See id. Redding v. Tanner, 231 Ga. App. 250, 251 (1) ( 498 SE2d 156) (1998).Redding is distinct and does not control the outcome here. First, the instant case does not involve a contract, but instead involves a covenant, which is not required to be signed by the party to be bound.

In Georgia, questions of negligence, proximate cause, and foreseeability are generally for the jury, except in "plain, palpable and undisputed cases where reasonable minds cannot differ as to the conclusions to be reached." Ford v. Smith, 248 Ga.App. 339, 546 S.E.2d 346, 350 (2001); Redding v. Tanner, 231 Ga.App. 250, 498 S.E.2d 156, 158 (1998) (Andrews, C.J., concurring and dissenting); Murphy v. Wometco Cable TV of Fayette County, Inc., 223 Ga.App. 640, 478 S.E.2d 398, 399 (1996); Wade v. Mitchell, 206 Ga.App. 265, 424 S.E.2d 810, 813 (1992). Although these Georgia cases addressed these questions at the summary judgment stage, the Supreme Court has stated that "the standard for granting summary judgment `mirrors' the standard for judgment as a matter of law, such that `the inquiry under each is the same.'"

unconscionable and violative of public policy); Edwards v. Taylor, 182 N.C.App. 722, 727, 643 S.E.2d 51, 54 (2007) (affirming lower court's ruling declaring limitation of liability provision to be “unenforceable and against public policy” (internal quotations and citation omitted)); Bozich v. Kozusko, No. 09CA009604, 2009 WL 5150264 (Ohio Ct.App. Dec. 30, 2009) (upholding trial court's decision finding limitation of liability clause to be unconscionable and, thus, unenforceable); O'Donoghue v. Smythe, Cramer Co., No. 80453, 2002 WL 1454074 (Ohio Ct.App. July 3, 2002) (same); Carey v. Merritt, 148 S.W.3d 912, 918 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004) (applying Tunkl factors to conclude that exculpatory clause in home inspection contract is “contrary to public policy and void”); Russell v. Bray, 116 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003) (same); Glassford v. BrickKicker, 2011 VT 118, 35 A.3d 1044 (2011) (declaring limited liability clause in home inspection contract to be unconscionable and unenforceable). See also Redding v. Tanner, 231 Ga.App. 250, 498 S.E.2d 156 (1998) (refusing to enforce limitation of liability clause in home inspection contract because release was prepared and presented to home buyers after oral agreement for inspection services had been reached and inspection had been performed, and buyers never signed document purporting to limit home inspector's liability); Schaffer v. Property Evaluations, Inc., 854 S.W.2d 493 (Mo.Ct.App.1993) (declining to enforce limitation of liability provision in home inspection contract where no separate consideration was provided for exculpatory clause), abrogated by Purcell Tire & Rubber Co., Inc. v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 59 S.W.3d 505 (Mo.2001); Rubin v. AMC Home Inspection & Warranty Serv., 175 N.J.Super. 315, 418 A.2d 306 (1980) (concluding that exculpatory clause in home inspection contract did not operate to limit home inspector's liability for negligence in performance of home inspection because record did not evince clear intent of both parties to limit home inspector's liability); Estey

This stated a claim for negligent inspection of a home. See Redding v. Tanner, 231 Ga.App. 250, 498 S.E.2d 156 (1998). Hughes was not required in his complaint to anticipate and respond to the contractual limitation period defense asserted by Cornerstone.