to the roof area and to the entire building if not extinguished quickly. The fact-finder could infer from appellant's conduct that he intended to burn the habitation and not just the clothes. See Krebsbach, 962 S.W.2d at 734. We conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support appellant's conviction for arson. We overrule appellant's issues.

Conclusion

We conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support appellant's conviction for arson. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.


Summaries of

Reed v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas
Mar 15, 2005
No. 05-03-01632-CR (Tex. App. Mar. 15, 2005)
Case details for

Reed v. State

Case Details

Full title:ARNOLD RAY REED, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court:Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas

Date published: Mar 15, 2005

Citations

No. 05-03-01632-CR (Tex. App. Mar. 15, 2005)