Opinion
C. A. 4:23-5130-TLW-TER
10-25-2023
Kathy Reaves, Plaintiff, v. Patrick Lewis Huff; Lisa Arlene Thomas; Jerome Scott Kozacki; Samuel Buddy Arthur, III; County of Marlboro, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Thomas E. Rogers, III, United States Magistrate Judge
As a matter of procedural history, in Plaintiff's other pending action No. 4:23-cv-3847-TLW-TER, a narrowly drawn pre-filing injunction was recommended, but it is not yet applicable to this action.
This is the twentieth civil action filed in the recent past by Plaintiff, a pro se litigant, proceeding in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and District of South Carolina Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in such pro se cases and to submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of Plaintiff's pro se complaint filed in this case. This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Such pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Id.; Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Even under this less stringent standard, however, the pro se complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a complaint to include claims that were never presented, construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for her, or conjure up questions never squarely presented to the court. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985); Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1993); Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 1999). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir.1990) (The "special judicial solicitude" with which a [court] should view such pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate.).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff has a pending action, No. 4:22-cv-318-TLW-TER, which was authorized for service in part, and Plaintiff has several recently dismissed actions in this court; some of which involve some of the factual allegations in the instant action. All of Plaintiff's actions are subject to review for potential summary dismissal as Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. The court reviews Plaintiff's complaints under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which directs the court to summarily dismiss a complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, as well as when monetary relief is sought from a defendant immune from such relief.
Plaintiff sues Defendant Huff who Plaintiff alleges is the attorney for defendant Dickens. (ECF No. 1 at 2). Defendant Huff is not the attorney for defendant Dickens(not a defendant in this case but a defendant in pending case No. 4:22-cv-318-TLW-TER) in federal court actions, but Huff instead appears to be the attorney in a state court case in Marlboro County. Plaintiff refers to No. 4:22-cv-639-TLW and cites allegations regarding legal filings in that case. (ECF No. 1 at 2).
Plaintiff sues Defendant Thomas, who is an attorney for defendant Dickens in No. 4:22-cv-318-TLW-TER and No. 4:22-cv-639-TLW and for other entities in other actions. (ECF No. 1 at 3). Plaintiff refers to No. 4:22-cv-639-TLW and makes allegations regarding legal filings in that case. (ECF No. 1 at 3).
Plaintiff sues Defendant Kozacki, who is an attorney for defendant SLED in No. 4:22-cv-318-TLW-TER and in No. 4:22-cv-639-TLW and other entities in other actions. (ECF No. 1 at 3). Plaintiff refers to No. 4:22-cv-639-TLW and makes allegations regarding legal filings in that case. (ECF No. 1 at 3). Plaintiff asserts Defendant Kozacki won a summary judgment for Kozacki's client. (ECF No. 1 at 3). Plaintiff has attempted to pursue Defendant Kozacki in his capacity as defendants' attorney before in Nos. 4:22-cv-1024-TLW-TER and 4:22-cv-1142-TLW-TER, which were summarily dismissed as frivolous.
Plaintiff sues Defendant Arthur, who is an attorney for Defendant Marlboro County in No. 4:22-cv-318-TLW-TER and in No. 4:22-cv-639-TLW and other entities in other actions. (ECF No. 1 at 3). Plaintiff refers to No. 4:22-cv-639-TLW and makes allegations regarding legal filings in that case. (ECF No. 1 at 3-4).
Plaintiff sues Marlboro County as a Defendant alleging it is responsible for enforcing the rules of the county and ensuring employees obey the law. (ECF No. 1 at 1-2). Later, Plaintiff alleges the employees who committed improper actions are judges and clerks and Plaintiff asserts the county is responsible for those judges' and clerks' actions. (ECF No. 1 at 20).
Plaintiff alleges jurisdiction is under federal question jurisdiction due to violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. (ECF No. 1 at 4).
Plaintiff asserts the claims in the instant action arise from recent 2023 state court orders. (ECF No. 1 at 6). Plaintiff asserts the state court orders are what is unconstitutional. (ECF No. 1 at 7).
Plaintiff asserts Defendant attorneys filed a notice of removal of state court action No. 22-CP-34-00034, and it became No. 4:22-cv-639-TLW in federal court. (ECF No. 1 at 7). No motion to remand was filed in No. 4:22-cv-639-TLW, the case proceeded in this court. The ultimate resolution of No. 4:22-cv-639-TLW was in February 2023; the court dismissed the federal claims but declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of Plaintiff's remaining state law claims against Defendant SCDMV and those particular claims were remanded to the state court. Then, in state court, SCDMV filed a motion for summary judgment in March 2023 and a plethora of docket entries followed from all parties. Plaintiff attempted to file an Amended Complaint and served all the parties whom she now asserts were no longer defendants due to the federal court's prior ruling. Those parties then filed motions. In May 2023, Plaintiff told the court she did not wish to pursue her claims any more and the action was dismissed with prejudice in its entirety. A few weeks later, Plaintiff changed her mind and filed a motion to vacate in state court. A hearing was held in state court on Plaintiff's motion to reconsider the June order and the state court held on October 9, 2023, that the order of dismissal should not be vacated. Based on Plaintiff's allegations, Plaintiff appears to be filing the instant action in federal court in reaction to the dismissal in state court. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff alleges she has filed appeals. (ECF No. 1 at 15).
See generally, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/marlboro/publicindex/(with search parameters limited by Plaintiff's name). The court may take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government websites. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation, No. 05-4182, 2008 WL 4185869 at * 2 (E.D. La. Sept. 8, 2008) (noting that courts may take judicial notice of governmental websites including other courts' records); Williams v. Long, No. 07-3459-PWG, 2008 WL 4848362 at *7 (D. Md. Nov. 7, 2008) (noting that some courts have found postings on government websites as inherently authentic or self-authenticating).
Plaintiff alleges her damages are a violation of court orders, her rights, distress, frustration, extreme inconvenience and severe economic loss. (ECF No. 1 at 16).
Plaintiff alleges Defendants in the instant action participated in the issuance of state court orders when they should not have been allowed to participate because they were already dismissed from the lawsuit in federal court. (ECF No. 1 at 8). In the instant action, Plaintiff references her dissatisfaction in the results and rulings in pending No. 4:22-cv-318-TLW. (ECF No. 1 at 11-14).
A complaint is frivolous when it is clearly baseless. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327-28 (1989)).When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, § 1915 “gives courts the authority to ‘pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations[,]' mean[ing] that a court is not bound, as it usually is when making a determination based solely on the pleadings, to accept without question the truth of the plaintiff's allegations.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32. The district court is entrusted with the discretion to dismiss the case for factual frivolousness “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.” Id. at 33.
Simply, all the attorney defendants are not state actors and not subject to a § 1983 action for alleged constitutional violations. An attorney, whether retained, court appointed, or a public defender does not act under color of state law or federal law, which is a jurisdictional prerequisite for any civil action brought under 42. U.S.C. § 1983. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-24 nn. 8-16 (1981) (public defender); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 53 (1992) (public defender); Hall v. Quillen, 631 F.2d 1154, 1155-56 nn. 2-3 (4th Cir.1980) (court-appointed attorney); Deas v. Potts, 547 F.2d 800 (4th Cir.1976) (per curiam) (private attorney). Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim upon which relief can be granted against these attorney defendants.
Plaintiff argues that her claims against Marlboro County are due to its municipal and supervisory liability over court clerk employees and judges. (ECF No. 1 at 20). Plaintiff's allegations of the County's liability is based on allegations of liability as to judges and quasi-judicial employees. No supervisory liability can originate where there is no underlying liability. Judicial immunity is a threshold question which requires summary dismissal. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). The doctrine of absolute immunity for acts taken by a judge in connection with his or her judicial authority and responsibility is well established and widely recognized. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991) (judges are immune from civil suit for actions taken in their judicial capacity, unless “taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction”); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978) (“A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.”); Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir.1987) (a suit by South Carolina inmate against two Virginia magistrates); Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir.1985) (“It has long been settled that a judge is absolutely immune from a claim for damages arising out of his judicial actions.”).
Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim as to all defendants.
Further, Plaintiff repeatedly references other cases. To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to contest what happened in 2023 in her state court case after receiving closure of that case recently, Plaintiff is barred from contesting that judgment in this court. To the extent Plaintiff's allegations involve claims already pursued in state court, and Plaintiff is attempting to challenge final judgments in prior state court proceedings, the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine bars them. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Such state court ruling cannot be reviewed or set aside and such relief cannot be granted by the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. See Rooker, 263 U.S. 413; Feldman, 460 U.S. 462. This prohibition on review of state court proceedings by federal district courts is implicated when a ruling in the plaintiff's favor on his claims in connection with state court proceedings would, necessarily, require the federal court to overrule (or otherwise find invalid) various orders and rulings made in the state court. Such a result is prohibited under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. See Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293-94 (2005); Davani v. Va. Dep't of Transport., 434 F.3d 712, 719-20 (4th Cir.2006). Because the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine is jurisdictional, it may be raised by the court sua sponte. American Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003). According to the Fourth Circuit, “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies . . . when the loser in state court files suit in federal district court seeking redress for an injury allegedly caused by the state court's decision itself.” Davani v. Va. Dep't of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 713 (4th Cir. 2006).
Further issues are addressed as a matter of thoroughness but are not required to find this action wholly subject to summary dismissal.
Plaintiff alleges her third claim is conspiracy and that attorney defendants and the county issued unconstitutional orders “to attempt to cover up the false arrest and false imprisonment.” (ECF No. 1 at 24). Attorney Defendants are not state actors subject to any conspiracy allegations under § 1983. As to the County, to the extent Plaintiff attempts to allege a conspiracy claim, Plaintiff makes conclusory allegations. “To establish a civil conspiracy under § 1983, [the plaintiff] must present evidence that the [defendants] acted jointly in concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy which resulted in [his] deprivation of a constitutional right.” Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, W.Va., 81 F.3d 416, 421 (4th Cir.1996). There must be a showing that the defendants entered into some sort of an agreement to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right. Id.; see also Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1377 (4th Cir.1995) (noting that a conspiracy claimant “must show an agreement or a ‘meeting of the minds' by defendants to violate the claimant's constitutional rights”). Courts have held plaintiffs to a relatively stringent standard in assessing whether a conspiracy claim has been properly alleged. See Gooden v. Howard County, 954 F.2d 960, 969-70 (4th Cir.1992). Plaintiff's complaint has failed to allege a cognizable federal conspiracy claim under § 1983 upon which relief could be granted.
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in this court. This is not the first occasion Plaintiff has sued attorneys who represent defendants in other cases. See No. 4:22-cv-1024-TLW-TER; No. 4:22-cv-1142-TLW-TER. A pre-filing injunction that would have been relevant to the disposition of this action has already been recommended in No. 4:23-3847-TLW-TER; Plaintiff's filing of the instant action further supports that prior recommendation. Plaintiff continues to file repetitious and duplicative actions surrounding allegations of an alleged Georgia warrant and her South Carolina arrest and the resulting multiple related cases. Plaintiff alleges here: “these defendants moved the case from state court to federal court so that they could pin the blame for the arrest of Reaves in South Carolina on the issuance of a warrant in Georgia.” (ECF No. 1 at 7). Plaintiff alleges her due process claim arises from these attorney defendants' conduct “to try to suppress Reaves rights to file state claims against their clients under false arrest and false imprisonment of the events surrounding the November 19, 2021 incident.” (ECF No. 1 at 16). Plaintiff alleges the attorney defendants' conduct are continued harassment of her and impeding her ability to enjoy a normal life. (ECF No. 1 at 20). Plaintiff has been repeatedly instructed through multiple summary dismissals that duplicative claims are frivolous and violative of the rule against claim splitting. A “complaint that merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims may be considered abusive, and a court may look to its own records to determine whether a pleading repeats prior claims.” Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F.Supp. 458, 460 (E.D. N.C. 1987) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “Federal courts have a responsibility to assess the nature of the allegations presented in a civil action and determine whether the plaintiff's motive is to harass and vex the defendants or to seek redress for a legitimate claim.” Johnson v. Edlow, 37 F.Supp.2d 775, 776 (E.D. Va. 1999). When claims arose out of the same facts as the facts in an earlier-filed action, this court dismissed such a complaint where issues raised were directly related to issues in a pending action brought by the same Plaintiff. Davis v. Colleton Cty. Mem'l Libr., No. 2:17-CV-2948-PMD-MGB, 2018 WL 2170338, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 12, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 2149309 (D.S.C. May 10, 2018), dismissed, 2018 WL 6333601 (4th Cir. July 23, 2018); see also, e.g., Reynolds v. Third Circuit Pub. Def. Office, No. 4:17-cv-3469-BHH-MGB, 2018 WL 1322102, *5 (D.S.C. Feb. 6, 2018), adopted by 2018 WL 1124592 (D.S.C. Mar. 1, 2018). “[R]epetitious litigation of virtually identical causes of action may be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 as frivolous.” Paul v. de Holczer, Case No. 3:15-2178-CMC-PJG, 2015 WL 4545974 (D.S.C. July 28, 2015) (holding that “the instant Complaint should be summarily dismissed as a frivolous duplicate filing in the interest of judicial economy and efficiency”), affirmed by 631 Fed.Appx. 197 (4th Cir. Feb. 4, 2016); Cox v. Cartledge, No. 3:13-481-TMC, 2013 WL 1401684 (D.S.C. March 13, 2013), adopted by 2013 WL 1401674 (D.S.C. April 8, 2013) (same); Sherron v. Perry, 2016 WL 407303, *2 (W.D. N.C. February 2, 2016) (same). “Because district courts are not required to entertain duplicative lawsuits, they may dismiss such suits as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e).” Cottle v. Bell, 229 F.3d 1142, 2000 WL 1144623, *1 (4th Cir. Aug.14, 2000) (per curiam). As to much of Plaintiff's numerous actions concerning a Georgia warrant and South Carolina arrest, the Fourth Circuit states the rule against claim splitting “prohibits a plaintiff from prosecuting its case piecemeal and requires that all claims arising out of a single wrong be presented in one action.” Lee v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 802 F.3d 626, 635 (4th Cir. 2015)(quoting Sensormatic Sec. Corp. v. Sensormatic Elecs. Corp., 273 Fed.Appx. 256, 265 (4th Cir.2008))(emphasis added). The rule against claim splitting is a corollary to the principle of res judicata. Id. at 635. It is undisputed that it is within a district court's power dismiss a suit that is duplicative of another federal court suit. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and this action is subject to summary dismissal in its entirety.
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that the District Court dismiss the Complaint in this case pursuant to § 1915(e) with prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
See Michau v. Charleston Cty., 434 F.3d 725, 728 (4th Cir. 2006) (affirming the district court's dismissal of two complaints pursuant to § 1915, even though the plaintiff was not a prisoner, because the plaintiff was proceeding in forma pauperis).
The undersigned finds that, in light of all of the foregoing, Plaintiff cannot cure the deficiencies in her Complaint and that allowing Plaintiff to amend her pleadings therefore would be futile. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the District Court decline to give Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. See Workman v. Kernell, No. 6:18-cv-00355-RBH-KFM, 2018 WL 4826535, at *2 n.7 (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2018); Young v. Santos, No. GLR-16-cv-1321, 2018 WL 1583557, at *6 (D. Md. Apr. 2, 2018); McSwain v. Jobs, No. 1:13-cv-00890, 2014 WL 12672619, at *1 (M.D. N.C. Jan. 6, 2014); see also Boyd v. South Carolina, No. 7:19-CV-00867-BHH-JDA, 2019 WL 2061495 (D.S.C. Mar. 28, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 2057961 (D.S.C. May 9, 2019), aff'd, 773 Fed.Appx. 678 (4th Cir. 2019).
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).