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Reed v. Pelley

Supreme Court, Special Term, Broome County
Jan 7, 1982
112 Misc. 2d 382 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982)

Opinion

January 7, 1982

William C. Burtis, Jr., for petitioner.

Levene, Gouldin Thompson ( John H. Hartman of counsel), for respondent.


Petitioner, by order to show cause, moved for an order pursuant to section 130 Gen. Bus. of the General Business Law to dispense with signature of respondent to a certificate of discontinuance of doing business as partners.

The matter came on before the Honorable DAVID F. LEE, JR., at Special Term, on March 17, 1981, and the motion was denied by Justice LEE on the ground that the moving papers failed to contain sufficient facts as to the nature of the partnership, but with leave to renew the motion, which has now been done. Since the prior motion was made, an action for an accounting has been instituted by respondent on December 30, 1981.

The purpose of requiring the filing of a certificate by persons operating under an assumed name or as partners is to protect the public, to afford the public information as to the identity of the persons conducting the business, to prevent deception and confusion. ( G.L. R. Realty Corp. v State Liq. Auth., 78 Misc.2d 620; Matter of Cooper v Goodman, 65 Misc.2d 939.) It does not affect the rights between the partners as to the continued use of the assumed name or rights to the assets of the partnership.

That the parties in fact no longer operate as partners appears clear. The continuance of the present certificate on file constitutes a misrepresentation to the public which calls for correction. The motion is therefore granted.

We see no reason for denial of the motion because section 61 Partnership of the Partnership Law provides that on "dissolution the partnership is not terminated, but continues until the winding up of partnership affairs is completed." The purpose of that section is to continue the liability of partners on predissolution obligations. ( Patrikes v J.C.H. Serv. Stas., 180 Misc. 917, affd 180 Misc. 927, mot for lv to app den 266 App. Div. 924.)

Respondent argues that the motion should be denied as no "special proceeding" has been commenced by petitioner or no plenary action. As pointed out, this proceeding was originally instituted by order to show cause. This is a proper method. (CPLR 103, subds [b], [c]; 403, subd [d]; and General Business Law, § 130, subd 10.)


Summaries of

Reed v. Pelley

Supreme Court, Special Term, Broome County
Jan 7, 1982
112 Misc. 2d 382 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982)
Case details for

Reed v. Pelley

Case Details

Full title:JERRY E. REED, Petitioner, v. LEE PELLEY, Respondent

Court:Supreme Court, Special Term, Broome County

Date published: Jan 7, 1982

Citations

112 Misc. 2d 382 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982)
447 N.Y.S.2d 98

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