Opinion
A-13966
11-20-2024
TRAVIS JAMES REED, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Sharon Barr (opening brief) and Renee McFarland (reply brief), Assistant Public Defenders, and Terrence Haas, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Madison M. Mitchell, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks Trial Court No. 4FA-17-02586 CR, Thomas I. Temple, Judge.
Sharon Barr (opening brief) and Renee McFarland (reply brief), Assistant Public Defenders, and Terrence Haas, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Madison M. Mitchell, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Harbison, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Travis James Reed was convicted of first-degree murder and misconduct involving a corpse after his mother was found decapitated in her house. Prior to trial, Reed moved to suppress evidence derived from the warrantless entry by troopers into his mother's house. The superior court denied Reed's motion after an evidentiary hearing, concluding that the search fell within the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement. On appeal, Reed challenges that ruling.
AS 11.41.100(a)(1)(A) and AS 11.61.130(a)(1), respectively.
The superior court also found that Reed's brother, Dustin Reed, who occasionally lived at the house, gave consent for the troopers to enter the house, and that the search therefore fell under the consent exception to the warrant requirement. Reed additionally challenges this ruling. Because we uphold the superior court's ruling that the search fell under the emergency aid exception, we do not reach the consent issue.
Under Alaska's emergency aid exception, law enforcement officers may conduct a warrantless search if three conditions are met:
(1) the police must have reasonable grounds to believe there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance in the protection of life or property; (2) the search must not be primarily motivated by the intent to arrest a person or to seize evidence; and (3) there must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched.
State v. Gibson, 267 P.3d 645, 659 (Alaska 2012) (citing Gallmeyer v. State, 640 P.2d 837, 842 (Alaska App. 1982)).
On appeal, Reed argues that the first condition was not met - i.e., that the troopers did not have reasonable grounds to believe there was an emergency requiring their immediate assistance. We reject this contention.
The search at issue occurred on a Sunday afternoon after Reed's brother, Dustin Reed, called law enforcement and asked them to conduct a welfare check on his mother. Dustin told dispatch that he had last spoken to his mother on Friday and that Reed was with her at her house and high on methamphetamine. Dustin explained that his mother told him she would call him back after Reed left, but she never did, and he had been unable to reach her. Dustin informed the responding trooper that Reed had been violent with his mother in the past. (Dispatch similarly told the trooper that Reed had previously assaulted his mother.) Dustin also told the trooper that Reed had a history of drug use and assaultive behavior, and he was worried that something had happened to his mother.
Dustin testified that, before calling the police, he asked a person who lived near his mother to check on her. This person informed Dustin that both Reed's and his mother's vehicles were in the driveway and no lights were on in the house, which prompted Dustin to call law enforcement, since his mother always kept a light on.
The troopers, however, did not enter the house based solely on this information. Rather, after arriving on the scene, the police made numerous attempts to get the attention of anyone inside the house: they knocked repeatedly on multiple doors, tried calling Reed's mother through her known phone numbers, sounded the patrol vehicle's sirens, and used the vehicle's public address system to call out to Reed and his mother. The troopers remained in contact with Dustin during this process, and Dustin became increasingly distressed as the attempts to make contact were unsuccessful. One trooper testified that Dustin's "voice was trembling with the concern that he had for his mom," and that Dustin expressed concern that Reed was in a "schizophrenic psychosis."
Dustin, who occasionally lived with his mother, explained to the troopers that the presence of the two vehicles in the driveway (Reed's and his mother's) meant that Reed and his mother were almost certainly in the house. The troopers also observed that snow covered both vehicles; there were tire tracks behind Reed's vehicle, but none behind his mother's. A neighbor told the troopers that the inactivity was unusual for Reed's mother; even with the small amount of snow in the driveway, she usually would have shoveled it. One of the responding troopers testified that Dustin was "adamant" that his mother would make contact with the troopers if she were able to do so.
Given these facts, the troopers had good reason to believe that Reed's mother was injured or incapacitated. We therefore conclude that the troopers had reasonable grounds to believe there was an emergency at hand requiring their immediate assistance.
See Gibson, 267 P.3d at 650 (recognizing that whether a search falls within an exception to the warrant requirement is a legal question that is reviewed de novo) (citing State v. Blank, 90 P.3d 156, 159 n.19 (Alaska 2004)).
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.