GMAC could have sued defendant on his contract as assumption. Miller v. Potter, supra; Rector v. Lyda, 180 N.C. 577, 105 S.E. 170, 21 A.L.R. 411; 83 C.J.S., Subrogation, 37. In 2 Jones on Mortgages, 8th Ed., 1125, it is said: "An indorser of a note or surety of a debt, upon being compelled to pay it, is entitled to the benefit of any security, as, for instance, a mortgage given by the principal debtor to the holder of the note, or debt to secure it.

As such it may maintain this action. Rector v. Lyda, 180 N.C. 577, 105 S.E. 170; Canestrino v. Powell, 231 N.C. 190, 56 S.E.2d 566. Should the Cab Company be permitted to pursue the cause to its final judgment, it would, on its own allegations, receive the amount recovered as agent for Broad Street Motors to which it would have to account and to which it would be compelled to look for its compensation for services rendered. It is, therefore, an unnecessary party plaintiff.

The rule is well established in this jurisdiction that a third person may sue to enforce a binding contract or promise made for his benefit even though he is a stranger both to the contract and to the consideration. Chipley v. Morrell, 228 N.C. 240, 45 S.E.2d 129; Boone v. Boone, 217 N.C. 722, 9 S.E.2d 383; James v. Dry Cleaning Co., 208 N.C. 412, 181 S.E. 341; Foundry Co. v. Construction Company, 198 N.C. 177, 151 S.E. 93; Keller v. Parrish, 196 N.C. 733, 147 S.E. 9; Glass Co. v. Fidelity Co. 193 N.C. 769, 138 S.E. 143; Schofield v. Bacon, 191 N.C. 253, 131 S.E. 659; Parlier v. Miller, 186 N.C. 501, 119 S.E. 898; Rector v. Lyda, 180 N.C. 577, 105 S.E. 170, 21 A.L.R. 411; Crumpler v. Hines, 174 N.C. 283, 93 S.E. 780; Chandler v. Jones, 173 N.C. 427, 92 S.E. 145; Springs v. Cole, 171 N.C. 418, 88 S.E. 721; Supply Co. v. Lumber Co., 160 N.C. 428, 76 S.E. 273, 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 707; Faust v. Faust, 144 N.C. 383, 57 S.E. 22; Gorrell v. Water Supply Co., 124 N.C. 328, 32 S.E. 720, 46 L.R.A. 513, 70 Am. St. Rep. 598; Porter v. R. R., 97 N.C. 46, 2 S.E. 374. Hence, the allegations of the cross-complaint relating to the contingent liability of the Receivers for contribution to Staudt and the contractual assumption of such liability by the Railroad Company, standing alone and unqualified, state facts sufficient to entitle Staudt to the relief which he seeks against the Railroad Company. The Railroad Company contends, however, that these particular allegations do not stand alone and are not without qualification, but that, on the contrary, whatever legal efficacy they may appear at first blush to possess is invalidated by the other allegations of the cross-comp

Such is the law as it obtains with us in respect of checks, albeit we have in a number of cases held that "where a contract between two parties is made for the benefit of a third, the latter may sue thereon and recover although not strictly a privy to the contract." Rector v. Lyda, 180 N.C. 577, 105 S.E. 170; Gorrell v. Water Supply Co., 124 N.C. 328, 32 S.E. 720. These latter cases are grounded on principles of equity, not presently applicable to the plaintiff's suit. The arguments, pro and con, on the subject are fully set out in Cincinnati, Etc., R. Co. v. Bank, supra, and the reasoning of the majority view quoted with approval in Perry v. Bank, supra.

isions of this Court with respect to the liability of the grantee of land who has assumed the payment of an indebtedness of his grantor which was secured by a prior mortgage or deed of trust executed by the grantor, as said in Bank v. Page, 206 N.C. 18, 173 S.E. 312, `the law undoubtedly is, that when a purchaser of mortgaged lands, by a valid and sufficient contract of assumption, agrees with the mortgagor, who is personally liable therefor, to assume and pay off the mortgage debt, such agreement inures to the benefit of the holder of the mortgage, and upon its acceptance by him, or reliance thereon by the mortgagee, thenceforth, as between themselves, the grantee occupies the position of principal debtor and the mortgagor that of surety, and the liability thus arising from said assumption agreement may be enforced by suit in equity under the doctrine of subrogation, Baber v. Hanie, 163 N.C. 588, 80 S.E. 57, or by an action at law as upon a contract for the benefit of a third person, Rector v. Lyda, 180 N.C. 577, 105 S.E. 176.'" The liability of a grantee of mortgaged lands, by reason of an assumption agreement with his grantor, both to the mortgagor and to the mortgagee, arises out of his contract, and is limited by its terms.

"[3] That the plaintiff is entitled to sue upon the `President's Re-employment Agreement,' voluntarily signed by the defendant, either in equity, under the doctrine of subrogation, or at law, as upon a contract made for the benefit of a third person, is fully established and supported by the decisions in this jurisdiction. Rector v. Lyda, 180 N.C. 577, 105 S.E. 170, 21 A.L.R. 411; Gorrell v. Greensboro Water Supply Co., 124 N.C. 328, 32 S.E. 720, 46 L.R.A. 513, 70 Am. St. Rep. 598; Baber v. Hanie, 163 N.C. 588, 80 S.E. 57, 12 A.L.R. 1518. "[4] It is said in some of the cases that the plaintiff occupies the position of a `donee beneficiary,' or, at least, that he is no less advantageously circumstanced.

The Home Mortgage Company, as creditor, could have sued Miller on his contract of assumption without foreclosing the deed of trust. Rector v. Lyda, 180 N.C. 577. By the application of the proceeds of the insurance policy to the payment of the debt secured by the deed of trust Miller's estate had its debt paid.

Statesville v. Jenkins, 199 N.C. 159; Barnes v. McCullers, 108 N.C. 47. The renewed indemnity obligation was clearly intended for the benefit of the Bank of Duplin, and its rights thereunder cannot be defeated by the contention that the promise to remain bound was made to another, since it was expressly stipulated it was intended for the protection of the Bank of Duplin. Glass v. Fidelity Co., 193 N.C. 769; Rector v. Lyda, 180 N.C. 577; Withers v. Poe, 167 N.C. 372. Nor was it without consideration.

That the plaintiff is entitled to sue upon the "President's Reemployment Agreement," voluntarily signed by the defendant, either in equity, under the doctrine of subrogation, or at law, as upon a contract made for the benefit of a third person, is fully established and supported by the decisions in this jurisdiction. Rector v. Lyda, 180 N.C. 577, 105 S.E. 170; Gorrell v. Water Co., 124 N.C. 328, 32 S.E. 720, 70 Am. St. Rep., 598, 46 L.R.A., 513; Baber v. Hanie, 163 N.C. 588, 80 S.E. 57. It is said in some of the cases that the plaintiff occupies the position of a "donee beneficiary," or, at least, that he is no less advantageously circumstanced. Bank v. Page, 206 N.C. 18, 173 S.E. 312.

isions of this Court with respect to the liability of the grantee of land who has assumed the payment of an indebtedness of his grantor which was secured by a prior mortgage or deed of trust executed by the grantor, as said in Bank v. Page, 206 N.C. 18, 173 S.E. 312, "the law undoubtedly is, that when a purchaser of mortgaged lands, by a valid and sufficient contract of assumption, agrees with the mortgagor, who is personally liable therefor, to assume and pay off the mortgage debt, such agreement inures to the benefit of the holder of the mortgage, and upon its acceptance by him, or reliance thereon by the mortgagee, thenceforth as between themselves, the grantee occupies the position of principal debtor and the mortgagor that of surety, and the liability thus arising from said assumption agreement may be enforced by suit in equity under the doctrine of subrogation, Baber v. Hanie, 163 N.C. 588, 80 S.E. 57, or by an action at law, as upon a contract for the benefit of a third person. Rector v. Lyda, 180 N.C. 577, 105 S.E. 170."