Opinion
23A-CR-2731
06-06-2024
Tyler J. Redmond, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Christopher J. Petersen Goshen, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Jennifer Anwarzai Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Elkhart Superior Court The Honorable Kristine A. Osterday, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 20D01-2204-F6-459
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Christopher J. Petersen Goshen, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana
Jennifer Anwarzai Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
RILEY, JUDGE
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[¶1] Appellant-Defendant, Tyler J. Redmond (Redmond), appeals his conviction for sexual battery, a Level 6 felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-4-8(a).
[¶2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[¶3] Redmond presents this court with one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to support his conviction for sexual battery.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[¶4] In April 2021, Redmond and M.T. were both employees at Lowe's in Elkhart County, Indiana, and shared a common interest in anime and video games. M.T. had recently graduated from high school, lived with her parents, and did not have many friends. On April 12, 2021, Redmond and M.T. made plans to go to Redmond's place after work to watch anime videos. After M.T.'s shift was finished, Redmond and his brother picked up M.T. and, after a short drive, Redmond's brother dropped Redmond and M.T. off at a nearby Red Roof Inn. M.T. was surprised because she thought Redmond "had a place of his own." (Transcript p. 68). They entered a room and Redmond told M.T. to sit down. The room had two beds and M.T. and Redmond each sat on separate beds while they talked about their interests. Redmond showed M.T. a sexually explicit video which made her feel uncomfortable. After the video they continued talking about their interests and MT. inquired about the anime video they originally had agreed to watch. Redmond stated, "Oh right, I forgot," and began complaining about back pain. (Tr. p. 71). He asked M.T. to give him a massage. M.T. moved to the other bed, sat behind Redmond, started massaging, and apologized because she did not know what to do. M.T. became uncomfortable, realized it was getting dark, and wanted to go home. However, she did not have a car and stayed because she "just didn't want to be rude and [she] thought he'd still want to watch the show." (Tr. p. 72).
[¶5] Redmond rolled over on the bed and M.T. observed a pocketknife, "half the length of an iPad" when closed, fall out of Redmond's pocket. (Tr. p. 74). He stood up between both beds and asked M.T. to take off his shirt. M.T. was scared and believed she was "in trouble" but she did not run because she saw the knife. (Tr. p. 74). M.T. realized, "I didn't really know this person and . . . I was alone and I just . . . didn't know what his intentions were at that moment." (Tr. p. 74). Redmond told M.T. to stand up and she complied. He asked her, "How do you take your shirt off?" (Tr. p. 75). M.T. responded, "like a regular person," and motioned as if she was taking off her shirt. (Tr. p. 75). Redmond grabbed the bottom of M.T.'s shirt, untucked it from her pants, pulled it upwards, and removed it. M.T. froze. Redmond removed his shirt, grabbed M.T.'s waist, and moved her closer to him. M.T. did not want to do this and did not cooperate. Redmond licked M.T.'s lips and asked her to kiss him back, but she did not. He kissed her on the lips, then moved her hair to kiss her neck. M.T. continued to stand, "too scared to move or say anything." (Tr. p. 76). At some point, M.T. told Redmond to stop but he continued to kiss her. Then Redmond pushed M.T. on the bed.
[¶6] When M.T. was on the bed, Redmond kissed her chest and stomach. M.T. did not feel good. Redmond pushed M.T.'s bra to the side and started kissing her breasts. When Redmond took off his pants, M.T "wanted to get out of there, but [she] was scared." (Tr. p. 77). Redmond told M.T. not to worry about him taking her virginity, which confused M.T. as the two had never discussed her virginity. M.T. informed Redmond that she was not comfortable with what was happening. Redmond did not stop but instead unbuttoned and unzipped M.T.'s pants and removed them. M.T. did not kick or fight because she was scared that if she did, Redmond might attack. Redmond kissed and touched M.T.'s genitals over her underwear. Then, Redmond, still wearing underwear, brought his body closer to M.T.'s and rubbed his erect penis against her clothed genitals. Redmond continued doing so while he kissed M.T. and placed his hands on M.T.'s wrists, which lay by her sides. Redmond moved M.T. in different positions, grabbed her legs as he spread them apart, moved them from side to side, and bent them. M.T. told Redmond to stop and, in response, Redmond unsuccessfully attempted to pull up M.T.'s pants. Redmond then put M.T. over his shoulder and smacked her buttocks. M.T. remained limp and scared. Eventually, Redmond placed M.T back on the bed, rubbed her back, and said, "I'm sorry." (Tr. p. 83).
[¶7] For a short time, M.T. laid on the bed with her hair covering her face while Redmond played an anime episode on his phone. Redmond told her, "I'm sorry and I understand if you're still not here by the time I get back," and left the room. (Tr. p. 84). M.T. phoned a friend to pick her up. Later that evening, Redmond texted M.T. to apologize and stated, "I wish I could never have done that . . . I'm better than that and want more from you than sex . . ." (State's Exh. 2, 3). During a text exchange on April 14, 2021, Redmond admitted that he had touched and slapped M.T. for his "sexual arousal." (State's Exh. 9). On September 28, 2021, M.T. filed a police report about the events of April 12, 2021.
[¶8] On April 13, 2022, the State filed an Information, charging Redmond with Level 6 felony sexual battery. On September 19, 2023, the trial court conducted a jury trial. At the close of the evidence, the jury found Redmond guilty as charged. On October 16, 2023, during the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Redmond to two and a half years, with 180 days executed in the Department of Correction, one year served on community corrections, and one year suspended to probation. Redmond was also ordered to register as a sex offender for ten years.
[¶9] Redmond now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
[¶10] Redmond contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain his conviction for sexual battery. Our standard of review with regard to sufficiency claims is well-settled. In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, this court does not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Clemons v. State, 987 N.E.2d 92, 95 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013). We consider only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom and will affirm if the evidence and those inferences constitute substantial evidence of probative value to support the verdict. Id. Reversal is appropriate only when reasonable persons would not be able to form inferences as to each material element of the offense. Id.
[¶11] To convict Redmond of sexual battery, the State was required to establish that Redmond, with the intent to arouse or satisfy his own sexual desires or the sexual desires of M.T., touched M.T. when M.T. was compelled to submit to the touching by force or the imminent threat of force. See I.C. § 35-42-4-8(a). "A person's intent may be determined from their conduct and the natural consequences thereof and intent may be inferred from circumstantial evidence." J.J.M. v. State, 779 N.E.2d 602, 606 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002). "Furthermore, the intent to gratify required by the statute must coincide with the conduct; it is the purpose or motivation for the conduct." Id. Conceding that he touched M.T. with the intent to satisfy his own sexual desires, Redmond focuses on the second prong of the statute and contends that there was insufficient evidence presented from which the jury could infer that M.T. was compelled to submit to his touching by force or the imminent threat of force.
[¶12] Although an element of the offense of sexual battery is that the victim was "compelled to submit to the touching by force or the imminent threat of force," the force need not be physical or violent, but may be implied from the circumstances. Chatham v. State, 845 N.E.2d 203, 206 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006). Evidence that a victim did not voluntarily consent to a touching does not, in itself, support the conclusion that the defendant compelled the victim to submit to the touching by force or threat of force. Bailey v. State, 764 N.E.2d 728, 730 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002), trans. denied. However, "it is the victim's perspective, not the assailant's, from which the presence or absence of forceful compulsion is to be determined." Chatham, 845 N.E.2d at 207. "This is a subjective test that looks to the victim's perception of the circumstances surrounding the incident in question." Id. "The issue is thus whether the victim perceived the aggressor's force or imminent threat of force as compelling her compliance." Id.
[¶13] Relying on Scott-Gordon v. State, 579 N.E.2d 602 (Ind. 1991) and Smith v. State, 678 N.E.2d 1152 (Ind. App. 1997), Redmond argues that M.T. silently acquiesced to his touching and never expressed any fear, and that he did not threaten her to submit to his advances. In Scott-Gordon, 579 N.E.2d at 604, the defendant was charged with sexual battery for grabbing an employee's buttocks, after which the employee punched the defendant in the eye. The Indiana Supreme Court concluded that the employee's immediate reaction demonstrated that he did not voluntarily consent to the touching by the defendant, but the court found no evidence to support the conclusion that the defendant compelled the employee to submit to the touching by force or imminent threat of force. Id. The supreme court noted that the defendant made no threats to the employee and that the employee was not afraid of the defendant. Id. Thus, the court reversed the conviction, finding that there was no evidence that the employee was compelled to submit to the touching by force or threat of force. Id.
[¶14] In Smith, 678 N.E.2d at 1155, the defendant was charged with sexual battery for unbuttoning the victim's pants and grabbing and fondling the victim's penis. The victim testified that he had no reason to be afraid of the defendant before the incident. Id. The victim also testified that he did not say anything to the defendant while he was fondling him because he "didn't know what to do." Id. This court held that "[a]lthough it is clear that [the victim] did not consent to the touching, evidence that a victim did not voluntarily consent to a touching does not, in itself, support the conclusion that the defendant compelled the victim to submit to the touching by force or threat of force." Id. We concluded that "there is no evidence that [the victim] was compelled to submit to Smith's touching by force or the imminent threat of force." Id.
[¶15] However, we find both cases distinguishable from the situation before us. Just prior to Redmond commencing his sexual advances, M.T. observed a pocketknife, "half the length of an iPad" when closed, fall out of Redmond's pocket. (Tr. p. 74). M.T. became scared and believed she was "in trouble" but she did not run because she saw the knife. (Tr. p. 74). She realized that she didn't "really know this person and . . . I was alone and I just . . . didn't know what his intentions were at that moment." (Tr. p. 74). M.T. testified that she was scared and felt like she could not escape because Redmond had a knife and might attack. When M.T. did not comply with Redmond's request to remove her shirt, Redmond forcibly grabbed her shirt, untucked it from her pants, pulled it upward, and removed it. He used force when he grabbed M.T.'s waist and moved her closer toward him, even though she did not cooperate. When he started kissing her, M.T. was "too scared to move or say anything." (Tr. p. 76). Although she told Redmond to stop, he continued to kiss her. Then Redmond pushed M.T. forcibly onto the bed. He used force to place his hands on M.T.'s wrists as he rubbed his erect penis on her clothed genitals before spreading her legs apart and moving them from side to side. He used force to put her over his shoulder and smack her buttocks, while she was limp and scared and after she told him to stop. See Frazier v. State, 988 N.E.2d 1257, 1261 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013) (evidence that defendant forcefully grabbed victim's hand and placed it on his crotch was sufficient to show that defendant compelled victim to submit to the touching by force or threat of force).
[¶16] Redmond's claims that M.T. consented to his touching and that he exhibited no force or threat of force are without merit. His argument that M.T. consented relies on the circumstances that preceded the battery, in that M.T. agreed to hang out with Redmond, voluntarily got into the car, entered the hotel room, and watched a sexually explicit movie. However, none of his arguments account for the use of force or imminent threat of force posed by his physical actions and the presence of the knife, both of which scared M.T. and compelled her to submit to his touching. See Chatham, 845 N.E.2d at 207 (in a sexual battery prosecution the issue is whether the victim perceived the aggressor's force or imminent use of force as compelling her compliance).
[¶17] The circumstances surrounding this case support that Redmond took advantage of M.T., a recent high school graduate who lived with her parents and lacked friends, and turned an evening that she believed would be limited to hanging out and watching anime videos into an unexpected and uncomfortable sexual experience. After seeing Redmond's knife, M.T. became scared and was forced to submit to several instances of sexual conduct. This conduct was more extensive than that present in Smith and Scott-Gordon. Redmond used force to remove M.T.'s shirt, push her into the bed, hold down her wrists, and place her over his shoulder to smack her buttocks. Unlike Smith and Scott-Gordon, Redmond continued his sexual advances after having been told twice to stop and despite her feeling that she could not fight back without risking being attacked. See Lewis v. State, 440 N.E.2d 1125, 1127 (Ind. 1982) ("Force or threat of force may be shown even without evidence of the attacker['s] oral statement of intent or willingness to use a weapon and cause injury, if from the circumstances it is reasonable to infer the attacker was willing to do so.")
[¶18] Based on the facts before us, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that M.T. felt forced to submit to Redmond's demands after seeing the knife, and after he physically forced himself upon her, ignoring her demands to stop. See Tobias v. State, 666 N.E.2d 68, 72 (Ind. 1996) (finding compulsion by force where defendant committed sexual acts after defendant demanded victim's compliance, physically forced himself upon her, ignored her lack of consent, verbal resistance, and requests for him to stop). Therefore, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to support Redmond's conviction.
CONCLUSION
[¶19] Based on the foregoing, we hold that the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to support Redmond's conviction for sexual battery.
[¶20] Affirmed.
Brown, J. and Foley, J. concur