As their first proposition of error defendants assert that since neither plaintiff nor his predecessor in title, Lavina Phenis, nee Lavina Crowder, was ever in possession of the property involved herein or ever took any rents or profits therefrom, the deed from Lavina Phenis to plaintiff was absolutely void as to defendants, they being in adverse possession, such deed being champertous and in violation of the statutes of Oklahoma. In support of such proposition defendants cite Huston v. Scott, 20 Okla. 142, 94 P. 512, 35 A.L.R., N.S., 721; Welch v. Langley, Okla., 264 P.2d 347; Red Bed Royalty Company v. Phelan, 192 Okla. 210, 134 P.2d 969; Davis v. Manhard, 172 Okla. 85, 45 P.2d 1095, and Setterstrom v. Phelan, 182 Okla. 453, 78 P.2d 415, all of which cases clearly state the general rule that a deed to real property by a grantor out of possession who has not been in possession for a year next preceding date of conveyance, or has not within a year taken rents and profits, or those under whom he claims, is void as against any person or persons in adverse possession. In making such contention, defendants ignore the fact that the rule announced in the above cases applies only to persons holding adversely to the owner thereof and ignore the specific findings of the trial court that defendants were not holding the premises involved in adverse possession but were holding as mortgagees in possession.