Opinion
SA-05-CA-186-RF.
June 21, 2005
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Before the Court is Defendant San Antonio Aerospace's 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 12), Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant San Antonio Aerospace's Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 15), and Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint (Docket No. 18). After due consideration, the Court is of the opinion that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss should be DENIED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this complaint pro se against Defendants, alleging that Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Plaintiff claims that Defendants' alleged discriminatory conduct was based on his race and color. He claims that Defendants harassed Plaintiff and terminated Plaintiff's employment.
Plaintiff claims that the discrimination against him began on or about September 16, 2004 and continued for roughly 300 days (during February 2003 to August 2004). He alleges that he was intimidated and harassed by David Young, lead supervisor, and was mistreated in comparison to his colleagues. He claims that David Young admitted that he was prejudicial against African Americans. Moreover, Plaintiff states that supervisors John Milton, David Rodriguez, Juan Ferris, and Justin Roe treated him differently than his Caucasian and Hispanic co-workers and retaliated against him which resulted in the loss of his employment.
Plaintiff seeks to have Defendant pay Plaintiff wages and benefits lost as a result of termination. He further prays that the Court grant other relief as may be appropriate, including injunctive orders, damages, costs and attorney's fees.
Defendants move for dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) asserting that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts that would entitle him to relief. Defendants claim that Plaintiff may not bring a Title VII claim against the individual Defendants because they do not fall within the definition of "employer" under Title VII. Defendants contend that Plaintiff fails to allege an ultimate employment decision that was sufficient to alter Plaintiff's employment and create an abusive working environment. In addition, Defendants allege that Plaintiff's claim for age discrimination under the ADEA should be dismissed because it was not raised before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOE"). Plaintiff raised this claim in the initial complaint. It does not appear from the record that there is evidence to support Plaintiff's previous claim. Since this issue was not raised by Plaintiff in the amended complaint, the Court will not address this issue.
DISCUSSION
For purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim, the complaint must be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiffs, and all the facts pleaded in the complaint must be taken as true. Gauging the likelihood of success on the merits is not appropriate; rather, courts should determine whether the complaint contains "either direct allegations on every material point necessary to sustain a recovery or . . . allegations from which an inference fairly may be drawn that evidence on these material points will be introduced at trial." However, the Court does not accept as true conclusory allegations or unwarranted deductions of fact. Pleadings filed by pro se parties are subjected to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Dismissal on the basis of a 12(b)(6) Motion is a disfavored means of disposing of a case, and district courts should avoid such dismissals "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." "The question therefore is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in his behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief."
Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 781 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir. 1986).
ALAN WRIGHT ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1216 at 156-59 (3d ed. 1998).
Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994).
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 52092 S. Ct. 594, 595-596 (1972).
Kennedy v. Tangipahoa Parish Library Bd. of Control, 224 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir. 2000).
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102 (1957).
Brown v. Nationsbank Corp., 188 F.3d 579, 586 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1357, at 601 (1969)).
Defendants claim that Plaintiff may not bring a Title VII claim against individual Defendants, David Young, John Milton, David Rodriguez and Juan Ferrios, because individual defendants who do not qualify as "employers" cannot be held individually liable and are not proper parties in a Title VII claim. Defendant cites Grant v. Lone Star Co., in which the Fifth Circuit ruled that an individual defendant who was not an "employer" could not be held individually liable. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) defines an Employer as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person"(emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit has ruled that the phrase "any agent" in this Title VII provision should be accorded a liberal construction and has ruled that "immediate supervisors are Employers when delegated the employer's traditional rights, such as hiring and firing. In the matter at hand, the record indicates that David Young served as an immediate supervisor to Plaintiff. However, the record is unclear as to whether Defendants John Milton, David Rodriguez, Juan Ferris, and Justin Roe are "employers" under the definition stated in Title VII, because the record does not indicate which defendant(s) possessed the authority to hire, fire, and transfer Plaintiff. The record states that all listed Defendants are supervisors, but it is unclear whether Defendants supervised Plaintiff.
Docket No. 12 at 1.
21 F.3d 649 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1015, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994).
Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226, 227 (5th Cir. 1990).
Defendants contend that Plaintiff's claims do not amount to a claim for racial harassment or disparate treatment because Plaintiff has not alleged that his working conditions were sufficiently altered, nor has he alleged an ultimate employment decision. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants discriminated against him for the last 300 days of his employment based on Plaintiff's race and color. He claims that he was mistreated in comparison to his other (non-African American) co-workers. He further states that his immediate supervisor, David Young, admitted that he was prejudicial against Plaintiff and emptied Plaintiff's desk, kicked his paperwork and his phone charger, all after Plaintiff reported this admission to Defendants John Milton and David Rodriguez. Plaintiff also claims he was harassed and ultimately terminated.
Docket No. 18 at 1-2.
Defendants cite Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuela SA and list the five criteria necessary for Plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of harassment based on race. Defendants assert that Plaintiff must show that:
266 F.3d 343, 353 (5th Cir. 2001).
(1) He is a member of a protected group
(2) He was subjected to unwelcome harassment
(3) The harassment was based on race
(4) The harassment complained of affected a term, condition or privilege of employment.
Docket No. 12 at 2.
Plaintiff offers some evidence as to each of these criteria. At this point, the Court is reluctant to dismiss Plaintiff's claim and will allow the parties to proceed with discovery. Viewing the allegations stated in the complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in their behalf, the Court DENIES Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for Failure to State a Claim upon which Relief can be Granted (Docket No. 12) be DENIED.
It is so ORDERED.