Opinion
C. A. 9:23-cv-00008-DCC-MHC
05-29-2024
Sammy Lemars Reed, Plaintiff, v. Nurse Williams, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry Judge.
Plaintiff Sammy Lemars Reed (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights while he was incarcerated within the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”). ECF No. 1. Defendant Nurse Williams (“Defendant”) filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”). ECF No. 39. After the Court issued an order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to Defendant's Motion, Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition. ECF No. 44. The matter is, therefore, ripe for review.
All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) and (e) (D.S.C.). Because the Motion is dispositive, this Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the District Judge. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends granting the Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated while he was incarcerated at Trenton Correctional Institution. Specifically, Plaintiff appears to allege a claim for deliberate indifference to his medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant refused to allow him to sign up for sick call on March 10, 2022. ECF No. 9 at 5. Plaintiff claims he was “never seen” by Defendant. ECF No. 9 at 5. Plaintiff maintains that his injuries are pain in his lower back and a swollen knee. ECF No. 9 at 6. It is unclear whether these injuries were the reason Plaintiff sought medical attention, or if these injuries were the result of Defendant allegedly refusing to provide care.
Defendant is the only remaining Defendant in this action. By prior Order, other Defendants named in the Amended Complaint were dismissed from the action without prejudice and without issuance of service of process. See ECF Nos. 14, 36.
Plaintiff does not request monetary damages; rather, he requests “confidentiality, discrimination and slande[r] with other inmate know my condition [sic].” ECF No. 9 at 6.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 39. Summary judgment is appropriate if a party “shows there is no genuine dispute as to any issue of material fact” and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Under the framework established in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the Court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist which give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324.
Under this standard, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, although the Court views all the underlying facts and inferences in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the non-moving “party nonetheless must offer some ‘concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his [or her] favor.'” Williams v. Genex Servs., LLC, 809 F.3d 103, 109 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256). That is to say, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory or speculative allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To survive summary judgment, the non-movant must provide evidence of every element essential to his action on which he will bear the burden of proving at a trial on the merits. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
Additionally, pro se filings are to be “liberally construed” and a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This “[l]iberal construction of the pleadings is particularly appropriate where, as here, there is a pro se complaint raising civil rights issues.” Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 173 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting “we are obliged to construe [a complaint's] allegations liberally and with the intent of doing justice”).
However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. See United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2012); Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The ‘special judicial solicitude' with which a district court should view such pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate.”).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant maintains she is entitled to summary judgment for two reasons. First, Defendant argues Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. ECF No. 39-1 at 2-4. Second, Defendant argues Eleventh Amendment immunity bars claims against her in her official capacity. ECF No. 39-1 at 4-5.
A. Exhaustion of administrative remedies
Defendant argues she is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies before filing this action, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Defendant has not carried her burden in showing this affirmative defense.
The PLRA requires an inmate to exhaust “such administrative remedies as are available” before bringing suit under § 1983 to challenge prison conditions. Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 635 (2016) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)). “[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement is mandatory.” Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 677 (4th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Custis v. Davis, 851 F.3d 358, 363 (4th Cir. 2017); see also Graham v. Gentry, 413 Fed.Appx. 660, 663 (4th Cir. 2011) (“The exhaustion requirement is mandatory, and courts lack the authority to waive that requirement.”). Section 1997e mandates “proper” exhaustion; thus, a “procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal” does not satisfy the mandatory exhaustion requirement. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 83-84 (2006).
The PLRA “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). “Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, and defendants have the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion.” Baxley v. Jividen, 508 F.Supp.3d 28, 46 (S.D. W.Va. 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “However, if a defendant makes a threshold showing of failure to exhaust, the burden of showing that administrative remedies were unavailable falls to the plaintiff.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Defendant has not made a threshold showing of failure to exhaust. As an initial matter, other than quoting SCDC policies that are not in evidence before the Court, Defendant offers no evidence that details the administrative exhaustion procedure at Trenton Correctional Institution. See ECF No. 39-1. Thus, as a practical matter, it is not clear what Plaintiff was required to do to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) (noting “it is the prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion”); Woodford, 548 U.S. at 95 (noting that “proper exhaustion” only occurs when “the grievant complies with the system's critical procedural rules”).
Additionally, because failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, Defendant must present evidence or otherwise make a showing that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Defendant has not done so. Instead, Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to allege he exhausted his administrative remedies (see ECF No. 39-1 at 2-4), noting that portions of the Amended Complaint were left blank and that “Plaintiff sets forth no reasons or explanations as to why he failed to file the grievance on time or thereafter failed to exhaust administrative remedies.” ECF No. 39-1 at 4. However, it is Defendant's, and not Plaintiff's, burden to establish a failure to exhaust. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 216 (“We conclude that failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, and that inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.”); Custis v. Davis, 851 F.3d 358, 361 (4th Cir. 2017) (“But an inmate does not need to demonstrate exhaustion of administrative remedies in his complaint. Instead, failure-to-exhaust is an affirmative defense that the defendant must raise.” (citations omitted)); Baxley, 508 F.Supp.3d at 46 (noting failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense which defendants have the burden of raising and proving). Consequently, Defendant has failed to meet her burden in raising this affirmative defense.
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff is “familiar with the grievance policy and was on notice of when and how to file” (ECF No. 39-1 at 4); however, there is no evidence before the Court that shows Plaintiff was familiar with the grievance policy or that he was “on notice” of when and how to file. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323 (noting “a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact”); Graham v. Gentry, 413 Fed.Appx. 660, 663 (4th Cir. 2011) (referencing evidence before the court that “the jail's grievance policy in the inmate handbook and the information that Graham received during the orientation session” demonstrated that “Graham knew of the existence of the grievance procedure, and knew that he could ask jail officials questions about the procedure”).
B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's § 1983 claims are brought against her in her official capacity only, such that the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff's claims entirely. Indeed, the Amended Complaint specifies that Defendant is being sued in her official capacity, rather than her individual capacity.
Notably, in the original Complaint, Plaintiff sued some Defendants in their individual capacities and some Defendants in the official capacities while seeking both injunctive relief and monetary damages. See ECF No. 1. However, the Amended Complaint sued all Defendants in their official capacities only and removed the claim for monetary damages. See ECF No. 9; see also Harris v. Copeland, No. 2:11-CV-02209-GRA, 2013 WL 4504764, at *5 (D.S.C. Aug. 22, 2013) (noting an indicator for finding a plaintiff intended to sue a defendant in their individual capacity includes “a plaintiff's request for compensatory or punitive damages” because “such relief is unavailable in official capacity suits” (quoting Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 61 (4th Cir. 1995))). Furthermore, in his Response, Plaintiff does not dispute Defendant's assertion that this suit is against Defendant in her official capacity only. See ECF No. 44.
Under the Eleventh Amendment, federal courts are barred from hearing claims for monetary damages against a state or its agents, instrumentalities, and employees, unless the state has consented to the suit. Fauconier v. Clarke, 966 F.3d 265, 279 (4th Cir. 2020); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997) (“It has long been settled that [the Eleventh Amendment's] reference to ‘actions against one of the United States' encompasses not only actions in which a State is actually named as the defendant, but also certain actions against state agents and state instrumentalities.”). Unless a state has consented to suit or Congress has waived a state's immunity pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, a state (and its agencies) may not be sued in federal or state court. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). Congress has not abrogated the states' sovereign immunity under § 1983, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343 (1979), and South Carolina has not consented to suit in federal district court. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e). This Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to arms of the state, “including state agencies and state officers acting in their official capacity,” Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996), because “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office,” such that it “is no different from a suit against the State itself,” Will, 491 U.S. at 71.
In this case, there is no dispute that Defendant was an employee of SCDC at the time of the alleged incident. Thus, any claims for monetary damages brought against Defendant in her official capacity would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Simpson v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 2:19-CV-2245-RMG, 2020 WL 582321, at *2 n.1 (D.S.C. Feb. 6, 2020) (noting SCDC employees are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in suits brought against them in their official capacities).
Here, however, Plaintiff only seeks injunctive relief, rather than monetary damages, in his Amended Complaint. ECF No. 9 at 6. State officials can be subject to suit in their official capacities for injunctive or other prospective relief. Indeed, Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar claims for prospective injunctive relief pursuant to Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Under Ex parte Young, “a federal court [is permitted] to issue prospective, injunctive relief against a state officer to prevent ongoing violations of federal law, on the rationale that such a suit is not a suit against the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.” McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 399 (4th Cir. 2010). “The Ex parte Young exception is directed at ‘officers of the state who are clothed with some duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws of the state, and who threaten and are about to commence proceedings'” to enforce an unconstitutional act against affected parties. Id. (cleaned up) (alteration in original) (quoting Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 155-56).
To invoke this exception, there must be a “special relation” between the state official being sued and the challenged statute, ensuring that the official has proximity to and responsibility for the challenged state action. Id.; Hutto v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 773 F.3d 536, 550 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity applies only where a party ‘defendant in a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an act alleged to be unconstitutional' has ‘some connection with the enforcement of the act.'” (citation omitted)). General authority to enforce state laws does not meet this requirement. McBurney, 616 F.3d at 399. “Thus, to correctly plead such a claim, the proper State official must be included as a defendant by name and identified in the body of the complaint with a specific unconstitutional policy, custom, or practice.” Powell v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 2:21-cv-02720-DCC-MGB, 2023 WL 2815046, at *5 (D.S.C. Jan. 17, 2023) (citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:21-CV-02720-DCC, 2023 WL 2583214 (D.S.C. Mar. 20, 2023).
While Defendant offers no argument on this point, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show his suit against Defendant in her official capacity may proceed pursuant to the provisions of Ex Parte Young. Although the Amended Complaint seeks some sort of injunctive relief, it does not identify any ongoing unconstitutional policy, custom, or practice. See Powell, No. 2:21-cv-02720-DCC-MGB, 2023 WL 2815046, at *5 (noting, to correctly plead a claim that falls under Ex Parte Young, the proper State official must be identified with a specific unconstitutional policy, custom, or practice), adopted, No. 2:21-CV-02720-DCC, 2023 WL 2583214. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not shown, much less alleged, that Defendant has proximity to and responsibility for enforcement of any ongoing unconstitutional policy, custom, or practice. See Smith v. Demory, No. CV 9:19-1771-HMH-BM, 2020 WL 2814330, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 21, 2020) (“Although state officials may be sued in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief, in order to proceed with his claim Plaintiff's allegations must nonetheless show that the state official or employee being sued has both the responsibility for the alleged ongoing violations of federal law as well as the authority to provide prospective redress for those alleged ongoing violations.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 9:19-01771-HMH-BM, 2020 WL 1181310 (D.S.C. Mar. 12, 2020). Consequently, Plaintiff has failed to show, or even allege, that his claims fall within the exception contemplated by Ex Parte Young.
Plaintiff requests “confidentiality, discrimination and slande[r] with other inmate know my condition [sic].” ECF No. 9 at 6. In the initial Complaint, Plaintiff sought Defendants to be terminated from employment by SCDC. ECF No. 1 at 6.
As a result, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment. See Woods v. S. C. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 318CV00834MGLKDW, 2019 WL 1995136, at *6 (D.S.C. Apr. 18, 2019) (“Where these requirements are not met, the Ex parte Young exception does not apply and the Eleventh Amendment entitles the defendant state officers or employees to dismissal of the action.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:18-CV-00834-MGL, 2019 WL 1995511 (D.S.C. May 6, 2019).
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendant's Motion, ECF No. 39, be GRANTED and this action DISMISSED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).