Opinion
01-CV-0829E(Sc).
December 10, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This decision may be cited in whole or in any part.
Plaintiff Valerie Reed commenced this action on November 20, 2001 alleging that defendants — former employer Belknap Heating and Cooling, Inc. ("Belknap"), Gary E. Gorenflo, Belknap's President, and Jon Baumler, plaintiff's supervisor and alleged harasser at Belknap — had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"), N.Y.Exec. Law § 290 et seq., by subjecting her to a hostile work environment, discriminating against her because of her gender and retaliating against her after she had complained of the alleged discriminatory conduct. On July 31, 2003 defendants, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCvP"), filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which this Court granted in its entirety on April 23, 2004 (the "April 23 Decision"). The April 23 Decision dismissed all of plaintiff's claims and the case was closed. On May 10, 2004 plaintiff moved for relief from the judgment or to alter or amend the judgment, pursuant to FRCvP 59(e) and 60(b). On June 14, 2004 plaintiff moved to deny defendant's Bill of Costs. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's motion for relief from judgment will be denied and plaintiff's motion to deny costs will be denied without prejudice. At this time, this Court does not find the materials in support of plaintiff's motion to deny costs sufficient for a determination of plaintiff's financial abilities and the Court requests that both parties submit more thorough papers in support of their arguments regarding plaintiff's motion to deny costs.
The April 23 Decision details the relevant facts of this case and familiarity with such is presumed. Therein, this Court held that although plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact with regard to her hostile work environment claim, she had not suffered a tangible employment action. Defendants were thus permitted to and did meet their burden in asserting the affirmative defenses — to wit, (1) that defendants exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior and (2) that plaintiff unreasonably failed to avail herself of defendants' non-harassment policy and the corresponding preventive or corrective measures. Accordingly, this Court held that defendants are entitled to summary judgment with regard to plaintiff's hostile work environment claim. The April 23 Decision also held that plaintiff had failed (1) to allege anything tangible that could be construed as an adverse employment action for the purpose of establishing her prima facie retaliation claim, (2) to raise a triable issue of material fact with regard to her disparate treatment claim and (3) to raise a genuine issue of material fact that she had been constructively discharged. Plaintiff now seeks relief from the April 23 Decision granting summary judgment to defendants and requests that this Court alter or amend such so as to (1) reinstate plaintiff's hostile work environment claims against defendants Baumler and Gorenflo, individually, (2) reinstate plaintiff's hostile work environment claim against all defendants, (3) reinstate plaintiff's claims of constructive discharge and (4) reinstate plaintiff's claims of retaliation.
FRCvP 60(b) sets forth the grounds on which a court, in its discretion, can rescind or amend a final judgment or order. It provides, in pertinent part:
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect * * *. The motion shall be made * * * not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken."
FRCvP 60(b) is intended to strike a balance between serving the ends of justice and preserving the finality of judgments. House v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 688 F.2d 7, 9 (2d Cir. 1982). In other words, it should be "broadly construed to do substantial justice, * * * yet final judgments should not be lightly reopened." Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986) (citations and quotations omitted). "Since [FRCvP] 60(b) allows extraordinary judicial relief, it is invoked only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances." Ibid. The propriety of granting a motion pursuant to FRCvP 60(b) is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. Ibid.
Plaintiff has timely filed her motion and claims that she is entitled to relief from the April 23 Decision because of this Court's mistake of law and/or fact. See In re 310 Assoc., 346 F.3d 31, 34-35 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that FRCvP 60(b)(1) is available for a court to correct mistakes of law and mistakes of fact). In support of her Motion, however, plaintiff does not cite any alleged factual mistake that would alter the judgment nor does she claim any mistake of law. She instead asserts the same facts that the Court considered in its April 23 Decision and asserts unfounded legal arguments that fail as a matter of law.
FRCvP 59(e) allows a party to make a motion to alter or amend a judgment, but such must be "filed no later than 10 days after entry of the judgment." FRCvP 6(a) provides that in computing any period of time prescribed by the FRCvP, the day of the act shall not be included and when the time period prescribed is less than 11 days, holidays and weekends are also not included. Thus, the April 23 Decision resulted in judgment on April 26, 2004. Plaintiff's May 10, 2004 filing of her Motion fell within the 10-day period.
Plaintiff first asserts that her hostile work environment claim should not have been dismissed as to defendants Gorenflo and Baumler in their individual capacities because the affirmative defense to a hostile work environment claim only applies to the issue of vicarious liability for the employer and does not entitle non-employer defendants individually to summary judgment. It is clear, however, that in this Circuit an employer's agents cannot be held individually liable for violations under Title VII. Rivera v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16337, at *36 (2d Cir. Oct. 21, 1996); see also Tomka v. Selier Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that "individual defendants with supervisory control over a plaintiff may not be held personally liable under Title VII"). Thus, neither Gorenflo or Baumler may be held personally liable under federal law.
Plaintiff also argues that Baumler and Gorenflo should be personally liable under NYSHRL § 296(6). Her argument is unjustified because the law in New York does not allow an employer to be held liable for an employee's discriminatory act "unless the employer became a party to it by encouraging, condoning, or approving it." DeWitt v. Lieberman, 48 F. Supp. 2d 280, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citations and quotations omitted). Because plaintiff has not offered proof that Gorenflo, as President, encouraged, condoned or approved of Baumler's conduct, plaintiff's state claims against Gorenflo must remain dismissed. See Rivera, at *13 ("In order to hold an individual liable under the [NYS]HRL, * * * plaintiffs must show that the individual aided or abetted a primary violation of the [NYS]HRL committed by another employee or the business itself.") (quotations and citation omitted). As Baumler acted alone, plaintiff's evidence is insufficient, under the NYSHRL, to support a claim of aider or abettor liability against either defendant. See DeWitt, at 294. Plaintiff's hostile environment claims, therefore, against Baumler and Gorenflo individually remain dismissed. See Jacob v. Falbaum, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 19882, at *14 (2d Cir. Sept. 6, 2001) (finding that under NYSHRL it is generally accepted that "once an employer has been found to have not discriminated, there is no predicate for imposing liability on the supervisors").
NYSHRL § 296(6) states: "It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any acts forbidden under this article, or to attempt to do so."
Plaintiff next asserts that her hostile work environment claim against defendants should be reinstated because plaintiff claims that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether plaintiff suffered from a tangible employment action and whether defendants met their burden in asserting the affirmative defense. Plaintiff, however, makes arguments that were specifically rejected in the April 23 Decision and, as such, neither warrant extraordinary judicial relief nor rise to the level of exceptional circumstances.
Plaintiff claims it was appropriate for her to complain to her supervisor/harasser about the harassment instead of complaining to another member of management. This Court in the April 23 Decision, however, found that such behavior was not reasonable. Plaintiff also argues that the Court's determination that defendants' remedial measures were sufficient to end the harassment is wrong although the April 23 Decision held that plaintiff is not entitled to choose the appropriate punishment or warnings and plaintiff does not claim that the harassment continued and, in fact, admits that the alleged harassment stopped once she confronted Baumler and Gorenflo.
Similarly, plaintiff's arguments asserting that she suffered an adverse employment action and was constructively discharged do not highlight any mistakes in the April 23 Decision. This Court found that plaintiff had not been subjected to a tangible employment action because (1) a constructive discharge does not constitute a tangible employment action in this context, (2) defendant did not reduce plaintiff's compensation, demote her or significantly change her job duties, (3) any reduction in job duties was due to a co-worker's return from maternity leave and (4) plaintiff could not have been expected to be promoted after four months on the job when she was not qualified for a promotion and was not expecting a promotion until after a few years of training. Plaintiff argues that her duties were reduced two weeks after the co-worker's return from maternity leave, which argument this Court considered in the April 23 Decision and concluded that the facts were not sufficient to show a reduction in duties. Plaintiff also contends that her adverse employment action was not a denied promotion but a denied continuance of her training for a potential promotion. The alleged halting of training for a potential promotion two years in the future, however, is not a tangible employment action. See, e.g., Banks v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 320 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that an employment action that limits an employee's future opportunities for promotion, but does not itself affect the employee's job duties, compensation or benefits, does not qualify as an adverse employment action).
Finally, in finding that plaintiff had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that she had been constructively discharged, this Court held that plaintiff had not shown that defendants deliberately made her working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign. In support of her Motion, plaintiff does not assert any deliberate action by defendants and therefore the April 23 Decision must stand. Plaintiff has made no showing of exceptional circumstances to warrant the extraordinary judicial relief available under FRCvP 60(b) and therefore plaintiff's Motion will be denied.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Judgment and/or to Alter or Amend Judgment is denied and that plaintiff's Motion to Deny Defendant's Bill of Costs is denied without prejudice.