Opinion
B229636
01-26-2012
RECEIVERSHIP ESTATE OVER SPECIFIC ASSETS OF RCVR etc., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAMES SCHRAMM et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Cole R. Sheridan for Defendants and Appellants James Schramm, 41, Inc., and Metropolitan, Inc. No appearance by Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC440035)
APPEAL from the judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Teresa Sanchez-Gordon, Judge. Affirmed.
Cole R. Sheridan for Defendants and Appellants James Schramm, 41, Inc., and Metropolitan, Inc.
No appearance by Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendants and appellants James Schramm, 41, Inc., and Metropolitan, Inc., appeal from the judgment entered against them on a jury verdict in a commercial unlawful detainer action. The judgment was in favor of the landlord (plaintiff and respondent), restoring possession of the premises, forfeiting the lease, and awarding rent in the amount of $30,500, plus attorney fees and costs. The only argument defendants assert on appeal is that the judgment must be reversed because the three-day notice to pay rent or quit was defective as a matter of law and cannot support the unlawful detainer judgment. Plaintiff and respondent did not file a brief on appeal. We find the jury's general verdict impliedly resolved this issue against defendants, and since defendants assert no other basis for reversal, we affirm.
Plaintiff served the three-day notice to pay rent or quit (three-day notice) pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1161.1 (section 1161.1), which permits the landlord of a commercial property to state a reasonable estimate of the amount of unpaid rent that is due and owing when, for example, the exact amount of rent is not readily ascertainable on the face of the lease. The three-day notice was attached as an exhibit to the complaint. The amount of rent due was not readily ascertainable because defendants were entitled to rent concessions in exchange for performing certain tenant improvements. Plaintiff plainly stated in the three-day notice that it demanded payment under a commercial lease in the sum of $52,000, which was estimated in good faith as the amount due for the period January 1, 2010 through June 30, 2010, pursuant to section 1161.1. The three-day notice identified the lease as commercial, and in paragraph 8.a.(5) of the complaint, plaintiff alleged the lease was commercial.
Defendants do not expressly address the commercial nature of the lease in their brief on appeal. The clerk's transcript does not include the answer to the complaint, and nothing in the record suggests defendants ever denied the lease was commercial. Defendants, on page nine of their brief on appeal, acknowledge that it "shields landlords from the harsh requirements of having to demand the 'precise sum due[,'] so long as the landlord's demand for rent stated in the three-day notice to pay or quit is 'reasonably estimated.'" The named tenant on the lease was 41, Inc., which all parties acknowledged to be a corporate entity that the Secretary of State had suspended from business. Since defendants have cited nothing in the record to suggest the lease was residential, and they do not argue the judgment is unsupported by substantial evidence that the lease was commercial, we assume for purposes of this opinion that substantial evidence demonstrated the lease was commercial.
The chief disputes at trial concerned whether the three-day notice stated a reasonable estimate or, instead, unreasonably overestimated the rent that was due, and whether defendants tendered to plaintiff an amount that defendants reasonably estimated to be due. We have gleaned this by briefly scanning the reporter's transcript of the trial, because defendants have not addressed the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment or provided citations to the record. Appellate briefs must provide a summary of the significant facts relevant to the appeal and citations to the record. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a).) "'The appellate court is not required to search the record on its own seeking error.' [Citation.] Thus, '[i]f a party fails to support an argument with the necessary citations to the record, . . . the argument [will be] deemed to have been waived. [Citation.]' [Citations.]" (Nwosu, at p. 1246.) We therefore assume the record contains substantial evidence to support the judgment awarding possession of the premises and unpaid rent to plaintiff.
Though they do not argue the judgment is unsupported by substantial evidence, defendants nonetheless contend reversal is required as a matter of law because the three-day notice demanded payment of $52,000. Defendants argue that, since the jury awarded only $30,500, the estimated amount of rent stated in the three-day notice was manifestly unreasonable. Defendants rely heavily on section 1161.1, subdivision (e), which establishes a presumption affecting the burden of proof that a three-day notice is reasonably estimated if the amount of rent claimed by the landlord was no more than 20 percent greater than the amount of unpaid rent determined to be due. Defendants' argument that the three-day notice was not reasonably estimated as a matter of law rests on the mathematical fact that $52,000 is more than 20 percent greater than $30,500.
The general verdict in favor of plaintiff belies defendants' contention. The questions of the reasonableness of plaintiff's estimated rent demand and the reasonableness of the rent that defendants tendered were submitted to the jury for decision, and the jury impliedly decided the estimated rent demand was reasonable. The trial court instructed the jury that plaintiff had to prove all the elements of its claim, including, specifically, "that under the lease or rental agreement, [plaintiff] 41, Inc. was required to pay rent for the commercial premises," that plaintiff gave a proper three-day notice, that "the amount stated in the three-day notice was a reasonable estimate of the total amount of rent owing," and that defendants did not pay the amount stated and still possessed the premises. Further, the trial court specifically instructed the jury: "A notice stating a reasonable estimate of the amount of rent due that is within 20 percent of the amount actually due is reasonable unless defendants prove that it was not reasonable." Defendant's counsel argued in closing that the estimated rent demanded in the three-day notice was not reasonable and overstated the amount due by more than 20 percent.
The jury returned a general verdict finding in favor of plaintiff and stating the amount of rent due was $30,500. "A general verdict is that by which [the jury] pronounce[s] generally upon all or any of the issues, either in favor of the plaintiff or defendant . . . ." (Code Civ. Proc., § 624.) A general verdict "implies a finding in favor of the prevailing party of every fact essential to the support" of the prevailing party's case. (Henderson v. Harnischfeger Corp. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 663, 673; 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Trial, § 341, p. 397.) An essential element of plaintiff's case was proof that plaintiff gave a proper three-day notice. The jury was instructed that a three-day notice reasonably estimates the amount of rent due if the amount stated is no more than 20 percent greater than the amount actually due, and defendants' counsel argued the estimated rent stated in the notice was not reasonable and overstated the amount due by more than 20 percent. In rendering a general verdict for plaintiff, the jury impliedly decided the notice reasonably stated the amount of rent due despite the fact the notice demanded payment of rent in an amount more than 20 percent greater than the jury awarded. Since the jury impliedly resolved the dispute over the claimed deficiency in the three-day notice in favor of plaintiff and against defendants, and defendants do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence or assert any other error in the trial proceedings, we affirm the judgment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
GRIMES, J.
WE CONCUR:
BIGELOW, P. J.
RUBIN, J.