Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-CV-71896
October 30, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of "Order and Judgment." Defendants oppose, in part, entry of the proposed order, attached to Plaintiff's Motion, and filed a Response setting forth the nature of their objection.
Plaintiff requests that this Court enter a "final" order and judgment in this matter since the terms of this Court's last "Order Clarifying Memorandum Opinion and Order Dated March 29, 2002, " dated May 17, 2002, have been met (i.e., calculation of benefits by the Plan Administrator). Defendants do not oppose the calculations made by the Plan Administrator. However, Defendants take issue with this Court entering a "final" Order from which Plaintiff would have the opportunity to appeal. Defendants contend that a "final" Order was already entered in this case in the form of a "Stipulated Order Dismissing Count V Without Prejudice, " and/or the "Order Clarifying Memorandum Opinion and Order Dated March 29, 2002, " both of which were also entered on May 17, 2002. Defendants maintain that the stipulated Order and/or the clarification Order disposed of the last remaining issue of law in dispute, and therefore, constituted a "final" Order.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff filed a five count Complaint against Defendants pursuant to common law and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Three of the Counts were dismissed subsequent to Defendants' filing their Motion to Dismiss. Consequently, two ERISA Counts of liability remained: (1) a claim under § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132, for benefits under a Leadership Severance Plan; and (2) a claim under § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140, for interference with rights under that Plan. After the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, this Court entered a "Memorandum Opinion and Order and Notice of Scheduling Conference" dated March 29, 2002. After an agreement by the parties to dismiss the § 510 claim and a scheduling conference which took place on May 13, 2002, this Court entered a "Stipulated Order Dismissing Count V Without Prejudice, "and an "Order Clarifying Memorandum Opinion and Order Dated March 29, 2002, " stating that the "[j]udgment will be entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants upon presentation of the amount due and owing under section 1(n)(ii)(d) of the Leadership Severance Plan (i.e., § 502 claim) on May 17, 2002.
APPLICABLE LAW ANALYSIS
A. The Court Speaks Through Its Orders
"[I]t is axiomatic that a court speaks through its orders. In re Roy C. Markey, 144 B.R. 738, 745 (W.D. Mich. 1992). A simple reading of both May 17, 2002 Orders demonstrates this Court's intent to retain jurisdiction over the matter until the Plan Administrator made the Court ordered calculation of benefits. The "Stipulated Order Dismissing Count V Without Prejudice" states in pertinent part:
The parties have attended a status conference with the Court on May 13, 2002, the Court having indicated that it will file a final order and clarification of its March 29, 2002 Memorandum Opinion and Order, the parties having agreed that Plaintiff's claim under Count V of the Complaint for violation of ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140, should be dismissed without prejudice . . . the parties having stipulated to the relief requested and the Court otherwise being fully advised in the premises; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: Count V of the Complaint is hereby dismissed without prejudiceStipulated Order Dismissing Count V Without Prejudice, dated 5/17/02, pp. 1-2 ( emphasis added).
This language indicates that the stipulated order was not meant to be a final order. Additionally, the stipulated order language distinguishes between the final order and the clarification order as two separate entries to be made after entry of the stipulated Order. The clarification order and the final order were not one in the same. The "Stipulated Order Dismissing Count V Without Prejudice, " was not intended to be a "final" order in this matter.
The Court also notes that the "Order Clarifying Memorandum Opinion and Order Dated March 29, 2002, " was not intended to be a "final" order of judgment. It states in pertinent part:
In a Memorandum Opinion and Order of this Court dated March 29, 2002, the Court GRANTED plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment or Judgment, construed as Motion for Entry of Judgment as to Count III. In accordance with said Memorandum Opinion and Order, Judgment will be entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants upon presentation of the amount due and owing under Section 1(n) (ii) (d) of the Leadership Plan. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plan Administrator calculate the amount of benefits due and owing under Section 1(n)(ii)(d) of the Leadership Severance for presentation to the Court and the parties, for entry of Judgment.
" Order Clarifying Memorandum Opinion and Order Dated March 29, 2002" (emphasis added). This Court's clarification Order essentially states that a "Judgment" will be entered once the Plan Administrator has calculated the Court ordered benefits "due and owing.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the language in both May 17, 2002 Orders establishes an intent by this Court to retain jurisdiction in this matter pending the Plan Administrator's "presentation of the amount due and owing under Section 1(n)(ii)(d) of the Leadership Plan." Id.
B. Final Judgments
A final judgment terminates all the issues presented and leaves nothing to be done except to enforce by execution what has been determined. Firestone Tire Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 373 (1981); Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) A decision that determines liability, but does not assess the damages is not final, nor is such a decision certifiable as final under Rule 54(b). Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744 (1976).Recker v. Newcourt Credit Group, Inc., Order, dated 9/23/02, Case No: 02-1789.
Defendants rely upon Grifffin v. Michigan Department of Corrections, 5 F.3d 186 (6th Cir. 1993) and Perlman v. Swiss Bank Corporation Comprehensive Disability Protection, 195 F.3d 975 (7th Cir. 1999) in support of their position that the stipulated Order and/or the clarification Order, both of which were entered on May 17, 2002, constitute final Order(s) of this Court because determining damages is a ministerial task and all of the issues of law were disposed of on May 17, 2002. Both Griffin and Perlman are distinguishable from this case.
In Grffin, a 1988 order was entered which was "couched in terms of specific damage calculations" and the court set forth in its order "specific instructions" regarding how the damages were to be calculated. Griffin, 5 F.3d 186 at 190. The argument upon which Defendants rely is that in Griffin a Special Master was given the task of calculating the damages, among other things; and those matters were considered to be a ministerial tasks. Consequently, the subsequent order entered in 1991 regarding the same case, which was essentially resolved in 1988, was held not to be a "final" order because "no substantive legal issues remained unresolved" in 1988. Id. at 190-91.
The difference between Griffin and this case is two-fold. First, this Court did not lay out "specific instructions" or "specific damage calculations" for the Plan Administrator to follow. Therefore, a damage determination could not be arrived at by virtue of either of the May 17, 2002 Orders. Second, the Plan Administrator's benefit calculation is directly related to Plaintiff's substantive claim under § 502. Therefore, the Plan Administrator in this case was not merely implementing a pre-set formula and/or following "specific instructions" from which a definitive damage determination could be gleaned. Consequently Griffin is not instructive in this case.
Perlman, is likewise not controlling in this matter because the subject order in that case specifically denied benefits and indicated that the case was finished by stating "judgment is, therefore entered accordingly." Perlman, 195 F.3d at 977. Not only did the parties in Perlman agree that the language constituted a finality, but the Perlman court held that simply because a district court remands a case to a plan administrator, after entering an order, that does not equate with finality of the district court's order entered prior to remand. Id. at 979. As in Griffin, the Perlman court looked to the specificity of the district court's order. "If the court directs the Commissioner to apply a specific rule, or accept specific evidence, and the Commissioner carries out that directive and awards benefits, the case may never return to court. . ." Id.
In this case, the only directive this Court gave to the Plan Administrator was to calculate the benefits due and owing under Section 1(n)(ii)(d). This Section is general in nature and essentially states that a party's receipt of benefits is determined by the significance of the party's reduction in employment duties. Memorandum Opinion and Order and Notice of Scheduling Conference, pg. 12. Therefore, this Court gave no specific guidance to the Plan Administrator regarding how to calculate the benefits "due and owing."
"A termination of employment by a participant prior to the second anniversary of the Closing Date for one or more of the following reasons (d) a significant reduction in the Participant's duties as they exist immediately after the Closing date . . . " Qualifying Termination under section 1(n) (ii) (d) of the Leadership Severance Plan.
As a result of the foregoing discussion, the Court does not find Defendants' citation of authority persuasive, and further finds that this Court's intent was to retain jurisdiction over this matter until the Plan Administrator presented a monetary amount for distribution to the Court. To the extent that the May 17th Order(s) do not evidence the intent of finality, the Orders are not appealable. See, National Elevator Industry Pension Welfare and Educational; Funds v. Viola Industries, Inc., 684 F. supp. 1564, 1565 (D. Kan. 1987).
CONCLUSION
Based upon the language set forth in this Court's "Stipulated Order Dismissing Count V Without Prejudice" and "Order Clarifying Memorandum Opinion and Order Dated March 29, 2002, " the fact that there is no "final" language within the texts of the Orders; and the fact that neither of these Orders are specific enough to stand on their own to "wrap up" all issues in this case, Plaintiff's Motion is GRANTED, and a Final Order and Judgment are entered this date.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Order and Judgment [Docket No: 49-1] is GRANTED.