Opinion
NUMBER 2011 CA 2207
09-21-2012
ALVIN F. REED v. JUDY ANN ST. ROMAIN
Jesse L. Wimberly, HI Jesse L. Wimberly, IV Mandeville, LA Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant, Alvin F. Reed Wesley J. Levesque Keith Couture Madisonville, LA Counsel for Defendant/Appellee, Judy Ann St. Romain
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appealed from the
Twenty-Second Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of St. Tammany, Louisiana
Docket Number 2010-11874
Honorable Reginald T. Badeaux, III, Judge Presiding
Jesse L. Wimberly, HI
Jesse L. Wimberly, IV
Mandeville, LA
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant,
Alvin F. Reed
Wesley J. Levesque
Keith Couture
Madisonville, LA
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee,
Judy Ann St. Romain
BEFORE: WHIPPLE, McCLENDON, AND HIGGINBOTHAM, JJ.
WHIPPLE , J.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court's judgment refusing to order defendant to return to plaintiff a diamond ring that plaintiff contended was an engagement ring given to defendant in contemplation of the parties' marriage, which never occurred. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 19, 2010, plaintiff, Alvin Reed, filed suit against defendant, Judy Ann St. Romain, seeking the return of a diamond ring that he had given St. Romain. Reed contended that the ring was a donation to St. Romain in contemplation of marriage, but that because the parties were no longer engaged to be married, he was entitled to the return of the ring. St. Romain answered the petition, denying that the parties had ever been engaged and, thus, that the ring had not been given in contemplation of marriage.
Following trial on the merits, the trial court found as a fact that the ring given to St. Romain was not an engagement ring, but was instead a "shut up" ring. Thus, the trial court concluded that Reed had failed to prove that the ring was given to St. Romain in contemplation of marriage and refused to order the return of the ring.
From the judgment denying him the relief sought, Reed appeals, contending that the trial court erred in finding that the donation of the ring was not in contemplation of marriage.
The trial court's original judgment in this matter, dated July 11, 2011, found in favor of St. Romain and refused to order the return of the ring to Reed. However, it did not contain decretal language dismissing Reed's claim. Thus, on January 27, 2012, this court issued a rule-to-show-cause order, ordering the parties to show cause by briefs whether the appeal should be dismissed for lack of the appropriate decretal language. In response to this court's order, the record was supplemented with a February 8, 2012 judgment, which dismissed Reed's demands at his cost. Thereafter, by action dated March 29, 2012, this court maintained the appeal.
DISCUSSION
Generally, an inter vivos donation is irrevocable. LSA-C.C. art. 1468. However, this rule is subject to several specific exceptions: the ingratitude of the donee, the non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition, the occurrence of a resolutory condition, and the non-performance of other conditions or charges. LSA-C.C. art. 1556. Thus, if the donation of the diamond ring was not in contemplation of marriage, it was an irrevocable donation because it would not be subject to any of the above exceptions. However, if the ring was given in contemplation of marriage, it is a revocable donation because marriage is the condition which was not fulfilled. Busse v. Lambert, 00-1032 (La. App. 5th Cir. 10/31/00), 773 So. 2d 182, 183, writ denied, 2000-3224 (La. 1/26/01), 782 So. 2d 633; see also LSA-C.C. arts. 1562, 1563, & 1773. Whether a ring was given in contemplation of marriage is a question of fact subject to the manifest error-clearly wrong standard of review. See Busse 773 So. 2d at 183; Fortenberry v. Ellis, 217 So. 2d 792, 793 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
In the instant case, Reed testified that he and St. Romain met in 1999 and began a romantic relationship at some point thereafter. He claimed that when he gave St. Romain the diamond ring at issue in December 2001, he got down on one knee and asked her to marry him, and she accepted. Thus, according to Reed, the ring was an engagement ring. In support of his testimony, Reed offered into evidence a photograph of St. Romain wearing the diamond ring on her "ring finger" and a copy of her 2004 address book, wherein she listed Reed under emergency contacts as her "fiance." Reed testified at one point that the parties' relationship ended in early 2010, but later in his testimony, he stated that their relationship ended in late 2008. Nonetheless, according to Reed, after the relationship ended, he requested that the ring be returned to him.
On the other hand, St. Romain testified that Reed never asked her to marry him. In contrast to Reed's testimony, St. Romain related that Reed gave her the ring at issue a couple of days before Christmas as an early Christmas present. She testified that on that occasion. Reed told her, "[I]f you are a good girl I will go get you an early Christmas present," and he then presented her with a gift in a Christmas bag. Inside the Christmas bag was a box containing the ring, which was a three-stone, Canary diamond ring. St. Romain specifically denied that Reed had gotten down on one knee and proposed to her at that time, stating that Reed had never asked her to marry him at any time during their relationship.
St. Romain also testified that "from the very beginning," she questioned what type of ring it was. However, whenever she would confront Reed about marriage, he either would not answer, get angry, or be very evasive. She explained that on one particular occasion, she specifically asked Reed whether the ring was an engagement ring, a Christmas present, or a "shut me up ring," and Reed did not directly answer her question, instead asking her, "[W]hy did you want to know that?" According to St. Romain, she responded to him that if it were an engagement ring, she was going to have to give it back, to which Reed stated that she would always get to keep the ring and not to worry about it. St. Romain related that this "broke [her] heart" because Reed would not tell her that they were going to get married.
When questioned about listing Reed in her address book as her fiance, St. Romain noted that she had always hoped and wished that she would someday be Reed's fiancee. However, she stated that they had never referred to each other that way. St. Romain explained that it was an illusion in her mind, but that Reed did not want to marry her. In sum, St. Romain testified that she always wanted to marry Reed and had hoped that he would ask her to marry him, but Reed never asked her to marry him, they were never engaged, and there was never a date set for a wedding. Indeed, on cross-examination, Reed acknowledged that a date had never been set for the parties' wedding at any point during the parties' alleged engagement, which, according to his testimony, apparently lasted for seven or eight years.
Moreover, as noted by the trial court, the testimony of Kristen Barnhardt, St. Romain's daughter, supports St. Romain's testimony that the ring was not given to her as an engagement ring. Specifically, Barnhardt testified that her mother called her on Christmas morning 2001 and related to Barnhardt that Reed had given her a ring the night before. However, St. Romain did not indicate to her daughter at any time that she was engaged to Reed.
Faced with this conflicting testimony, the trial court chose to credit the testimony of St. Romain and specifically found as a fact that Reed gave the ring to St. Romain as a "shut up ring ... given to lull her into a sense of security to stay with him and nothing more." Accordingly, the trial court found that Reed had failed to prove that the ring was given to St. Romain in contemplation of marriage such that he would be entitled to the return of the ring.
In the instant case, the trial court clearly was faced with conflicting testimony regarding whether Reed gave the ring at issue to St. Romain as an engagement ring. Where factual findings are based upon determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the manifest error standard of review demands that great deference be accorded to the trier of fact's findings. Succession of Wagner, 2008-0212 (La. App. 1st Cir. 8/8/08), 993 So. 2d 709, 722. Moreover, where the trier of fact is faced with two permissible views of the evidence, its choice between the two cannot be manifestly erroneous. Henderson v. Nissan Motor Corporation U.S.A., 2003-606 (La. 2/6/04), 869 So. 2d 62, 69; Marroy v. Hertzak, 2011-0403 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/14/11), 77 So. 3d 307, 318. Considering the foregoing and the record as a whole, we cannot conclude that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in finding that Reed did not give the ring to St. Romain in contemplation of marriage and, thus, that Reed had failed to prove his entitlement to revocation of this gift.
In so concluding, we also find no merit to the significance Reed attempts to attach to one statement by St. Romain at trial wherein she said that she "broke off the engagement in '09." St. Romain thereafter corrected herself stating that she meant she broke off the relationship. Moreover, given St. Romain's testimony as a whole, wherein she candidly admitted that she had always hoped that she and Reed would marry and thought that at some point she would be his fiancee, we cannot conclude that the trial court committed manifest error in declining to reject St. Romain's testimony based on this one particular statement.
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CONCLUSION
For the above and foregoing reasons, the February 8, 2012 supplemental amending judgment, dismissing Reed's claim, is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed against Alvin Reed.
AFFIRMED.