Reece v. Massachusetts Fire c. Ins. Co.

15 Citing cases

  1. Unigard Mutual Ins. Co. v. Fox

    236 S.E.2d 851 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977)   Cited 12 times
    Holding a single prior late payment insufficient as a matter of law to show course of dealing

    However, as to other forms of insurance our courts have made a clear distinction between the cancellation of a policy during the term and the expiration of the policy at the end of its term. Where the policy expires no notice of cancellation is necessary. Robertson v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 130 Ga. App. 807, 808 ( 204 S.E.2d 505). Accord, Reece v. Mass. Fire c. Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 581 (1) ( 130 S.E.2d 782); Barnes v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 140 Ga. App. 515 (1) ( 231 S.E.2d 569). In the case sub judice the policy expired by its terms on May 18, 1975 and the defendant insurance company was under no statutory obligation or contractual duty to tender a notice of cancellation.

  2. Queen Tufting Co. v. Fireman's c. Co.

    141 Ga. App. 792 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977)   Cited 6 times

    "This court has decided that a contract limitation upon the right to sue, fixing a shorter period than that allowed by statute [Code § 3-705], is lawful, `provided the period fixed be not so unreasonable as to raise a presumption of imposition of undue advantage in some way.'" Melson v. Phenix Ins. Co., 97 Ga. 722, 723 ( 25 SE 189); Reece v. Mass. c. Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 581 (2b) ( 130 S.E.2d 782); Yates v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 114 Ga. App. 360 ( 151 S.E.2d 523). A twelve month limitation of action clause in an insurance policy is valid and binding.

  3. East Tennessee, Etc. v. U.S. Fidelity c. Co.

    268 Ga. 536 (Ga. 1997)   Cited 5 times

    [Cits.]" Modern Carpet Indus. v. Factory Ins. Assn., 125 Ga. App. 150, 152 ( 186 S.E.2d 586) (1971); Reece v. Mass. Fire c. Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 581, 585 ( 130 S.E.2d 782) (1963). Thus, an action commenced by a mortgagee based upon the insurer's improper payment for a covered loss is an action "on the policy" for the recovery of a "claim."

  4. Waco Fire & Casualty Insurance v. Jones

    180 Ga. App. 26 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 3 times

    Defendant contends this issue has been decided by this court in Barnes v. Ga. Farm c. Ins. Co., 140 Ga. App. 515 ( 231 S.E.2d 569) and Reece v. Mass. Fire c. Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 581 ( 130 S.E.2d 782). In each of these cases the policy lapsed because of nonpayment of premiums, as in the instant case, and the mortgagee was not notified.

  5. Gravely v. Southern Trust Ins. Co.

    151 Ga. App. 93 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 7 times

    Many decisions hold that the parties may contract for a shorter period than that allowed by statute. See in this connection Melson v. Phenix Ins. Co., 97 Ga. 722 (1) ( 25 S.E. 189); Brown v. Savannah Mut. Ins. Co., 24 Ga. 97 (2); Underwriters' Agency v. Sutherlin, 55 Ga. 266 (1); Sovereign Camp, WOW v. Gunter, 59 Ga. App. 189 (1) ( 200 S.E. 181); Springfield Fire c. Ins. Co. v. Carter, 110 Ga. App. 382 (1, 3) ( 138 S.E.2d 590); Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Powell, 113 Ga. App. 311, 312 (1) ( 147 S.E.2d 823); Darnell v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 115 Ga. App. 367 ( 154 S.E.2d 741); Reece v. Massachusetts Fire c. Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 581 (2) ( 130 S.E.2d 782); Yates v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 114 Ga. App. 360, 361 ( 151 S.E.2d 523). Indeed it has been held that "if the source of the right claimed has evolved from the written contract of insurance, the limitations contained in it supersede any other general statutory limitations." Modern Carpet Industries v. Factory Ins. Assn., 125 Ga. App. 150, 152 ( 186 S.E.2d 586).

  6. Decatur Federal v. York Ins. Co.

    147 Ga. App. 797 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978)   Cited 16 times

    Notice to the loss payee is a condition precedent if the insurer wishes to bind it to the mechanics of prosecuting its claim where the insured fails to do so. Reece v. Mass. Fire c. Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 581 ( 130 S.E.2d 782) (1963) is not applicable because there the policy expired under its own terms; after the expiration date the mortgagee had no more right than the insured to prosecute a claim for a loss subsequently occurring. The insurer also cites Modern Carpet Industries v. Factory Ins. Assn., 125 Ga. App. 150 ( 186 S.E.2d 586) (1971) to the effect that where the source of the right evolves from the contract, the limitations in the contract supersede other statutory limitations.

  7. Barnes v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.

    140 Ga. App. 515 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976)   Cited 6 times

    Held: 1. This case is controlled by Headnote 1 of Reece v. Massachusetts Fire c. Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 581 ( 130 S.E.2d 782). It reads: "The policy of fire insurance having expired by its own terms and not having been canceled while in force, no duty was imposed upon the insurer to furnish any notice to the mortgagee as the named loss payee regarding the failure of the insured to exercise the option of renewal or of the lapse of the policy." 2.

  8. Modern Carpet Indust. v. Factory Insurance Ass'n

    125 Ga. App. 150 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971)   Cited 29 times
    Holding that the insurer did not waive 12–month contractual limitation period where it made a "final denial" well within the limitation period and there was "no evidence that the conduct of the company lulled or prevented plaintiff bringing the action within the stipulated time"

    However, this court has held that regardless of the form of the action, if the source of the right claimed has evolved from the written contract of insurance, the limitations contained in it supersede any other general statutory limitations. See Reese v. Massachusetts Fire c. Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 581 ( 130 S.E.2d 782), and Gibraltar Fire c. Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 64 Ga. App. 269 ( 13 S.E.2d 27). Judgment affirmed. Bell, C. J., and Eberhardt, J., concur.

  9. Laughinghouse v. First of Ga. Ins. Co.

    179 S.E.2d 780 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971)   Cited 9 times

    Neither Sedwick v. Gerding, 55 Ga. 264 nor Gibraltar Fire c. Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 64 Ga. App. 269 ( 13 S.E.2d 27) is controlling here as in these cases (1) only a local agent or adjuster was involved and (2) there was a refusal to pay in Sedwick v. Gerding, 55 Ga. 264, supra, within the period of limitation and negotiation toward settlement afterward; and in Gibraltar Fire c. Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 64 Ga. App. 269, supra, while there was no refusal to pay, neither was there an agreement of settlement and a promise to pay as in the present case. 3. Accordingly, whether the action be construed as one on the policy and governed by the twelve-month limitation provided in the policy, or as one on the agreement of settlement (see in this connection Reece v. Massachusetts Fire c. Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 581 ( 130 S.E.2d 782)), the filing of the proof of loss was necessary in either case, and there being evidence of the receipt of the proof of loss or a waiver of the filing of the proof of loss, and the same evidence also being evidence of wavier of the twelve-month limitation on the bringing of suit contained in the policy, the trial judge, in either case, erred in directing a verdict for the defendant insurance company. Judgment reversed. Jordan, P. J., and Eberhardt, J., concur.

  10. Barrow Development Co. v. Fulton Insurance Co.

    418 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1969)   Cited 104 times
    Holding that defective allegations of citizenship may be amended to establish diversity jurisdiction

    To that extent plaintiff's right to sue is governed by the terms of the policy, one of which is the express limitation provision requiring any suit to be brought "within 12 months next after the inception of the loss." Reece v. Massachusetts Fire Marine Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 581, 130 S.E.2d 782 (1963). Even if the limitation began to run, not from the time of the loss, as expressly provided in the policy, but rather from the date of defendant's alleged refusal, plaintiff's suit was not timely.