Opinion
7:22-CV-204-FL
02-24-2023
KATHY JUANITA REAVES and FREDERICK L. MCCALLUM, Plaintiffs, v. MAXTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Robert B. Jones, Jr. United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the court on the pro se Plaintiffs' applications to proceed in forma pauperis, [DE-1, -2], and for frivolity review of the complaint, [DE-1-1, -2-1], pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiffs have demonstrated appropriate evidence of inability to pay the required court costs, and the applications to proceed in forma pauperis are allowed. However, it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed.
I. Standard of Review
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court shall dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks money damages from a defendant immune from such recovery. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii); see Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining Congress enacted predecessor statute 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) “to prevent abuse of the judicial system by parties who bear none of the ordinary financial disincentives to filing meritless claims”). A case is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Examples of frivolous claims include those whose factual allegations are ‘so nutty,' ‘delusional,' or ‘wholly fanciful' as to be simply ‘unbelievable.'”). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A claim lacks an arguable basis in fact when it describes “fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Id. at 327-28.
In order to state a claim on which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .'” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, the plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions. Id.
In the present case, Plaintiffs proceed pro se, and pleadings drafted by a pro se litigant are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). This court is charged with liberally construing a pleading filed by a pro se litigant to allow for the development of a potentially meritorious claim. See id.; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Noble v. Barnett, 24 F.3d 582, 587 n.6 (4th Cir. 1994). However, the principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not without limits; the district courts are not required “to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
II. Discussion
Plaintiffs are Kathy Reaves and Frederick McCallum, former employees of the Public Schools of Robeson County. On March 3, 2022, Reaves was in her classroom at R.B. Dean/Townsend Middle School when she was summoned to the principal's office. Reaves went to the office but declined the principal's invitation to enter, instead remaining in the doorway because she claimed the principal previously brushed up against her, resulting in a verbal altercation. A Maxton Police Department (“MPD”) officer was already in the principal's office, and another MPD officer approached Reaves at the door. Freddie Williamson, Superintendent of the Public Schools of Robeson County, who was also present, handed Reaves an envelope, informed her that she was being suspended from her teaching duties, and directed the MPD officer to escort Reaves from the premises. The MPD officer escorted Reaves to her classroom to retrieve her personal possessions and then to her vehicle. McCallum, a staff member at South Robeson Intermediate School, similarly alleges that on March 18, 2022, a janitor escorted him through the hallways of the school, to his vehicle, and off the premises. Plaintiffs allege the MPD, Public Schools of Robeson County, Robeson County Board of Education, Freddie Williamson, and the unnamed individual officers deprived Plaintiffs of their civil rights by committing false imprisonment in violation of the Fourth Amendment, violation of their right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, workplace harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and interference with contractual obligations, and by violating the Privacy Act of 1974 and provisions of the North Carolina Constitution. Plaintiffs seek entry of judgment in their favor and unspecified monetary damages. Compl. [DE-1-1, -2-1] at 1-19.
Taking the well-pleaded allegations as true and liberally construing the complaint, Plaintiffs have failed to state a federal claim and the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the purely state law claims.
1. Fourth Amendment/False Imprisonment
Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims based on false imprisonment are construed as claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which imposes liability on anyone who, under the color of state law, deprives a person “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” “False imprisonment consists of detention without legal process.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389 (2007).
In a similar case brought by Reaves, she attempted to amend her complaint to assert a Fourth Amendment false imprisonment claim based on the same allegations here-that members of the Maxton police department escorted her off the school premises, pursuant to a suspension from her role as teacher. See Reaves v. Williamson, No. 7:22-CV-2-FL, 2022 WL 17169605, at *2 (E.D. N.C. Nov. 22,2022). The court recognized that false imprisonment claims are cognizable under the Fourth Amendment, but concluded that Reaves failed to allege that she was ever legally “detained.” Id. at *5 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 543 (10th ed. 2014) (defining detention as “the act or instance of holding a person in custody; confinement or compulsory delay”). The court reasoned that “[a] temporary ban from school grounds does not qualify as detention; plaintiff retained freedom of movement everywhere except on school property,” and the court denied as futile Reaves' motion to add the claim. Id. at *5.
Here, Reaves alleges that she was “taken into custody by the Maxton Police Department, who stalked her down the hallway in front of Reaves['] students and co-workers, stalked Reaves to her classroom, stood at the door of her classroom while she gathered her things, and stalked her to her vehicle.” Compl. [DE-1-1, -2-1] at 8. McCallum similarly alleges that he “was stalked throughout his place of employment and taken into custody, to wit, false imprisonment through the hallways of South Robeson Intermediate School and to his vehicle and off the premises.” Id. at 9. The factual allegations do not support that Reaves and McCallum were taken into custody or detained in any way; rather, they were escorted off school property, which the court previously found did not amount to a detention. Reaves, 2022 WL 17169605, at *5; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (labels and conclusions are insufficient to state a claim). Plaintiffs' related claims for municipal and supervisory liability and conspiracy, Compl. [DE-1-1, -2-1] at 16-18, also fail because the underlying false imprisonment claim fails. Accordingly, it is recommended that Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims for false imprisonment and related claims for municipal and supervisory liability and conspiracy be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
2. Title VII
Title VII prohibits an employer from “discharg[ing] any individual, or otherwise . . . discimin[ating] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ... .” 42 U.S.C.A § 2000e-2(a).
Reaves alleges Defendants violated Title VII by subjecting her to workplace harassment by involving the MPD in the March 3, 2022 incident. Compl. [DE-1-1] at 13. Reaves has failed to plausibly allege that she was discriminated against because of her race, sex, or other protected characteristic in violation of Title VII. Allegations of “general harassment” are insufficient to state a Title VII claim. See Cooper v. Edgewood Mgmt. Corp., No. GJH-19-1334, 2021 WL 915129, at *3 (D. Md. Mar. 10, 2021) (dismissing Title VII harassment claim where plaintiffs alleged harassment was not based on sex or membership in a protected class because “courts are not in a position to adjudicate or remedy general harassment or hostility in the workplace that is not based on a protected characteristic.”). To the extent McCallum attempts to assert a Title VII claim, he has likewise alleged no facts from which the court could conclude that he was discriminated against on the basis of a protected characteristic. Compl. [DE-2-1]. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Title VII claims be dismissed.
3. Privacy Act of 1974
The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, “provides that, under certain circumstances, an individual harmed by an agency's violation of provisions of the Act, may maintain a civil action for damages in federal district court against the agency.” Haywoodv. Owens, No. 8:19-CV-01025-JFA-JDA, 2019 WL 2292548, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 23, 2019) (citations omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 2284931 (D.S.C. May 29, 2019). “The Privacy Act contains only two substantive sections, Section 3, which applies only to federal agencies, and Section 7, which applies to federal, state, and local agencies.” Id. (citations omitted).
Reaves alleges that Defendants violated the Privacy Act because the MPD knew about her the disciplinary action against her before she did, and she did not authorize the disclosure of her protected information. Compl. [DE-1-1] at 14. McCallum alleges that Defendants violated the Privacy Act by involving a janitor in his disciplinary action. Compl. [DE-2-1] at 15.
Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under Section 3, which “provides a comprehensive remedial scheme for violations of the Privacy Act by federal agencies,” because there are no federal agencies alleged to have violated Plaintiffs' rights under the act. Haywood, 2019 WL 2292548, at *2 (citing Tankersley v. Almand, 837 F.3d 390, 407 (4th Cir. 2016)). Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under Section 7, which “makes it illegal for a governmental agency to deny an individual any right, benefit, or privilege based on the individual's refusal to disclose his or her [social security number],” because the claims do not involve disclosure of their social security numbers. Id. at *3 (citations omitted). Accordingly, it is recommended that Plaintiffs' Privacy Act claims be dismissed.
4. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
To state a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must allege “(1) a cognizable liberty or property interest; (2) the deprivation of that interest by some form of state action; and (3) that the procedures employed were constitutionally inadequate.” Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Patterson, 566 F.3d 138, 145 (4th Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court in Zinermon v. Burch, explained the relevance of state remedies to a § 1983 claim for violation of procedural due process:
A § 1983 action may be brought for a violation of procedural due process, but here the existence of state remedies is relevant in a special sense. In procedural due process claims, the deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected interest in “life, liberty, or property” is not in itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due process of law. Parratt, 451 U.S., at 537, 101 S.Ct., at 1913; Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1050, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (“Procedural due process rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property”). The constitutional violation actionable under § 1983 is not complete when the deprivation occurs; it is not complete unless and until the State fails to provide due process. Therefore, to determine whether a constitutional violation has occurred, it is necessary to ask what process the State provided, and whether it was constitutionally adequate. This inquiry would examine the procedural safeguards built into the statutory or administrative procedure of effecting the deprivation, and any remedies for erroneous deprivations provided by statute or tort law.494 U.S. 113, 125-26(1990).
Reaves alleges the disciplinary acts against her violated her Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights, construed as a § 1983 claim, because she was not placed on administrative leave, not given any disciplinary action in her personnel folder, and she could have appealed and been granted a stay to continue working. Compl. [DE-1-1] at 8. There are no allegations that McCallum's due process rights were violated that are not dependent on the false imprisonment claim. Compl. [DE-2-1].
Assuming Reaves had a property interest in her employment, she has not plausibly alleged that the disciplinary action against her constituted a procedural due process violation. Under North Carolina law, the superintendent may, under certain circumstances, suspend a teacher with pay for a reasonable period of time, not to exceed ninety days. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-325.5(c). If the superintendent does not initiate dismissal or demotion proceedings against the teacher within the ninety-day period, the teacher must be reinstated immediately. Id. There are notice and hearing procedures regarding the dismissal or demotion of a teacher for cause set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-325.6.
Reaves has filed multiple actions in this court regarding her suspension, and the court takes judicial notice of the fact that she was suspended with pay for ninety days. See Reaves v. Pub. Sch. of Robeson Cnty., No. 7:22-CV-39-FL, 2022 WL 18492009, at *2 (E.D. N.C. Sept. 9, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 443805 (E.D. N.C. Jan. 26,2023). Plaintiff alleges that at the time of her suspension she was not placed on administrative leave, not given any disciplinary action in her personnel folder, and she could have appealed and been granted a stay to continue working, Compl. [DE-1-1] at 8, but she has not alleged that she was deprived of any process due her under North Carolina's statutory scheme. See Gilreath v. Cumberland Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 253 N.C.App. 238, 798 S.E.2d 438 (2017) (dismissing a teacher's federal procedural due process claim and finding “[t]he statutory scheme set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-325 provided Plaintiff with all of the procedural due process to which he was constitutionally entitled,” and the plaintiff failed to take advantage of the process afforded to him). Accordingly, it is recommended that the due process claim be dismissed.
5. State Law Claims
Plaintiffs' remaining claims are state law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and interference with contractual obligations, and violations of the North Carolina Constitution. Compl. [DE-1-1, 2-1] at 18-19; see Parks v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, No. 5:13-CV-74-BR, 2014 WL 32064, at *5 (E.D. N.C. Jan. 6, 2014) (concluding plaintiffs claim for tortious interference with contractual or prospective business relations was an intentional tort) (citing Blue Ridge Pub. Safety, Inc. v. Ashe, 712 F.Supp.2d 440,447-48 (W.D. N.C. 2010) (under North Carolina law, tortious interference with contract and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage are intentional torts); Charles E. Daye & Mark W. Morris, North Carolina Law of Torts §§ 14.10-14.60 (2d ed. 1999); Taylor v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 5:19-CV-101-FL, 2021 WL 5985122, at *5 (E.D. N.C. Dec. 16,2021) (recognizing intentional infliction of emotional distress is a state law claim)). The court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over these state law claims where Plaintiffs have failed to state a federal claim and there is no diversity of jurisdiction.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, a court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” See Chesapeake Ranch Water Co. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Calvert Cnty, 401 F.3d 274, 277 (4th Cir. 2005) (having dismissed federal claims, district court properly declined supplemental jurisdiction of state claims); Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that under § 1367(c), the district courts “enjoy wide latitude in determining whether or not to retain [supplemental] jurisdiction over state claims when all federal claims have been extinguished”) (citing Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). As discussed above, Plaintiffs have failed to state a federal claim. Furthermore, because McCallum is a resident of North Carolina and Defendants are residents of North Carolina, Compl. [DE-2-1] at 4-5, the court cannot exercise diversity jurisdiction over the state law claims. See Allen v. City of Raleigh Police Dep't, No. 5:22-CV-82-M, 2022 WL 2443473, at *3 (E.D. N.C. Apr. 20, 2022) (finding no diversity jurisdiction with respect to state law claims because “[c]omplete diversity among the parties is required, which means that no defendant can have the same citizenship as any plaintiff”) (citing Wisconsin Dep't of Corrs, v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998); Hawkins v. i-TV Digitalis Tavkozlesi zrt., 935 F.3d 211,222 (4th Cir. 2019)). Accordingly, it is recommended that the court decline to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs' applications to proceed in forma pauperis are allowed, and it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS DIRECTED that a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation be served on Plaintiff. You shall have until March 10,2023 to file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation. The presiding district judge must conduct his or her own review (that is, make a de novo determination) of those portions of the Memorandum and Recommendation to which objection is properly made and may accept, reject, or modify the determinations in the Memorandum and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See, e.g, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); Local Civ. R. 1.1 (permitting modification of deadlines specified in local rules), 72.4(b), E.D. N.C.
If you do not file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation by the foregoing deadline, you will be giving up the right to review of the Memorandum and Recommendation by the presiding district judge as described above, and the presiding district judge may enter an order or judgment based on the Memorandum and Recommendation without such review. In addition, your failure to file written objections by the foregoing deadline will bar you from appealing to the Court of Appeals from an order or judgment of the presiding district judge based on the Memorandum and Recommendation. See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985).