Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:98CVP-79-S
May 7, 1999.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the court on motion of the defendants, Doug Sapp, et al., for summary judgment in this § 1983 action. The plaintiff, Willie B. Reed ("Reed"), pro se, has failed to respond to the motion.
Reed filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants have acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Reed claims that he injured his back when he slipped and fell in the kitchen of the Kentucky State Reformatory. He contends that he complained of pain, but was threatened with segregation and was deprived of the prescribed medical treatment. He alleges that he has been deprived medications and the recommended surgery. He claims that, as a result, his condition has deteriorated and he has suffered further injury.
The defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment. They claim that they are entitled to summary judgment for two reasons which we will address. First, they allege that they have not been deliberately indifferent to Reed's serious medical needs. Second, they contend that they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from claims in their official capacities. Reed has not responded to the motion for summary judgment, despite the court's granting of his request for an extension of the deadlines for discovery and motion practice.
The defendants have also urged that they are entitled to qualified immunity in performing discretionary functions. In light of the fact that they have failed to adequately apply this theory to the facts of this case, we will forego a review of this ground, as we find other arguments dispositive of the plaintiff's claims.
Failure to file an opposing memorandum may be sufficient grounds for granting the requested relief. See LR 7.1(c)(1). Nevertheless, in the interests of justice, this court will review and address the merits of the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see. Canderm Pharmacal, Ltd. v. Elder Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 862 F.2d 597, 601 (6th Cir. 1988). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
However, the moving party's burden may be discharged by demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the nonmoving party's case for which he or she has the burden of proof. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party demonstrates this lack of evidence, the burden passes to the nonmoving party to establish, after an adequate opportunity for discovery, the existence of a disputed factual element essential to his or her case with respect to which he or she bears the burden of proof. Id. If the record taken as a whole could not lead the trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, the motion for summary judgment should be granted. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
Reed must show that he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the defendants deprived him of that right under color of state law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1913, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held with respect to the proof required to establish deliberate indifference to serious medical needs that:
Officials may be shown to be deliberately indifferent to such serious needs without evidence of conscience intent to inflict pain. However, the conduct for which liability attaches must be more culpable than mere negligence; it must demonstrate deliberateness tantamount to intent to punish. Knowledge of the asserted serious needs or of circumstances clearly indicating the existence of such needs, is essential to a finding of deliberate indifference.Horn by Parks v. Madison County Fiscal Court, 22 F.3d 653, 660 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 199 (1994). In United States v. State of Michigan, 940 F.2d 143, 154 n. 7 (6th Cir. 1991), the court further explained:
This court notes the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Wilson v. Seiter, No. 89-7376, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271, 1991 U.S. Lexis 3490 (June 17, 1991), which has not only reaffirmed the principle that eighth amendment impingements anchored in conditions of confinement must be objectively demonstrated, id. at ___ — ____, 111 S.Ct. at 2326-27 but also has announced that the plaintiff has the burden of proving that prison authorities subjectively intended such violations. Id. at ___ — ___, 111 S.Ct. at 2326-27. It is noted, however, that the subjective intentions of prison authorities must be demonstrated by objective manifestations of such intent, and cannot be proved by factually unsupported, conclusory opinions of the court or of the prisoners or their representatives.See also, Brooks v. Celeste, 39 F.3d 125 (6th Cir. 1994).
Reed has claimed that Dr. Tanner discontinued his pain medication and canceled his appointments with doctors outside KSR. The medical records indicate that prescription orders were made by doctors other than Dr. Tanner. Reed was seen by a number of doctors on referral, and was treated primarily by Dr. Harkess. See, Tanner Affidavit.
Reed has made a non-specific allegation against Nurse Brenda Beehler that, when he asked about his appointments, she said she never received the requests or that they were lost in the mail. Reed does not provide any dates upon which these incidents occurred, nor is there evidence that he did not receive medical treatment because of some alleged action by Beehler.
Reed contends that Nurse Sheila Dykes charged him a co-payment for prescription refills during the period in question, and that there were delays in receiving medications. There are no specific allegations alleging when and under what circumstances these incidents purportedly occurred. The medical records do not reveal two- or three-week delays in refilling his prescriptions, as Reed alleges. The records reveal that he was charged a co-pay for certain medical visits, not for prescription refills.
Reed alleges that Dykes sometimes failed to take his blood pressure, and that her readings were inaccurate. He does not identify any particular incidents by time, date, or circumstance. In her affidavit, Dykes states that inmates who are under doctor's orders to have their blood pressure monitored are required to appear at a specific time and location to have the check performed. Reed does not allege that at any time that he appeared for such a check that she refused to administer it. Additionally, other nurses besides Dykes were responsible for taking blood pressures at various times. Without specific times or dates it is impossible to discern whether Dykes was responsible for failing to take a reading, if such an omission did, in fact, occur. Dykes also states in her affidavit that she took blood pressure readings according to her training and that she did it accurately. See, Dykes Affidavit.
Reed claims that Lieutenant Sharon Conrad was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs when she assigned him the duty of scrubbing the floors. Again, Reed has not identified the incident or incidents with any specificity. With respect to the date of the alleged fall and initial injury in October of 1996, any claim with respect to that incident is barred by the one year statute of limitations. See, Garcia v. Wilson, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985); KRS 413.140(1)(a). In his January 29, 1998 affidavit, Reed states that he was not aware of the extent of his own injury until he had been on his hands and knees scrubbing the floors. There is thus no evidence that Conrad knew of a restrictive back condition the extent of which Reed himself was not aware at the time of the job assignment. Additionally, Reed did not have a restricted duty slip from the medical department to verify his limitation, as he had obtained on prior occasions.
Commissioner Doug Sapp and Dr. Patrick Sheridan hold supervisory positions in Frankfort, Kentucky. Reed contends that he wrote them each a letter and that they did not respond. These individuals are not involved in the day-to-day management of KSR, although they have oversight responsibilities. Reed has not shown a direct causal link between the misconduct and any actions of these supervisors. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71, 96 S.Ct. 598, 604, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976).
Reed claims that he wrote a letter to Warden William Seabold about his medical problems and about Dr. Tanner. The letter, which Reed attached to his complaint, does not mention Dr. Tanner. He refers to a Dr. McCrakling. Deputy Warden Tony Williams responded to Reed's letter, stating that it had been referred to Williams for investigation. He further stated that he was aware that Reed was under the care of three physicians at that time. He advised that Reed should discuss the alleged inefficacy of his medications with one of his treating physicians. Thus Williams investigated the complaint and timely responded on behalf of Seabold.
Reed alleges that in the kitchen he attempted to talk with Deputy Warden Jim Stephens, but that Stephens ignored him and walked away. Reed does not identify what he attempted to discuss with Stephens. He does not state whether Stephens had any supervisory control over him, nor whether Stephens took any adverse action against him, other than ignoring him.
The evidence of record paints a very different picture from that which Reed portrays in his complaint. Reed received ongoing medical care from approximately one dozen different doctors, including a number of specialists from October of 1995 through the present. He received orders for medications, tests and treatments, and received follow-up care. Reed's total failure to rebut the evidence found in the defendants' affidavits and Reed's medical records lead this court to conclude that he is unable to establish a claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Decisions at to a course of treatment constitutes "a matter for medical judgment" and does not represent cruel and unusual punishment." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107, 97 S.Ct. 285, 293, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976).
There is a complete absence of evidence to establish obduracy or wantonness in the conduct of any of the defendants identified above. See, Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S.Ct. at 2324. The subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim requires that Reed produce some evidence that each defendant possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind to establish that they acted with deliberate indifference. He has failed to meet this burden.
Finally, to the extent that some of the defendants have been sued in their official capacity, and Reed seeks only money damages, the claims against them are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity and must be dismissed. Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989).
For the reasons set forth herein, we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the motion of the defendants for summary judgment must be granted and the action dismissed. A separate order will be entered this date in accordance with this opinion.